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ABSTRACT
BECOMING A GOOD NEIGHBOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE CASE OF CHINA’S 
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, 1989 - 2006.
Dirk Richard Morton 
Old Dominion University, 2007 
Director: Dr. Jie Chen
Since the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between China and the 
ASEAN states following the end of the Cold War, Sino-ASEAN relations have widened 
and deepened considerably. This is surprising, considering that most ASEAN states 
viewed China as a revisionist power and threat to regional security during the Cold War 
and Vietnam and the Philippines have a history of armed conflict with China over as-of- 
yet unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Given the withdrawal of 
American military forces from the Philippines in 1992 and the steady growth of Chinese 
economic and military power, one might expect ASEAN’s traditionally-held threat per­
ceptions of China to continue or even increase. This, however, is not the case as China 
is viewed increasingly in Southeast Asia as a cooperative, responsible “good neighbor” 
and Sino-ASEAN relations continue to deepen. This study argues that a reorientation of 
Chinese regional foreign policy is the principal force responsible for these surprising turn 
of events, and that ideational factors supervened structural factors in inducing this reori­
entation. Through a historical analysis within a social constructivist theoretical frame­
work of arguably the most contentious issue in Sino-ASEAN relations, this study con­
cludes that China’s cognitive base was changed as a result of “complex” social learning 
induced by increased diplomatic interaction with ASEAN which, in turn, led to Beijing’s 
successful “good neighbor” diplomacy and the subsequent emergence of China’s new 
“post-Cold War” identity in Southeast Asia and beyond.
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Chinese foreign policy has undergone considerable change since the end of the 
Cold War, especially so in Southeast Asia. This transition in Beijing’s approach to rela­
tions with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)1 and member states is 
responsible, to a large degree, for the rapid improvement and deepening of the relation­
ship that began during the mid-to-late 1990s, and continues today. As of 2006, China’s 
relations with ASEAN and member states have never been better. Trade and economic 
relations between China and the Southeast Asian countries have increased greatly, and 
will continue to do so in light of the agreement reached in 2001 to establish a China- 
ASEAN Free Trade Area, in effect merging the economies of China and the ASEAN 
states to create a huge trading block in Asia estimated to have a combined population of 
two billion and collective GDP of $3 trillion by 2010.2 Some analysts of Chinese foreign 
policy argue that current friendly relations between China and the ASEAN states are the 
result of a change in China’s approach to Sino-ASEAN relations initiated during the mid- 
1990s. Various labels are used to describe this innovative approach, such as China’s 
“smiling diplomacy,” ’’charm offensive ”or “ good neighbor” diplomacy (GND). What­
This dissertation follows the format requirements of The Chicago Manual o f Style, 15 th edition.
1 ASEAN is comprised of ten member states: Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; Indonesia; Laos; Malaysia; 
Myanmar; the Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; and Vietnam.
2 John McBeth, “Taking the Helm,” Far Eastern Economic Review 16 (October 2003).
3 See Andrew J. Nathan, “China's Goals in the Taiwan Strait,” China Journal 36 (July 1996): 87-93; An­
drew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997); Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Asia’s China De­
bate: A Special Assessment (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2003); and David Sham- 
baugh, "China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 
2004/05): 64-99, respectively.
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ever the label, Beijing’s diplomatic approach dining the last decade in the region is predi­
cated on reassuring the ASEAN states that China’s rise need not be feared — that no 
“China threat” exists. Beijing would rather have the ASEAN states view the rise of 
China as an opportunity for mutual economic benefit as well as the development of a 
stronger regional Asian position vis-a-vis the United States.
Considerable evidence exists that Beijing’s GND has already succeeded in lessen­
ing perceptions in Southeast Asia of a China “threat.” Witness the PRC’s actions during 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, when Beijing made repeated assurances that China would 
not devalue the renminbi to maintain the competitiveness of its exports. Even as China’s 
economy slowed the following year, Beijing reiterated its pledge against devaluing 
China’s currency and gained important recognition for doing so from the international 
community.4 Even after the crisis had passed, Beijing continued to resist revaluation of 
the renminbi as late as 2003, when Chinese premier Wen Jiabao pointed out to the inter­
national community that “[T]he Chinese government has always held a serious and re­
sponsible attitude towards the [currency] issue,” and that China’s actions had “contrib­
uted to the stability of the economy and financial well being of the region and the 
world.”5 Since then, China and the ASEAN states deepened their economic interdepend­
ence through the implementation of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) in 
2005. Improvement in other areas of PRC-ASEAN relations, such as increases in aca­
demic and professional exchanges, bi-directional tourism, and the growth of cultural
4 Both British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Chirac praised Beijing’s responsible behav­
ior during the Asian financial crisis, describing the PRC as “a pillar of stability and responsible behavior.” 
See “Blair Looks to Profit in Beijing,” South China Morning Post, 6 October 1998.
5 “Stable RMB Exchange Rate Benefits World Economy: Premier Wen,” People's Daily Online, 7 August 
2003 (accessed 15 June 2006).
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exchange programs can also be observed as further evidence that Beijing’s GND has im­
proved China’s national image in Southeast Asia.
This turn of events in Southeast Asia is surprising for several reasons. First, 
China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries during the Cold War were, for the most 
part, antagonistic and confrontational. As elaborated in the following chapter, China has 
historically been perceived in Southeast Asia as a threat. In fact, ASEAN was established 
in 1967 partly to oppose the expansion of Chinese power. Second, as discussed in the 
following two chapters, just a decade ago China’s territorial disputes in the South China 
Sea with several Southeast Asian states (Figure 1) were moving the region closer to con­
flict.6 Aggressive actions and provocative statements by Beijing during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s in support of China’s claim of “inviolable” territorial sovereignty over 
the Paracel and Spratly Islands and most of the South China Sea, for that matter 
(Figure 2), reinforced and increased perceptions in Southeast Asia of a “China threat.” 
Third, China’s military modernization initiated during the 1980s (especially in areas re­
lated to power projection capabilities) increased concerns in the region and beyond that a 
rising China would have a destabilizing influence in Asia. China’s military moderniza­
tion campaign continued unabatedly through the 1990s, and presently shows no sign of 
slowing its pace. The “China threat” thesis, especially as expounded by the second Bush
6 China has territorial disputes with Vietnam over the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes, with the Philip­
pines over the Spratlys and adjacent areas, with Malaysia and Brunei in the Spratlys, and with Indonesia 
near the Pratas Islands. While these disputes have engendered much tension between China and the 
ASEAN states, armed conflict has been limited to China’s disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines. As 
such, Hanoi and Manila historically viewed themselves as “frontline” states facing Chinese expansion into 
the region.




















Figure 1. Conflicting Territorial Claims in the South China Sea.
Source: The Palgrave Concise Historical Atlas o f South East Asia 
(St. Martin’s Press, 2006).
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Administration, appeared therefore to be confirmed by Beijing’s aggressive attitude and 
brash actions regarding the South China Sea disputes. From the vantage point of South­
east Asia then, the American military withdrawal from the Philippines in 1992 combined 
with the PRC’s military modernization and truculent attitude vis-a-vis the territorial dis­
putes in the South China Sea reinforced historic perceptions of a China threat.
Given these conditions and perceptions, mainstream realist theory suggests that 
the smaller and weaker ASEAN states — especially those contesting Beijing’s territorial 
claims in the South China Sea such as Vietnam and the Philippines — should view China 
as a rising threat. Realism predicts that states either join with or balance against rising 
powers or threats. As such, the ASEAN states should be expected to either balance 
against rising Chinese power through defensive alliances with other states (the United 
States being the most likely balancer) or bandwagon with the rising regional power. Yet 
the ASEAN states have chosen neither strategy, suggesting that their approach in dealing 
with the rise of China is not founded solely upon power or threat considerations. In spite 
of the China threat thesis and its regional manifestation in the form of the South China 
Sea disputes, Sino-ASEAN relations since the mid-to-late 1990s have improved to the 
point that both sides now discuss the establishment of a “security community” to com­
plement the economic integration already underway.
While the above evidence supports the assertion that Beijing’s GND has im­
proved Sino-ASEAN relations by promoting an image of China as a “friend” and a “good 
neighbor,” some may question whether this test of the GND thesis is indeed rigorous
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enough. This study therefore seeks answers to several important questions concerning 
China’s GND in Southeast Asia. First, what are the underlying motivations behind 
China’s GND in the region, and to what extent has social learning resulting from diplo­
matic interaction with the ASEAN states impacted Beijing’s evolving application of 
China’s good neighbor diplomacy? Second, how successful has Beijing’s approach to 
relations with the ASEAN states been in mitigating regional fears of a “China threat” and 
in improving Sino-ASEAN relations? And lastly, can Beijing’s GND find relevance and 
utility in China’s relations with other regional powers such as Japan, India, and Australia 
— as well as with Beijing’s strained but vitally important relationship with the United 
States? To answer these questions, a historical approach within a social constructivist 
theoretical framework is undertaken to (1) identify and explain the causes of change in 
China’s foreign policy in Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War by examining the 
case of China’s policy toward the South China Sea disputes with the Philippines, Viet­
nam, and with ASEAN as a group; and (2) study the effects of such change on Sino- 
ASEAN relations by examining the change in Southeast Asian perceptions of China as a 
regional and global power.
As discussed in greater detail below and in subsequent chapters, realist theory 
falls short in explaining this turn of events in Sino-ASEAN relations because of its my­
opic focus on material power distribution and associated threat perceptions, while at the 
same time liberal institutionalist theory also misses the mark because its focus on the 
constraining effects of institutions on actor behavior is undertaken within the same nar­
row conception of anarchy utilized by realism. In addition, both schools of thought fall
71 define Beijing’s GND as a foreign policy strategy premised upon portraying China as a cooperative, 
responsible, and friendly “good neighbor” in Southeast Asia aimed at dismissing the “China threat” thesis 
and improving Sino-ASEAN relations.
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short in their analyses of recent Sino-ASEAN relations because they do not allow actor 
identity and interests to be endogenously given. Therefore, in order to fully understand 
and appreciate the recent and remarkable about-face in Sino-ASEAN relations, a different 
theoretical model is needed. Because the “China threat” debate associated with the rise 
of Chinese economic and military power is intimately related to this study’s analytical 
approach, a brief review of the relevant literature follows.
CURRENT DEBATE ON CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY
Considerable theoretical debate has taken place concerning the implications of 
China’s rapidly increasing economic and military power on the international system, and 
the debate continues. As discussed below, realism believes that China’s rise to great 
power status in Asia represents a growing threat to the US-led international order, while 
liberal institutionalism believes that the rise of China can occur less dramatically as 
China becomes “socialized” through its participation in international institutions and re­
gimes and is transformed into a status quo power. A third approach which focuses on the 
social construction of identity and interest and its effect on state behavior challenges 
some basic assumptions made by mainstream IR theory. The constructivist approach, 
unlike realism and liberal institutionalism, does not assume that actor identity and inter­
ests are exogenously given. Instead, actor identity and interest formation is viewed as an 
ongoing endogenous process in which identity and interests can change through social 
interaction at the international level. Constructivism makes another point of departure 
from mainstream IR theory in that it rejects the narrow, self-help definition of anarchy 
shared by the realist and liberal schools.
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China as a Rising Threat
Proponents of the “China threat” thesis believe that China is rapidly becoming a 
threat to the stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region, if not the world. They sup­
port their predictions by citing the spectacular rise in the PRC’s economic strength which 
allows Beijing substantial leverage in the global economy, and by pointing to Chinese 
efforts at modernizing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and seeking power projection 
capabilities in Asia. One of the most widely known works in Realist literature represent­
ing the “China threat” school is Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Monroe’s book, The 
Coming Conflict with China. The authors contend that the leadership in China has been 
working towards a goal of domination over Asia by a four-pronged strategy based on ac­
quiring sovereignty over Taiwan, expanding Chinese power projection capabilities and 
military presence in the South China Sea, seeking a reduction in American military pres­
ence in East Asia (excepting Japan), and tolerating a high American military presence to
o
prevent Tokyo from rearming and becoming more assertive in Asian affairs. While 
Bernstein and Monroe’s rather pessimistic analysis of the strategic implications of 
China’s rise is quite foreboding, other analyses are even more dubious of Chinese inten­
tions and conclude that Chinese foreign policy represents some sort of sinister plot for 
world domination.9 These and other analyses that posit a growing China threat are theo­
8 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Monroe, The Coming Conflict with China (Vintage: Reprint edition,
1998).
Q
Examples of these rather Manichean points of view are Constantine C. Menges, China: The Gathering 
Threat (Nelson Current, 2005), and Arthur Waldron, “Why China Could be Dangerous,” American Enter­
prise 9, no. 4 (July-August 1998): 40-45. Menges argues that the U.S. and China could be headed toward a 
nuclear face-off within four years. The thesis of Menges’ study is that China is pursuing a systematic strat­
egy to gain geopolitical and economic supremacy in Asia first, and then possibly globally, within the next 
two decades. Menges cites as evidence China's secret alliance with Russia, the PRC’s growing military 
power and nuclear threat, and the damage to the US economy caused by the PRC’s trade tactics. Further, 
Menges asserts that China and Russia have been responsible for weaponizing terrorists hostile to American 
interests. Waldron’s argument is similar, but founded upon a more balanced (yet still quite skeptical)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
retically based upon “balance of power” theory and represent various variations of the 
realist approach premised on power considerations (material power, mostly defined in 
military or economic terms) and a zero-sum, “self-help” conception of anarchy at the sys­
temic level.10 Other realist approaches are modeled on Stephan Walt’s “balance of threat” 
theory premised upon perceptions of threat (rather than distributions of power) as evalu­
ated through the lens of human cognition, which represents an attempt in the realist pro­
ject to incorporate ideational factors into realist structural theories.11 There are, however, 
some realist studies which do not conclude that China’s rise necessarily constitutes a
analysis of Chinese intentions. Waldron argues that “China seeks to combine targeted military capabilities 
with diplomatic and economic measures in order to weaken American presence and resolve in Asia.” Also 
see Waldron’s testimony to the Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Arthur Waldron, 
“U.S. China Relations: Status o f Reforms in China, ” Senate Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Af­
fairs, 22 April 2004.
10 John J. Mearsheimer’s work serves to exemplify these sorts of analyses. In The Tragedy o f Great Power 
Politics, Mearsheimer argues “[t]he great powers seek to maximize their share of world power" because 
"having dominant power is the best means to ensure one's own survival," and warning “against putting too 
much faith in the goodwill of other countries." Mearsheimer believes that by trying to make China wealthy 
and democratic via engagement will only make it a stronger rival. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy o f  
Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002). Robert Gilpin argues in War and Change in 
World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Reprint edition, 1983) that differential growth of 
power in the international system and the result o f this unevenness causes a shift in the balance of power 
(defined in economic or military terms) weakens the basis of the existing system as those actors gaining 
power see increasing benefits and the decreasing costs of changing the system. Actors, therefore, seek to 
alter the system through territorial, political, or economic expansion until the marginal costs of continuing 
change are greater than the marginal benefits. When states develop the power to change the system accord­
ing to their interests, Gilpin maintains they will strive to do so. Another example of such analyses is Mi­
chael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future (The 
RAND Corporation; 2000), in which they argue that Chinese history, the behavior of earlier rising powers, 
and the basic structure and logic of international power relations suggest that a strong China will likely 
become more assertive globally, beginning in 2015-2020 at the earliest. The United States, they argue, 
should adopt a policy of realistic engagement with China that combines efforts of cooperation whenever 
possible; and, if necessary, preventing Chinese acquisition of capabilities that would threaten US national 
security interests and remaining prepared to cope with the consequences of a more assertive Chinese for­
eign policy. Other analyses of this type are routinely generated by the RAND Corporation and other think 
tanks funded by the U.S. Department of Defense, such as, Mark Buries, Chinese Policy Toward Russia and 
the Central Asian Republics, (MR-1045-AF, 1999); Zalmay M. Khalilzad, Abram N. Shulsky, Daniel L. 
Byman, Roger Cliff, David T. Orletsky, David Shlapak, and Ashley J. Tellis, The United States and a Ris­
ing China: Strategic and Military Implications (MR-1082-AF, 1999); Mark Buries and Abram N. Shulsky, 
in Patterns in China's Use o f Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings (MR-1160-AF, 2000). 
These publications are part of a project conducted in the Strategy and Doctrine Program of Project AIR 
FORCE sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff or Air and Space Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force 
(AF/XO),and the Director, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force 
(AF/XOI).
11 Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power,” International Security 9 
(1985): 3-43. and The Origin o f Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
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12threat to regional order. Nonetheless, the realist approach over determines threat while 
at the same time under determines change.
A “Socialized” China
Authorities on the other side of the “China threat” debate interpret China’s rise to 
great power status in less ominous terms. In general, these neo-liberal scholars and ana­
lysts believe that China can be “socialized” either through participation in international 
institutions and regimes which reduce transaction costs and constrain actors behavior 
through mutually accepted normative frameworks, or as a result of China’s increasing 
economic interdependence in the global economy. Many scholars of the liberal school 
argue that the Chinese economy is of vital and primary importance to the Chinese and 
that Beijing pursues “economic security” through increased economic interdependence
i -j
with surrounding states. Most maintain that the Chinese realize that it is not in China’s
12 Perhaps one of the best examples representing this genre of analysis is Chinese foreign policy is Avery 
Goldstein’s Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: Stan­
ford University Press, 2005). Goldstein does a good job analyzing and explaining the constraints on Chi­
nese foreign policymaking from a Realpolitik perspective. Goldstein argues that the PRC’s new grand strat­
egy seeks to promote continued economic growth and development, and domestic stability, while at the 
same time address and correct irrational and fearful perceptions held by other nations concerning the rise of 
China. Goldstein makes an interesting historical comparison between the current rise of China and the ear­
lier rise of Germany during the late 1800s, arguing that China’s new grand strategy is quite similar to that 
followed by Bismarck -  namely, reassure neighboring countries that the rising new power is not a threat to 
be balanced against, and thus mitigate the security dilemma between the rising and established powers. 
While the comparison is insightful and interesting, there exist some important differences between Ger­
many and China. One obvious difference is that Germany was industrially and technologically one of (if 
not the most) advanced society in Europe at the time, while the same thing can hardly be said about China 
currently. Nonetheless, the comparison is interesting in that both states believed that their rise to great 
power status could best be realized through a strategy o f downplaying others’ fears and perceptions of 
threat posed by the rising power. Goldstein’s thesis gives a good Realist account and explanation why Bei­
jing had to rethink its approach to foreign policy, but does not offer any ideas concerning how Beijing 
might actually implement the new approach.
13 Thomas G. Moore approaches Beijing’s GND from an economic perspective centered on the effects of 
globalization on Chinese foreign policy, arguing that “economic globalization provides the means by which 
China can pursue an alternative strategy for coping with U.S. hegemony in lieu of the classical balancing 
strategy many observers had expected Beijing to adopt during the post-Cold War era.” According to 
Moore, China’s alternative strategy is based upon establishing more cooperative relations among countries, 
or better “economic security.” Thomas G. Moore, “Chinese Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalization,” in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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best interests to follow a confrontational path to great power status. Further, some ana­
lysts believe that Beijing came to an understanding that continuing a strategy of balanc­
ing against American hegemony by working towards a multi-polar power structure was, 
in the near to middle future, a flawed stratagem. The PRC could not pursue a costly and 
dangerous policy of actively balancing against the US and continue to experience sub­
stantial economic growth simultaneously. American hegemony, the Chinese came to be­
lieve, would not quickly yield to a new multi-polar world during the early 21st century, as 
was initially believed in the early 1990s.14 Other researchers focus on China’s diplomacy 
and increased participation in international institutions and multilateral organizations.15 
The approach utilized by this group offers a better explanation of the shift in Chinese for­
eign policy than does the realist approach given the dramatic increase of Chinese partici­
pation in multilateralism, but falls short because its approach is limited to studying the 
constraining effects of institutions on state behavior under anarchy. As with the neo-
China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New 
York: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2005).
14 Thomas G. Moore and Yong Deng make some of the strongest arguments that Chinese foreign policy has 
undergone a dramatic shift as a result of new perceptions of what constitutes Chinese self-interest in the 
21st century. They posit that Beijing is following new geopolitical strategy of co-opting US power by en­
meshing it in a deepening web of interdependence instead of pursuing a traditional balancing strategy 
against American hegemony. See “Chinese Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalization,” chap. 6; and Yong 
Deng and Thomas G. Moore, “China Views Globalization: Towards a New Great Power Politics?” Wash­
ington Quarterly 27, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 117-36.
15 Jianwei Wang argues that China’s recent multilateral diplomacy is mainly motivated by instrumental 
considerations, being perceived as a more effective and less threatening way of advancing the PRC’s inter­
ests and projecting China’s influence in both Asia and globally. Jianwei Wang, “China’s Multilateral Di­
plomacy in the New Millennium,” in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, ed. 
Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 159-200. One of the 
more recent works on Chinese multilateralism in Southeast Asia is Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “Multilateralism in 
China’s ASEAN policy: its evolution, characteristics, and aspirations,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, 
no. 1 (April 2005): 102-121. Kuik studies the origins and patterns of China's involvement in regional multi­
lateral institutions and its characteristics and implications for China’s ASEAN policy in the post-Cold War 
era. Kuik argues that China's perceptions and policies toward multilateral institutions have undergone sig­
nificant changes, from caution and suspicion to optimism and enthusiasm. Further, he maintains that in­
stead of perceiving multilateral institutions as malign arrangements that might be used by other states to 
challenge China's national sovereignty and to limit its strategic choices, Beijing now views multilateral 
institutions as useful diplomatic platforms that can be utilized to advance its own foreign policy objectives.
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realist approach, the liberal school does not allow for possible change in actor identity 
and interest endogenously to the interaction process, and — as with realism — only defines 
anarchy in self-help, zero-sum terms. As such, while scholars in this second group do not 
commit the same error of over determining threat as do neo-realist studies, the neo-liberal 
approach is guilty of under determining the change in recent Chinese foreign policy in 
Southeast Asia.
Metamorphosis of China’s Identity
Taking a different perspective than that of the mainstream Realist and Liberal tra­
ditions, constructivist analyses of Chinese foreign policy emphasize ideational over mate­
rial factors. As such, actor identity and interest formation is viewed as being mostly in­
fluenced by perceptions of self and of other actors (role-identities) rather than by the dis­
tribution of power (material) and self-help anarchy. Constructivist studies argue that Bei­
jing came to a realization that Chinese national interests could be better achieved in 
Southeast Asia through cooperative rather than confrontational relations with ASEAN 
and member states.16 This realization occurred, some argue, through a change in identity 
and interest formation resulting from social interaction and shared knowledge. There are 
differences and points of debate within this group concerning China’s rise and its influ­
ence on Chinese foreign policy, to be sure. These differences are reflected in the differ­
ing approaches and perspectives utilized by individual scholars. Some scholars focus on 
domestic Chinese politics, elite power structures, and Chinese political culture,17 while
16 See, for example, Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, “China’s Regional Strategy,” in Power Shift: China 
and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 2005), 48-68.
17 Addressing the roles of perception and sentiment in the growth of popular nationalism and its influence 
on Chinese foreign policy and Sino-American relations, Peter Hays Gries traces the emergence of this new 
nationalism and argues that it is challenging the Communist Party's monopoly on political discourse and 
thereby threatening the regime's stability. Peter Hays Gries, China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and
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other scholars focus their study of Chinese foreign policy on China’s national image and 
1 8identity. For all the above accounts (and including many Institutionalist arguments), 
China is viewed as the primary catalyst of change in the region because of the rise of the 
PRC as the engine of regional economic growth, a major military power, a growing force 
in regional diplomacy, and as a proactive member in multilateral institutions. As such, 
these scholars challenge the “China threat” theory by arguing that Beijing has come to an 
understanding that a strategy of balancing against US power ultimately is counterproduc­
tive to Chinese interests given current restraints imposed upon China by both domestic as 
well as international environments. By the early 1990s, Beijing learned that a balancing 
strategy had little chance of success, was too costly, and would have a detrimental impact 
on China’s domestic development. They argue that instead of balancing against the U.S., 
Beijing now pursues a strategy based on maintaining a peaceful international environ­
ment and China’s continued economic development within the present international sys­
tem. Beijing’s GND, therefore, is based upon assuring the ASEAN states that China’s 
rise poses no threat but rather an opportunity for the Southeast Asia states to integrate
Diplomacy (University of California Press, 2005). Concerning China’s political culture, several prominent 
studies have been undertaken. Examples include Lucian W. Pye and Nathan Leites, Nuances in Chinese 
Political Culture (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1970); Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit o f Chinese 
Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); and William S. Pott, A. Chinese Political Philoso­
phy (New York: Knopf, 1981). Some more recent works on Chinese political culture are Shiping Hua, ed., 
Chinese Political Culture, 1989-2000 (East Gate Book, 2001), and Shiping Hua, Utopianism in Chinese 
Political Culture (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).
18 Hongying Wang draws on constructivist theory in her interesting study o f Chinese foreign policy and 
national image building, concluding that Beijing is actively promoting a new image of China as a coopera­
tive and responsible member of the international community. See Hongying Wang, “National Image Build­
ing and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. 
Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 73-102; and David 
Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29, no. 3 (Win­
ter 2004/05): 64-99. Shambaugh argues that China’s “good neighbor” diplomacy has succeeded in dispel­
ling the China threat thesis in region, and that "most nations in the region now see China as a good 
neighbor, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a non-threatening regional power."
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their own economic development with that of China.19 As this integration process moves 
forward and interaction between China and the ASEAN states intensifies, a new regional 
(Asian) identity emerges.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This study is informed fundamentally by the work of Alexander Wendt and other 
scholars within the constructivist school who follow the positivist tradition of scientific 
inquiry.20 More specifically, this investigation supports Wendt’s argument that “anarchy 
is what states make of it” and utilizes Wendt’s analytical framework of three “cultures of 
anarchy” and the notion of “distribution of interests” (where interests are defined mostly 
in ideational terms, but also, to a lesser extent, defined in materialistic terms) in its analy-
'y t
sis of Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Through the case study of Beijing’s
19 See David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004),David Shambaugh, ed., Greater China: The Next Superpower? (Ox­
ford: Oxford University Press, 1995) and “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” 64-99.
20 Amitav Acharya investigates the issue of national identity in Southeast Asia and its influence on state 
relations in the region, while Alastair Iain Johnston gives a constructivist appraisal of the “ASEAN Way” 
and IR theory. Johnston makes an interesting argument concerning the social construction of security di­
lemmas (he focuses on Sino-American relations) which this study will utilize in the context of the security 
dilemma between China and the ASEAN states vis-a-vis their territorial disputes, as further explained be­
low. Peter J. Katzenstein and others argue that explanations derived from only one paradigm have short­
comings beyond their inability to recognize important empirical anomalies. These authors maintain that IR 
research is better served by combining explanatory approaches from different research traditions or, as they 
call it, “analytical eclecticism”. See respectively Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International 
Relations o f South-East Asia (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2000); Alastair Iain Johnston, “Sociali­
zation in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory,” in International 
Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, eds. John G. Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Co­
lumbia University Press, 2003), “International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China and the 
World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Westview Press, 1998), 
55-87, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, vol. 4 (Spring 2003): 5-56, and “Bei­
jing’s Security Behavior in the Asia-Pacific: Is China a Dissatisfied Power?” in Rethinking Security in East 
Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency, ed. J. J. Suh, et al. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004): 34-96; 
and Peter J. Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, “Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” in 
Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency, ed. J. J. Suh, et al. (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004), 1-33.
21 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” In­
ternational Organizations 46, no 2 (1992): 391-425, “The State as person in international theory,” Review 
of International Studies 3 0, no. 2 (2004): 298-316, and Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge 
University Press, 1999).
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diplomatic approach to China’s South China Sea disputes, I argue that the processes of 
interaction between China and ASEAN at the international level facilitated a rapid expan­
sion of shared knowledge and social learning which in turn impacted and changed the 
cognitive base (and thus identity) of each actor. Before continuing, however, I must 
make two caveats. First, I do not dismiss realist theory as an important analytical tool for 
the study of international relations. Realism offers many useful insights and ideas such as 
the notions of anarchy and balance of power which are extremely helpful in understand­
ing the interaction of states in the international community. In fact, this analysis utilizes 
realist theory to explain structural change in the international system following the end of 
the Cold War. However, as with any theory, realism has its weaknesses as well. One of 
realism’s most conspicuous weaknesses is that it tends to over determine threat while at 
the same time underdetermine change. For this reason, I believe that realism proves itself 
unable to fully explain the incredible rapprochement in Sino-ASEAN relations since the 
end of the Cold War and why a social constructivist approach offers a more accurate 
analysis and understanding of our topic. Second, because there exists a great diversity of 
analytical approaches within the social constructivist school, I must explain why this 
study is based on the theoretical work of Alexander Wendt as opposed to that of other 
“constructivists”. One reason that my research follows Wendt’s version of constructiv­
ism is that his approach is commensurate with the scientific approach followed by main­
stream International Relations (IR) scholars - positivism. As such, Wendt’s form of con­
structivism represents a “moderate” stream of constructivist IR theory which rejects the 
more radical “postmodernist” stream represented by the works of Bob Walker, Richard 
Ashley, and Ann Tickner.22 Another reason for following Wendt’s approach is that it re­
22 Richard Ashley, “The poverty of neorealism” International Organization 38, 225-286, and “The geopoli-
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jects the realist notion of a “logic of anarchy” (conflictual, self-help world) and thus al­
lows for a more nuanced understanding of anarchy (“anarchy is what states make of it”). 
Anarchy does not always have to be premised on conflict and self-help - it can sometimes 
be premised on cooperation and mutual benefit. As such, Wendt’s approach to construc­
tivism allows for a rationalist, positivist approach to IR theory.
Until now, I have not offered a precise definition of “social learning.” This must 
now be rectified, as social learning resulting from multilateral diplomatic interaction be­
tween China and the ASEAN states became the principal source of change in China’s 
GND in Southeast Asia after 1996. It is important to note that “social learning” is de­
fined differently by the various theoretical approaches in IR. Rationalist theoretical ap­
proaches, such as realism, generally emphasize the behavioral (causal) effects of social 
learning by focusing on how new information about the environment enables actors to 
pursue and achieve their interests more effectively and treat the identities and interests of 
the actors as being constant and exogenously given. In other words, for rationalist theo­
ries, learning and perspective-taking (the ability to see Self from the perspective of the 
Other) do not change who actors are or what they desire, just actors’ ability to realize 
their desires in a given social context (“simple” learning).
A constructivist-interactionist approach, on the other hand, defines “social learn- 
ing” as a mechanism of cultural selection which allows for the possibility that social
tics of geopolitical space: Toward a critical social theory o f international politics” Alternatives 12, 403-434; 
R.B.J. Walker, “Realism, change, and international political theory” International Studies Quarterly 31, 65- 
86, and Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993); and Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993).
23 “Cultural selection” is defined by Alexander Wendt as an “evolutionary mechanism involving the trans­
mission of the determinants of behavior from individual to individual, and thus from generation to genera­
tion, by social learning, imitation or some other similar process.” Wendt, Social Theory o f International 
Politics, 324-326. Wendt quotes Richard Boyd and Peter Richerson, “Sociobiology, culture and economic
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learning may also have “construction effects” or constitutive effects on identities and in­
terests (“complex” learning).24 Thus, identity and interest formation must be defined as 
an ongoing social process endogenously given to interaction. In other words, actors are at 
every occurrence of interaction mutually defining who each of them is. This is not to say 
that the rationalist and constructivist-interactionist models of social learning are mutually 
exclusive — just that they have different ideas about what actually occurs in structural 
change and why it happens. In both models actors are rational, but in the rationalist 
model the basic unit on which utility and rational action is calculated is the actor (egoistic 
state), and in the constructionist model the basic unit is the group of actors (holistic 
community). From the constructivist-interactionist perspective then, through interac­
tion-generated “complex” social learning, Self and Other develop a collective identity (a 
fully internalized culture) that actors have created and with which they identify. The 
mechanism through which identities are learned is known as “reflected appraisals” or 
“mirroring,” a process in which “identities and their corresponding interests are learned 
and then reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant Others.” Thus, 
the generalized Other becomes part of their conception of Self. As such, collective iden­
tity is associated with the structure of any internalized culture, and therefore a change in 
that structure necessitates a change in collective identity, “involving the breakdown of an
theory,” Journal o f Economic Behavior and Organization 1 (1980): 97-121. Wendt equates cultural selec­
tion to Kenneth Waltz’s “socialization.”
24 For our study then, “simple” social learning may induce a reorientation of an actor’s method or strategy 
of realizing foreign policy goals, but without changing an actor’s identity or interests. “Simple” learning, 
therefore can lead to instrumental change in actor behavior. “Complex” social learning, on the other hand, 
may induce a reorientation of an actor’s foreign policy as a result o f changed actor identity and interests. 
“Complex” learning can therefore lead to constitutive change in actor behavior. See Social Theory o f Inter­
national Politics, 326-335. For a more detailed discussion of the differences between simple and complex 
learning, see Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1990). Haas 
uses different terms (“adaptation” and “learning”) but illustrates the same difference.
25 Social Theory o f International Politics, 337.
26 “Mirroring” hypothesizes that actors see themselves as a reflection of how they think others see them. 
Social Theory o f International Politics, 327.
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old identity and the emergence of a new. Identity change and structural change are not 
equivalent, since identity formation happens ultimately at the micro-level [unit, or state] 
and structural change happens ultimately at the macro, but the later supervenes on the 
former.”27 As discussed below, an interactionist model of social learning is employed to 
explain and illustrate the evolution of Beijing’s approach (GND) in the territorial disputes 
and its impact on ASEAN perceptions of China — and thus on Sino-ASEAN relations.
Using Wendt’s interactionist model in our analysis of the change in Beijing’s 
GND and its effect on Sino-ASEAN relations, this chapter identifies and explains the 
emergence and evolution of a regional collective identity bom of “complex” learning as a 
major source of change in both Beijing’s approach to the territorial disputes and in Sino- 
ASEAN relations. As argued below, multilateral interaction with ASEAN on economic 
and security issues influenced change in China’s identity from that of a “sovereign, asser­
tive power” (egoistic identity) to “member of regional grouping” or “ASEAN Partner”
? o
(holistic identity). This process began with Beijing’s acceptance of multilateral discus­
sion of the South China Sea issue (1995-1996), but the intensity of this process increased 
exponentially from 1997 forward in most areas of China-ASEAN interaction — especially 
in the economic area. I argue that by 2002-2003, as a result of interaction between China 
and ASEAN and a corresponding development of a regional collective identity as “Asian 
states,” the culture of anarchy underwriting the relationship moved away from that of a
27 Social Theory of International Politics, 338.
28 For this study, China’s “identity” is defined within the framework of the case study (China’s identity as 
an actor in the issue of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea) and should not be confused with 
China’s overall national identity (which encompasses far more than the specific issue of China’s territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea). Therefore, in this case study China’s “identity” is synonymous with 
China’s “role-identity”.
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“Lockean culture” (egoistic identity, others viewed as “rivals”) toward a new “Kantian 
culture” (collective identity, others viewed as “partners” or “friends”).29
An excellent example of such shift in identity was the 1997 Asian Financial Cri­
sis, which revealed a burgeoning sense of “we-ness” in Sino-ASEAN relations on the part 
of China. Beijing’s decision against devaluing the Renminbi demonstrated altruistic 
thinking based on group interest as opposed to egoistic self-interest. In fact, the 1997 Fi­
nancial Crisis represented the moment in time when a “collective” identity between 
China and the ASEAN states began to emerge. While Beijing’s acceptance of multilat­
eral talks on the territorial disputes in 1995 was the result (in all likelihood) of “simple” 
social learning — an instrumental application of the shared knowledge that ASEAN 
highly valued multilateralism — China’s selfless actions during the Financial Crisis, and 
demonstrated acceptance of the “ASEAN Way,” signaled that something deeper than 
egoistic interaction was starting to occur. However, one must remember that identity 
formation is an ongoing process, and depending on the circumstances in which it occurs, 
old identities can be either reinforced or changed.
China’s Schizophrenic Identity
Actually, China’s identity during 1997 -  2005 was schizophrenic. Schizophrenic 
in the sense that while China’s multilateral relations with the ASEAN states concerning 
the territorial disputes revealed a new “post-Cold War” identity, China’s traditional “Cold 
War” identity remained dominant in bilateral dialogue until the 2005 Tripartite Agree­
ment between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines for joint development of offshore hy­
drocarbon reserves in the disputed Spratly Islands.
29 For a more thorough discussion of the three “cultures of anarchy,” see Social Theory o f International 
Politics, Chapter 6.
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In China’s multilateral relationship with ASEAN, Beijing initially pursued a strat­
egy of subsuming the South China Sea disputes within the wider context of Sino-ASEAN 
relations by indirectly linking progress in Sino-ASEAN relations in general to the South 
China Sea disputes specifically. If ASEAN pushed China too hard on the disputes issue, 
Beijing could stall on other issues (trade, cooperation, etc.). Conversely, Beijing might 
reward ASEAN for downplaying sovereignty issues by conceding to broadened multilat­
eral discussion of the disputes. To this point, it was purely egoistic Realpolitik behavior 
on the part of China. However, by 1996 Beijing began to understand, appreciate, and be­
come comfortable with the special brand of multilateralism practiced by ASEAN — the 
“ASEAN Way” of informal, consensus-based multilateral discussion of mutual interests, 
and non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. “Complex” learning be­
gan to challenge traditional perceptions of Self and Other (“role-identities”) in the rela­
tionship. Becoming good neighbors was less daunting than first believed, as both sides 
“learned” that Self and Other were not that different after all. By 2002 -  2003, China’s 
“post-Cold War” identity superseded her traditional one evidenced by Beijing’s accep­
tance of the Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea (2002) and ASEAN’s Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003. From the ASEAN perspective (addressed di­
rectly in the next chapter), Beijing’s new GND in Southeast Asia was interpreted as evi­
dence that ASEAN’s policy of “engagement” and “socialization” of China was working. 
In addition, not wishing to scare-off the Chinese from this integrative process, the 
ASEAN states seemed happy not to push China too hard on the Spratlys disputes. Both 
China and the ASEAN states desired (and took action) to prevent the South China Sea 
disputes from impeding strengthening China-ASEAN relations. As such, Beijing’s GND
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approach to the territorial disputes cannot be fully understood and appreciated outside 
and apart from the wider multilateral context of Sino-ASEAN relations and the role 
played by “complex” learning and the formation of a “collective identity.” Over time, an 
emerging collective identity, or perception of “We-ness,” in Sino-ASEAN relations in­
creasingly imparted an influence on Beijing’s bilateral implementation of the GND to the 
territorial disputes.
Throughout most of this second period of our case study, Chinese bilateral diplo­
macy represents “simple” learning and instrumental changes in Beijing’s application of 
the GND to the territorial disputes — in effect, a continuation of China’s “Cold War” 
identity. Beijing’s bilateral GND strategy was formulated upon linking the disputes to 
the larger context of improving relations and trade with both Vietnam and the Philip­
pines. Beijing agreed to discuss the disputes with both Hanoi and Manila (as long as the 
issue of sovereignty was not put on the table) while sweetening the pot in the bilateral 
relationships with a substantial Chinese commitment to strengthened trade and economic 
development, as well as increased Chinese technical and scientific aid. As long as Hanoi 
and Manila agreed to put the issue of sovereignty in the South China Sea disputes on the 
back burner, relations and trade with China could continue to strengthen. However, as 
discussed further below, over time “complex” learning at the multilateral level eventually 
had a “spill-over” effect on China’s bilateral diplomacy ultimately leading to a resolution 
of China’s “schizophrenic identity” in 2005. The historic 2005 Tripartite Agreement be­
tween China, Vietnam, and the Philippines for joint development of offshore oil in the 
disputed Spratlys evidences that China’s “Cold War” identity in bilateral diplomacy had
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finally yielded to the new “post-Cold War” identity evidenced earlier in Beijing’s multi­
lateral diplomacy.
Therefore, I am not arguing that China’s identity shift occurred at any immediate, 
definite moment in time, or that the metamorphosis happened in all issue areas simulta­
neously. Rather, social construction of actor identity and interests occurs over time and is 
a never-ending, continual process. As such, I do not make the argument that China and 
ASEAN have become absolute “friends,” rather that they no longer perceive one another 
in zero-sum egoistic terms associated with a Hobbesian strategic culture (as “enemy”) or, 
for that matter, completely in terms attributable to a Lockean culture (as “rival” or “com­
petitor”). Increasingly, China and the ASEAN states are seeing and coming to under­
stand one another in terms associated with a Kantian strategic culture (as “partners” or 
“friends”).30 This does not mean, however, that Sino-ASEAN relations will continue to 
improve in a linear fashion. Currently this appears to be the case, but “complex” social 
learning can also lead to negative changes in role-identities, which adversely affect state- 
to-state relations.
During the first period of our study (1989-1996) discussed in the following chap­
ter, interaction between China and the ASEAN states led mostly to “simple” social learn­
ing which caused Beijing to modify its GND through a superficial embrace of multilater­
alism to demonstrate a cooperative and non-threatening Chinese attitude. The initial re­
orientation of Beijing’s GND toward multilateralism, however, was principally motivated 
by instrumental calculations. China’s traditional Cold War identity as a self-interested 
actor appeared to continue unchanged into the post-Cold War period (Figure 3). This is 
not to say, however, that “complex” learning was not occurring as well. Learning is a
30 Social Theory o f International Politics, 297-312.
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process which occurs over time. As such, the impact of social learning on actor behavior 
may not be immediately perceptible, as new ideas challenge standing beliefs or percep­
tions (culture) which are not easily changed.31 I argue that “complex” learning began to 
take place during the first period of our study, but its impact on Beijing’s GND only be­
came readily discemable during the second period of this study (1997-2006). I argue 
that diplomatic interaction between China and the ASEAN states generated shared 
knowledge as a result of both “simple” and “complex” learning which caused a change in 
the cognitive base of Chinese policymakers as well as that of their ASEAN counterparts. 
Changes in actor cognitive bases caused by “complex” learning, in turn, caused (and con­
tinues to cause) a corresponding transformation in shared role-identities which ultimately 
is responsible for the positive developments witnessed in Sino-ASEAN relations during 
the last decade. In other words, due to “complex” social learning gained through diplo­
matic interaction, China’s traditional identity is changing toward a new, more holistic or 
collective post-Cold War identity. As such, the role-identity of China among the ASEAN 
states is emerging from the historic “enemy” or “rival” to a new role-identity of “good 
neighbor,” “partner,” or even “friend.”
Cognitive BaseA Simple Learning |Cognitive BaseA “Cold War” Identity
Cognitive BaseA Complex Learning -> [Cognitive Bases “Post-Cold War” Identity
Figure 3. Hypothesized Effects of “Simple” and “Complex” Learning on Chinese 
Cognitive Base and National Identity.
31Wendt argues that due to the dialectical relationship between agency and structure, “culture is a self- 
fulfilling prophecy” and must reproduce itself “if it is to be culture at all.” Social Theory of International 
Politics, 186-187.
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Cognitive BaseA reflects China’s traditional knowledge base of Self and Other predicated 
on self-interest, self-help, and the distribution of material power in the international sys­
tem, externalized as China’s “Cold War” identity (China as an egoistic, revisionist power 
with an essentially bilateral approach to foreign policy). Cognitive Bases reflects 
China’s new (current) knowledge base of Self and Other predicated on mutual interest, 
cooperation, and the distribution of both material power and ideas, externalized as 
China’s “Post-Cold War” identity (China as a holistic, status-quo power with an increas­
ingly multilateral approach to foreign policy emphasizing mutual interests-benefits ).
This theoretical approach allows a more nuanced and insightful understanding of 
recent Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia than do mainstream realist and liberal 
theories. The strategy behind Beijing’s foreign policy has significantly changed due to 
the social construction of knowledge at the international level of politics (shared knowl­
edge) and its influence on the social construction of identity and interests at the state 
(unit) level. As argued below, the source of this change has not been adequately identi­
fied nor explained thus far by mainstream neo-realist analyses based upon notions of 
“balance of power” or “balance of threat,” relative national (material) strength, and dis­
tribution of capabilities within the international system, nor by neo-liberal analyses which 
neglect the social processes of identity and interest formation and tend to focus on ex­
plaining results rather than process. The reason for this is that these approaches discount 
or ignore the important role played by non-material forces and factors (ideas, social proc­
esses, and shared knowledge) on the construction and composition of state identity, inter­
est, and perception of Self and Other (culture) and rely too heavily on materialistic and 
individualistic (as opposed to holistic or systemic) explanations. As a result, these ap­
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proaches fail to offer a complete explanation of the sources of change in the deepening 
China-ASEAN relationship. I argue that a more complete explanation and analysis can 
be accomplished by supplementing mainstream realist and liberal analyses by defining 
state interest and identity formation in idealistic as well as materialistic terms, and by al­
lowing for the existence of more than one “logic of anarchy” as postulated by realist and 
liberal theories.
Assumptions and Major Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical framework explained above, this study assumes a causal 
relationship between Chinese “good neighbor” diplomacy in Southeast Asia and a change 
in perceptions of China by the ASEAN states. I argue therefore that threat perceptions of 
China held by Vietnam, the Philippines, and ASEAN only began to lessen as China’s tra­
ditional Cold War identity began to give-way to a new post-Cold War identity bom of 
shared knowledge, complex learning, and a changed cognitive base. Specific to the case 
study, this study tests the following hypotheses: (1) Over time, social learning (independ­
ent variable) has affected a change in China’s GND (dependent variable) toward a more 
holistic and less narcissistic attitude; and (2), the change in China’s GND (now the inde­
pendent variable) has affected a change in ASEAN perceptions of China as well as the 
style and orientation of their China policies (dependent variable). In other words, there 
are two assumed causal relationships (as Figure 4 indicates): one relationship is between 
social learning gained through interaction and a reorientation in Beijing’s GND where the 
former is the independent variable and the latter the dependent variable; the other rela­
tionship is between the reorientation of Beijing’s GND and a change in ASEAN states’ 
perceptions of China and their China policies, where the former becomes the independent
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variable and the latter the dependent variable. These hypothesized casual relationships are 
explained and tested by the case study as discussed in the following three chapters.
SOCIAL LEARNING -> BEIJING’S GOOD -> ASEAN PERCEPTIONS
(IDEATIONAL FACTORS) NEIGHBOR DIPLOMACY OF AND POLICIES
TOWARD CHINA
Figure 4. The Major Relationships Among the Variables.
VARIABLES AND THEIR MEASUREMENT
Hongying Wang’s recent study of national image building as part of Chinese for­
eign policy traces various images that the PRC government projected of China since the 
Maoist period.32 Wang’s study provides us with an assessment and measurement of Bei­
jing’s external promotion of China as a “cooperative” and “peace-loving” country which 
clearly demonstrates China’s active campaign to promote a “good neighbor” image in the 
international community. Wang’s analysis of the average frequencies of projected im­
ages (1954-1999) indicates that Beijing’s projection of China as an international “coop­
erator” has increased appreciably since 1989 and become the most frequently projected 
image of China since 1993. The image of China as a “peace-loving” country is the sec­
ond most frequently projected image by Beijing since 1992.34 This investigation com­
plements Wang’s study by measuring ASEAN perceptions of China through an analysis 
of public opinion polls and surveys, and media. Indicators of favorable regional percep­
32 Wang’s data was derived from quantitative content analysis of articles appearing in Beijing Review and 
government work reports (zhengfu gongzuo baogao) relating to Chinese foreign policy. Hongying Wang, 
“National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese 
Foreign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 
73-102.
33 “National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy,” figures 4.1 and 4.2, 77-78.
34 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
28
tions of China relating to the disputes are views (images) of China as a “peaceful” or 
“cooperative” or “responsible” member of the international community (good neighbor). 
Indicators of Chinese accommodation are increased bilateral cooperation in various is­
sues concerning the South China Sea, and increased acceptance and willingness to dis­
cuss the disputes multilaterally {accede to ASEAN normative behavior — the “ASEAN 
Way”). Indicators of Chinese aggressiveness are provocative military actions and de­
ployments, and refusal or hesitancy to discuss the disputes within a multilateral setting 
{rejecting ASEAN normative behavior).
WORKING HYPOTHESES FOR THE CASE STUDY OF CHINA’S TERRITORIAL 
DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
Working from our two major hypotheses, it is possible to derive several working 
hypotheses for the investigation of the PRC’s “good neighbor” diplomacy using the case 
of the regional territorial disputes between China and Vietnam, and China and the Philip­
pines. (1) If social learning causes Beijing to adjust its GND to accommodate the con­
cerns of ASEAN states regarding disputed territories in the maritime environment, then 
regional perceptions of China will become less suspicious and more benign. (2) If social 
learning causes Beijing to adjust its GND to accommodate Chinese self-interest by be­
coming more aggressive in enforcing or defending Chinese territorial claims, then re­
gional perceptions of China will become less benign and more suspicious. (3) As percep­
tions of China in Southeast Asia move along the spectrum between threat and coopera­
tion, ASEAN and ASEAN states’ China policy will change in terms of orientation and 
style.
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ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter Two discusses and critically analyses Beijing’s traditional bilateral di­
plomacy concerning China’s South China Sea disputes with both the Philippines and 
Vietnam from the end of the Cold War until 1996, and also explains why Beijing began 
in 1995-1996 to explore a new approach to the disputes at the multilateral level. In es­
sence, the origins of Beijing’s “good-neighbor” diplomacy (GND) in Southeast Asia can, 
to a large extent, be traced to the lessens and insights gained by Chinese leaders from the 
mounting problems associated with the territorial disputes and their increasingly detri­
mental effects on Sino-ASEAN relations. Beijing’s traditional bilateral approach to the 
disputes, premised on China’s “indisputable” sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly 
islands, a strong aversion and avoidance of multilateral dialogue, and an aggressive mili­
tary posture in the South China Sea, caused an increased perception in Southeast Asia of 
China as a growing “threat.” This regional trend served to support the wider “China 
threat” thesis, as articulated by the United States to support Washington’s escalating con­
tainment strategy, and therefore threatened to undermine Chinese foreign policy in 
Southeast Asia. The solution to Beijing’s foreign policy dilemma, as it turned out, was to 
deconstruct China’s image as a “threat” in the region by actively promoting a new 
friendly, cooperative “good neighbor” image of China in Southeast Asia (instrumental 
change of GND as a result of mostly “simple” social learning). The South Sea disputes 
became, then, a good opportunity for Beijing to demonstrate China’s good intentions and 
ameliorate China’s traditional image in the region. And, considering that the South Sea 
disputes represented one of the most difficult and challenging issues in Sino-ASEAN re­
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lations, they became a rigorous litmus test that China had to pass before China’s relation­
ship with ASEAN could deepen.
Chapter Three discusses the evolution and implementation of Beijing’s GND to 
China’s territorial disputes during the last decade (1997 -  2006) with Vietnam and the 
Philippines at the bilateral level, as well as with ASEAN at the multilateral level. A new 
source of change in Beijing’s GND is identified and its impact on both the territorial dis­
putes and Sino-ASEAN relations is analyzed. The argument is made that during this pe­
riod “complex” social learning increasingly caused both instrumental and constitutive 
change in Beijing’s GND. Specifically, “simple” learning led to instrumental change, 
while “complex” learning led to constitutive change in Beijing’s GND due to a change in 
China’s cognitive base (identity). Further, I argue that bilateral diplomacy, due to the 
directly confrontational setting of this type of dialogue, led mostly to “simple” social 
learning which affected instrumental modification of Beijing’s GND without affecting a 
change in China’s cognitive base or national identity. On the other hand, multilateral di­
plomacy (especially Track II settings) led to both types of social learning, “simple” and 
“complex,” due to the plurality of views and positions facilitated by this type of setting. 
As such, Beijing’s bilateral handling of the territorial disputes represents “simple” social 
learning during the first period of this study (1989 -  1996) and during most of the second 
period (until 2004 or so) as well; while China’s growing multilateral approach to the dis­
putes represents the impact of “complex” social learning (beginning in 1995 - 1996) 
which led to a change of China’s cognitive base and national identity.
Chapter Four offers an evaluation of the impact of Beijing’s reoriented GND on 
ASEAN perceptions of China through a qualitative analysis of the change in China’s na­
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tional image in Southeast Asia (strength of “China threat” perception in the region) and 
its resultant influence on the security behavior of the ASEAN states regarding China.
This empirical analysis is based on data obtained from opinion polls and surveys, and 
from content analysis of articles appearing in the region’s national English-language 
newspapers concerning the territorial disputes. The general effects of Beijing’s GND on 
ASEAN perceptions (as a group) of China are discussed first, followed by a country- 
specific analysis of the change in national perception of China resulting from Beijing’s 
GND and its impact on security behavior of each of the following countries: Vietnam, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia.
Chapter Five concludes the study by reviewing and discussing the forces and fac­
tors responsible for the evolution of Beijing’s GND since the end of the Cold War, and 
by evaluating the impact of Beijing’s GND on the territorial disputes, as well as the im­
plications and ramifications of China’s GND within a wider, more inclusive context of 
Sino-ASEAN relations in general.
SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY
This study will make several contributions to the discourse on Chinese foreign 
policy since the end of the Cold War. First of all, the case study of China’s territorial 
disputes in maritime Southeast Asia will produce more empirical data concerning Bei­
jing’s “good neighbor” diplomacy in the region and its influences and effects on Sino- 
ASEAN relations. Moreover, it contributes to the analysis of security tension between 
China and ASEAN by advancing Alastair Iain Johnston’s investigation of the social con­
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struction of security dilemmas35 by investigating how security dilemmas might be so­
cially deconstructed as well. This paper argues that as social constructions, security di­
lemmas can be altered through actions taken by one (or more) actor(s) that change threat 
perceptions of the “other” either toward spiraling arms races and increasing possibilities 
of conflict (as realist interpretations of security dilemmas maintain), or toward a lessen­
ing of threat perceptions and the growth of more harmonious relations. Security dilem­
mas need not necessarily spiral toward conflict — actors can sometimes “learn” that the 
“other” is not as threatening as initially believed, and therefore change their opinions and 
perceptions of one another. Shared knowledge, therefore, can impart positive, as well as 
negative influences on the social processes of state identity and interest construction, 
which can (sometimes) change the “logic of anarchy.”
This study makes several arguments concerning Beijing’s “good neighbor” di­
plomacy in Southeast Asia. First, China’s GND in Southeast Asia represents a profound 
transformation, beginning in the mid-1990s, in Beijing’s foreign policy in the region. 
Second, this change in Chinese diplomacy, to a large extent, reflects Beijing’s response to 
increasing perceptions in Southeast Asia of China’s rise as constituting a growing “China 
threat.” Third, Beijing’s GND aims to dispel the “China threat” thesis in Southeast Asia 
by promoting a friendly, non-threatening image in the region that that will reassure the 
ASEAN states and lessen the Sino-ASEAN security dilemma. Fourth, this study argues 
that, to a certain extent, Beijing’s “good neighbor” diplomacy in Southeast Asia is the 
result of socialization between China and the ASEAN states, and that Beijing’s new re­
gional diplomacy is based partially upon the “ASEAN Way” (consensus-based, non-
35 See Alastair Iain Johnston, “International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China and the 
World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Westview Press, 1998), 
55-87.
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confrontational relations). Fifth, the evolution and maturation of Beijing’s GND in 
Southeast Asia appears as a text book example of Wendt’s interactionist model of social 
learning. The realization that China’s image as a threat in Southeast Asia was being per­
petuated by Beijing’s South China Sea policy led ultimately to a policy based on the 
Kantian model of collective identity and cooperation. Sixth, this study will shed light on 
possible strategies an ascending power might follow to manage its rise in the interna­
tional system. And finally, this investigation posits that China’s GND approach to its re­
lations in Southeast Asia might offer greater insight into Chinese foreign policy in gen­
eral, especially since the turn of the 21st century.
Unlike the often unilateral foreign policy approach of the United States during the 
George W. Bush administration, the PRC has pursued both bilateral and multilateral di­
plomacy at Track I and Track II venues to cooperate with China’s neighbors. Without 
giving any ground on China’s claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea, Beijing’s 
GND has transformed an issue fraught with potential for armed conflict into one of joint 
exploration and cooperation — truly a remarkable success by any measure.
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CHAPTER II
CHINESE DIPLOMACY AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES, 1989 -  1996:
IN SEARCH OF A NEW APPROACH
This chapter seeks to explain the change and reformulation of China’s regional 
foreign policy in Southeast Asia from 1989 to 1996 through a case study of Beijing’s 
evolving diplomatic approach to the South China Sea disputes and its effect on Sino- 
ASEAN relations. Argued below, two major factors contributed to the transformation of 
China’s regional foreign policy — one structural, the other ideational. The initial factor 
affecting a transformation of Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia was structural.
The end of the Cold War, the subsequent death of the Soviet Union, and the resolution of 
the Third Indochina War had, by the end of 1991, removed historic constraints on Chi­
nese foreign policy in Southeast Asia allowing Beijing greater opportunity and freedom 
to pursue closer relations with the ASEAN states. During the first half of the 1990s, 
however, Sino-ASEAN relations remained strained as China continued to be perceived as 
a threat to regional peace and stability. Beijing’s bold and aggressive action concerning 
the South China Sea disputes was the principal reason for the continuance of China’s 
traditional Cold War image in Southeast Asia. However, increased interaction between 
China and the ASEAN states concerning the territorial disputes led to the second and 
most important factor affecting change in Beijing’s GND and substantial improvement in 
Sino-ASEAN relations — social learning (ideational factor).
Through interaction over time, China and the ASEAN states developed shared 
knowledge of Self and Other which led to both “simple” and “complex” learning. As ar­
gued below, Beijing’s social learning during the first period was mostly “simple” leam-
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ing which affected instrumental change in Beijing’s GND but led to little or no change in 
China’s identity. Beijing “learned” that the ASEAN states continued to perceive China 
as a threat in spite of China’s promotion of a “good neighbor” image in the region, and 
that the South China Sea disputes were the principal reason for this. As explained below, 
this knowledge induced an instrumental transformation of Beijing’s GND toward accept­
ing multilateral dialogue with ASEAN concerning the territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea without affecting a change of China’s traditional cognitive base and identity 
(Figure 5). However, towards the end of the first period (by mid-1995 ), “complex” 
learning began to challenge some core beliefs or assumptions underwriting China’s tradi­
tional cognitive base. However, the effects of the initial “complex” social learning did 
not directly manifest themselves in Beijing’s GND until the second period (1997 - 2006). 
Let us now briefly discuss China’s traditional Cold War identity (or Cognitive BaseA) 
and assess the causal effects that structural change in the international system imparted 
on China’s regional foreign policy.
jCognitive BaseA Simple Learning Cognitive BaseA “Cold War” Identity
Figure 5. Effect of “Simple” Learning on China’s Cognitive Base and Identity.
STRUCTURAL FACTORS
China’s relations with most of its Southeast Asian neighbors during the Cold War 
were adversarial, reflecting the bipolar setting that forced Beijing to conceive Chinese 
security in global, rather than regional terms. Because Beijing supported insurgency 
groups in many Southeast Asian countries at the time, China had an image of being an
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aggressive troublemaker. Chinese support of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge in the then 
unfolding Cambodian disaster reinforced the image shared by most ASEAN states of 
China as a “threat.” Beijing’s violent 1988 clash with Vietnamese naval units at Fiery 
Cross Reef in the Spratlys, in which three Vietnamese vessels were destroyed and over 
70 sailors killed, heightened fears in Southeast Asia that the PRC would increasingly use 
force in asserting its territorial claims in the South China Sea.36 Events leading to the 
June 1989 government crackdown on the student-led pro-democracy movement in 
Tiananmen Square further strengthened the image of China as a growing problem and 
potential threat worldwide, as most western nations condemned Beijing’s actions and 
demonstrated their disapproval by imposing sanctions against the People’s Republic. 
With the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold 
War, many wondered whether Beijing’s foreign policy would become even more aggres­
sive as the constraints on Chinese foreign policy imposed by the bipolar international 
structure at the time gave way and the US was expected to significantly reduce its mili­
tary presence in Asia as a consequence. Thus, by the end of the Cold War, the regime in 
China was perceived by much of the world as brutal and authoritarian in its domestic 
policies, aggressive in asserting China’s territorial claims, and revisionist in its foreign 
policy. In short, China was perceived as constituting a “threat” both domestically as well 
as externally in the international community.
This negative, threatening image of China began to change, however, during the 
1980s when Beijing began formulating an integrated regional policy known as zhoubian
36 See Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy (New 
York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 134-35 and U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Admini­
stration, Country Analysis Brief: South China Sea Region (Washington, D.C., 2003). 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/South_China_Sea/Background.html (accessed 12 June 2006).
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zhengce (“periphery policy”) or mulin zhengce (“good neighbor policy”) to adapt China’s 
foreign policy to new trends in Asia. One of these trends was the promise of a “Pacific 
century” marked by fast economic growth in the Asia-Pacific. Beijing understood that 
integrating China’s economy with the rest of the region could offer a new path to eco­
nomic development and prosperity. Another trend was the rise of the “new Asianism” 
doctrine that attributed the success of Asian modernization to uniquely Asian values. As 
this doctrine challenged the concept of Western economic and ideological dominance, 
Beijing wished to support this trend through establishing closer relations with China’s 
Asian neighbors.37 This new policy was undertaken by Beijing during the 1980s partially 
in response to a diminishing Soviet threat and partially in light of a corresponding dimin-
-3 0
ishment in the utility of Sino-American rapprochement. As such, Beijing’s new “pe­
riphery policy” was a nuanced adjustment of China’s Cold War regional foreign policy 
bringing it in line with what were perceived at the time to be slowly developing geo­
strategic trends. Beijing’s peripheral policy, however, was inadequate and underdevel­
oped to respond to unforeseen events in 1989.
Tiananmen
In 1989 two events significantly changed China’s external political and strategic 
environment which, in turn, stimulated greater impetus toward further adjustments and 
reformulation of Beijing’s new “good neighbor policy” or GND; the Tiananmen Massa­
cre in June, and the ending of the Cold War in November. As we shall see, both events 
can be seen as causal factors in stimulating an initial change (1989 to 1995, or so) in Bei­
37 See You Ji and Jia Qingguo, “China’s Re-emergence and Its Foreign Policy Strategy,” in China Review, 
ed. Joseph Y. S. Cheng (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1998), 128.
38 Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2005), 21-22.
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jing’s foreign policy approach in Southeast Asia. Because of the events of June 1989 and 
the resultant international condemnation of the Chinese government, China found itself 
sanctioned and diplomatically isolated by the West. The reaction in Southeast Asia, 
however, was more subdued and far less critical than that of the West. Actually, Bei­
jing’s brutal repression of the pro-democracy activists imparted little negative impact on 
China’s relations in the region. This is not difficult to understand, considering that most 
of the ASEAN states had human rights records no better than that of China. As such, the 
Southeast Asia states were sympathetic to China’s notion of state sovereignty and the 
principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries (both China and 
the ASEAN states resented the American human rights campaign). It seemed logical, 
therefore, that Beijing focus China’s diplomatic energies on cultivating better relations 
with the ASEAN states to counter the diplomatic isolation imposed on China by the 
West. Establishing good relations with the ASEAN states, therefore, became extremely
•  39important to Beijing in its campaign of ending China’s status as an international pariah.
End of the Cold War
The other big event of 1989 which impacted and induced change in Chinese re­
gional foreign policy — the end of the Cold War — facilitated Beijing’s plans of wooing 
the Southeast Asian states by removing constraints on Chinese foreign policy associated 
with the bipolar international system. The ending of the Cold War and the subsequent 
demise of the Soviet Union transformed the then extant bipolar international system into 
the current American unipolar configuration, which in effect changed the external condi­
39 Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Periphery Policy and Its Asian Neighbors,” Security Dialogue 30, no. 3 (1999): 
338.
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tions on which China’s grand strategy of “peace and development” was based.40 The 
post-Cold War international environment for China then, was significantly less threaten­
ing than the immediate past, which allowed Beijing increased flexibility in pursuing 
China’s relations with other states. In Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union’s demise ended 
Vietnam’s ability to continue its aggressive and expansionistic polices in Cambodia and 
forced Hanoi to seek accommodation with China and the ASEAN states that allowed a 
resolution of the Cambodian issue in 1991. With this accomplishment, the last vestiges 
of the Cold War security situation (security dilemma) in Southeast Asia finally ended, 
removing the associated constraints on Chinese regional foreign policy. In short, during 
the early 1990s it became possible for Beijing to implement its “good neighbor diplo­
macy” in a meaningful way.41 To that end, Beijing initiated a bilateral campaign to im­
prove relations with China’s neighboring countries. In Southeast Asia, China normalized 
relations with Indonesia (8 August 1990), Singapore (3 October 1990), Brunei (30 Sep­
tember 1991), and Vietnam (November 1991),42 and began to pursue relations with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1991 43 This brings us to another
40 See John W. Garver, “China’s U.S. Policies,” in China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese For­
eign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 201-204; Bates 
Gill, “China’s Evolving Regional Security Strategy,” in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. 
David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 2005), 247-252.
41 From this point in time forward, I define GND as being the diplomatic component of Beijing’s new for­
eign policy approach in Southeast Asia aimed at deepening China’s relations and influence with ASEAN 
and member states while at the same time resisting American and Japanese influence in the region. A basic 
premise of the GND is mitigating fears associated with the rise o f Chinese economic and military power 
through actively promoting a friendly, cooperative, and responsible image of China in Southeast Asia.
42 Zhao, 338.
43 For good accounts of initial China-ASEAN encounters, see David Shambaugh, “Return to the Middle 
Kingdom? China and Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century,” in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dy­
namics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 23-47; David Shambaugh, 
"China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order," International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004/05): 
64-99; Jianwei Wang, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium,” in China Rising: Power 
and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2005), 166-177; and Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Periphery Policy and Its Asian Neighbors,” Secu­
rity Dialogue 30, no 3 (1999): 335-346.
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(and perhaps most interesting) source of change in Beijing’s regional foreign policy — the 
increase in interaction between China and the ASEAN states in the post-Cold War era.
IDEATIONAL FACTORS
During China’s period of diplomatic isolation imposed by the West following the 
Tiananmen Crisis and the end of the Cold War, ASEAN decided to pursue a policy of 
engaging China with a view of “socializing” Chinese behavior to mitigate possible re­
gional instability and conflict associated with China’s rise and a possible American mili­
tary drawdown in Asia. As such, Beijing’s desire to establish good relations with 
ASEAN dovetailed on ASEAN’s desire to engage China. These mutual desires led to the 
informal establishment of Sino-ASEAN relations in 1991 and to formal relations between 
the two sides in 1996.44 The end of the bipolar international system removed many con­
straints on Chinese foreign policy and allowed Beijing to pursue a new, more focused 
regional policy aimed at improving Sino-ASEAN relations. However, as the early 1990s 
neared an end, the impact of this source of change on Chinese foreign policy weakened. 
At about the same time, the impact of increased interaction and “simple” social learning 
between China and ASEAN on Beijing’s regional foreign policy amplified. Much of the 
increase in interaction is attributable to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, 
which during the early 1990s was the principal issue standing in the way of improved 
Sino-ASEAN relations. Actions undertaken by Beijing in 1992 and 1995 to assert Chi­
nese sovereignty over the Spratly archipelago and much of the South China Sea (dis­
cussed below) served to heighten perceptions of a rising China threat among the ASEAN
44Lai To Lee gives a good account o f initial China-ASEAN contacts. Lai To Lee , China and the South 
China Sea Dialogues (London: Praeger, 1999), 15-27. By 1991, China had established official relations 
with all ASEAN states, and in 1996 China became an official dialogue partner of the ASEAN Post Ministe­
rial Conference (PMC).
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states and thereby undermine Beijing’s strategy of pursuing improved Sino-ASEAN rela­
tions vis-a-vis China’s “good neighbor” diplomacy. As such, the territorial disputes be­
came the crucial issue in determining the future of Sino-ASEAN relations. I argue below 
that through the process of China-ASEAN interaction, “simple” social learning occurred 
resulting in the creation of “shared knowledge” of Self and Other that induced an instru­
mental transformation of Beijing’s GND — but not yet a transformation of China’s cogni­
tive base and identity. However, as discussed in the following chapter, “simple” social 
learning, over time, ultimately led to “complex” social learning that did affect a meta­
morphosis of China’s identity (Cognitive Bases) and a constitutive change in Beijing’s 
GND.
PROBLEMS WITH THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH
Beijing’s traditional diplomatic approach to the territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea from 1989 to 1996 was based on three guiding premises — the inviolability of 
Chinese sovereign territory, a strong preference for bilateral negotiations with other dis­
putants, and an intense determination to prevent the internationalization of the South 
China Sea issue. These premises, however, began to have detrimental effects on China’s 
larger foreign policy goal in the region — to strengthen China-ASEAN relations and 
thereby limit American and Japanese influence in Southeast Asia.45 Ever since the end of 
the Cold War and especially after the stunning 1991 American military tour de force in 
the first Gulf War, Beijing pursued a foreign policy of promoting a multipolar global sys­
tem to balance the preponderant military and economic power of the United States. This 
stance caused growing problems between Washington and Beijing that led to a more con­
45 Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, “China’s Regional Strategy,” in Power Shift, ed. David Shambaugh 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 50-51.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
frontational relationship between the two states and ultimately to the birth of the China 
threat thesis. The Clinton Administration’s linkage of human rights in China and the re­
newal of China’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status heightened ill will in both 
capitals as well as supported a growing opinion among the American public that the rise 
of Chinese power and influence spelled trouble for the U.S. The Bush Administration’s 
aggressive and confrontational position in Sino-American relations, along with primarily 
American calls for the containment of China, led to perceptions in Beijing that China had 
to prevent the strategic encirclement of itself by an American-led, anti-China alliance. 
Hence, Beijing pursued a policy in Southeast Asia of seeking and promoting closer 
China-ASEAN relations to dispel the China threat thesis and thus lessen any desire 
among ASEAN countries to ally with the U.S. against China in the region. Beijing’s re­
calcitrant and reluctant attitude to address the South China Sea disputes within ASEAN’s 
multilateral framework and aggressive Chinese moves to assert the PRC’s claim of terri­
torial sovereignty over the Spratlys were causing friction in the burgeoning China- 
ASEAN relationship and were, therefore undermining Beijing’s larger strategy of resist­
ing American influence in Southeast Asia. Beijing’s aggressive and assertive actions 
concerning the South China Sea disputes also supported the China threat thesis by 
strengthening the traditional image of China in Southeast Asia as a potential aggressor.
In short, China’s approach to the South China Sea disputes was antithetical to Beijing’s 
larger foreign policy goals of strengthening relations with ASEAN and resisting Japanese 
and American influence in Southeast Asia.
By 1995, as we shall see, China’s leadership realized that a new approach to the 
South China Sea disputes was vital if the China-ASEAN relationship was to widen and
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deepen. It became imperative for Beijing to prevent the maritime disputes from straining 
and limiting, or perhaps even preventing, the normalization of China-ASEAN relations. 
The problem for Beijing was that it had to accomplish this task without compromising 
China’s claim of territorial sovereignty over much of the South China Sea, which Beijing 
saw as inviolable.46 We will first examine Beijing’s bilateral approach to the South Sea 
disputes with both the Philippines and Vietnam, as bilateral diplomacy represents China’s 
traditional approach in relations with Southeast Asia (Cognitive BaseA). Beijing’s multi­
lateral diplomacy is examined next, as it serves as a key indicator of change in China’s 
GND. Having said that, I must point out that in some instances Beijing’s bilateral diplo­
macy also serves as an indicator of change, but this is so mostly during the second period 
of this study (1997-2006).
BILATERAL DIPLOMACY 
The Philippines
The dispute over the Spratlys between China and the Philippines remained quiet 
since Filipino President Aquino’s 1988 trip to China, where both sides reached an agree­
ment to put the territorial dispute on hold so that it would not negatively affect improving 
relations between the two countries.47 However, by the time of Washington’s 1992 an­
nouncement of an American military withdrawal from the Philippines and an increase in 
tensions between China and the Philippines in the Spratlys due in part to Manila’s plans 
for turning two islets in the Spratlys into diving resorts, Manila’s view of the PRC had
46 The issue of territorial sovereignty has always been one of the most important issues for the PRC; an 
issue that, until recently, caused Beijing considerable friction and conflict with states along China’s land 
border (Soviet Union, India, Vietnam) as well as with states that share a maritime border with the PRC 
(Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Japan).
47 The Straits Times, 26 April 1988.
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become more dubious and suspicious. Thus, at the 25th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
(AMM) hosted by the Philippines in July 1992, President Fidel Ramos and Foreign Sec­
retary Raul Manglapus demonstrated their displeasure to Beijing by attempting to inter­
nationalize the South China Sea disputes just as ASEAN promulgated the Declaration on 
the South China Sea (both discussed below).48 The following year, Ramos traveled to 
Beijing in April for talks concerning the dispute.
During the talks, Ramos was reassured that Beijing was committed to resolving 
the dispute peacefully. Further, the Chinese suggested that both sides shelve the sover­
eignty issue and develop the natural resources of the Spratlys jointly.49 Ramos returned 
home with a smile on his face, a result apparently of both the substantial economic 
agreements and benefits gained by the Philippines, as well comforting reassurance from 
Beijing that China was not a military threat to the Philippines.50 Indeed, Ramos subse­
quently suggested that the Chinese economy was a model for Asia and that he was confi­
dent that the PRC would not start a new confrontation with the Philippines over the 
Spratlys. He cited Beijing’s agreement to take part in a future multilateral workshop 
hosted by Manila on marine research in the Spratlys as evidence of China’s good inten­
tions.51 The road toward increased cooperation and better relations between Beijing and 
Manila, however, still had bumps and potholes ahead that had to be circumvented.
The relationship between China and the Philippines began to sour in 1994. Bei­
jing was not pleased by Ramos receiving Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui at Subic Bay
48 President Ramos favored a conference under United Nations auspices to resolve the problem, while Raul 
Manglapus made proposals to the AMM and ASEAN PMC that an international conference be convened 
on the disputed Spratlys. See Lee, 102.
49 Lianhe Zaobao, 27 April 1993 as cited in Lee, 102.
50 The Straits Times, 28 April 1993.
51 Ibid.
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during Lee’s controversial “holiday diplomacy” nor did China approve of Manila’s li­
censing of a Philippine-American offshore oil exploration project in the Reed Bank area 
close to the Spratlys. According to Lai To Lee, these circumstances expedited Beijing’s 
desires for, and efforts toward, an agreement with Manila for joint offshore oil and gas 
exploration and development in the Spratlys. However, just as it seemed that Beijing 
and Manila were moving towards an understanding over the Spratlys, the discovery by 
the Philippines of Chinese-built structures on Mischief Reef in the Philippine-claimed 
Kalayaan area of the disputed archipelago began a diplomatic row between the two dis­
putants. Manila lodged official protests against Chinese actions, and subsequently de­
stroyed Chinese territorial markers on nearby reefs, arrested 62 Chinese anglers for 
poaching, and organized a media trip to the area to publicize Chinese territorial en­
croachment.53 In addition, Manila suggested taking the issue to the UN Security Council 
and the International Court of Justice if no bilateral solution could be reached and also 
passed a $2 billion (US) bill in the Philippines Congress for modernizing its military (na­
val and air forces), building lighthouses and increasing armed patrols in the disputed 
area.54 Further, President Ramos’s use of the row with China to whip up public support 
of his coalition party in upcoming elections did not help relations with Beijing.55
Beijing reacted by denouncing Manila’s actions as “provocative” and, as could be 
expected, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan voiced China’s objections to the
52 Lee, 105. During a meeting in June 1994, Chinese vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen made 
it clear to Philippines House of Representatives Speaker Jose De Venecia that Beijing welcomed joint de­
velopment of the Spratlys and shelving sovereignty issues, but at the same time indicated that China would 
not welcome any internationalization of the Spratlys dispute. See The Straits Times, 20 June 1994.
53 Lee, 105.
54 The Straits Times, 21 February 1995.
55 Lee, 106.
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internationalization of the issue.56 Nonetheless, China agreed to hold bilateral talks with 
Manila to discuss the disputes. Talks commenced shortly there after covering a wide 
range of issues such as cultural and economic cooperation, but failed to reach any sub­
stantive agreement concerning the Spratlys specifically, save consensus to solve the dis­
pute in a peaceful manner and to continue talks at an unspecified date in the future.57
Because the Mischief Reef affair marked the first instance of a territorial dispute 
with an ASEAN state, China faced for the first time a multilateral reaction. The ASEAN 
ministers issued a joint statement on the South China Sea on 18 March 1995 urging all 
concerned parties to respect and follow the provisions of the 1992 ASEAN Declaration 
on the South China Sea advising concerned parties to seek negotiated solutions through
CO
participation in various forums. Further, during the first China-ASEAN security dia­
logue held in Hangzhou during April, the Spratlys were also brought up in the discus­
sions (discussed below). Increasingly, ASEAN applied multilateral pressure on Beijing, 
and Vietnam’s accession to ASEAN as a full member in July only intensified that pres­
sure. Therefore, the Chinese realized that some diplomatic way to diffuse the conflictual 
situation in the South China Sea was necessary so that it would not undo the gains made 
by Beijing in its strategy of strengthening relations with ASEAN.
During the months of April and May 1995, considerable diplomatic activity con­
ducted between China and the Philippines ultimately yielded an understanding (but not a 
resolution) over the Spratlys. Jiang Zemin assured Ramos by letter that the Spratly prob­
lem would be resolved peacefully and that friendly relations between the two countries
56 The Straits Times, 23 March 1995.
57 Ibid.
58 Association o f Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Declaration on the South China 
Sea (22 July 1992). http://www.aseansec.org/3634.htm (accessed 5 August 2005).
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would continue.59 In response to increased tensions between Beijing and Manila because 
of Manila’s press tour of the Spratlys, President Ramos decided on a Track II approach 
and sent Filipino businessman Alfonso Yuchengco to Beijing as a special envoy to carry 
Ramos’ response to one of Jiang Zemin’s letters. During his visit to China, Yuchengco 
was presented with a plan for joint ventures between China and the Philippines for scien­
tific surveying and developing the oil resources of Reed Bank. In addition, the Chinese 
indicated that Beijing would even consider international cooperation and capital invest­
ment in the project, but warned against any moves by Manila to internationalize the dis­
pute over sovereignty of the archipelago.60 Concerning the structures erected on Mis­
chief Reef by the Chinese, Assistant Foreign Minister Wang Yinfan stated that those 
structures were available for use by Philippine fishermen, and that he hoped for the early 
release of the 62 Chinese anglers arrested by Philippine authorities after the Mischief 
Reef incident. Wang also announced that China would like an agreement with Manila 
promoting cooperation on fishing in the area as well as preventing the arrest of Chinese 
anglers in the future.61 This Track II approach seemed to yield some benefit for the Phil­
ippines in subsequent Track I dialogues with China.
During the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) and the second ASEAN Re­
gional Forum (ARF) meeting held during July 1995 in Brunei, Chinese and Philippine 
delegates discussed their bilateral relationship (including the Spratlys issue) on the side­
lines, successfully laying the groundwork for formal meetings the following month. At
59 The Straits Times, 16 May 1995.
60 Assistant Foreign Minister Wang Yinfan made it perfectly clear to Yuchengco that it would be unwise 
for Manila to involve ASEAN or the United States in the dispute, adding that the Chinese military had been 
restrained by Beijing from taking any action in the Spratlys, but this restraint would not be permanent if 
Manila continued to take provocative actions. See Lee, 108-109; and The Straits Times, 23 June 1995.
61 The Straits Times, 23 June 1995.
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these meetings, an agreement was reached to set up panels of experts to discuss the legal 
basis of their conflicting claims of territorial sovereignty in the Spratlys. More signifi­
cantly, both parties agreed to formulate and implement a “code of conduct” governing 
their mutual actions in the Spratlys. The Code stipulated that the disputes in the Sprat­
lys should not be allowed to adversely affect the normal development of relations be­
tween the two countries, and that the disputes should be resolved in peaceful ways. Im­
portantly, the Code would adhere to international law and the United Nations Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS). Even more importantly, the Code represented the first instance of Bei­
jing agreeing to multilateral cooperation “at the appropriate time”63 and the first official 
acknowledgement by Manila of the Chinese proposal for joint exploration and develop­
ment of offshore oil and gas reserves in the Spratlys.64 Following the August meetings 
and agreement on a “code of conduct,” relations between the two countries improved. 
Ramos released the 62 detained Chinese anglers in two batches the next month and, in 
November, released another group of 14 Chinese anglers on compassionate grounds.65 
During a November meeting between Jiang and Ramos in Osaka before the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, the Chinese President reiterated that the PRC 
posed no threat to the peace and stability in the Asia Pacific, and that China and the Phil­
ippines could resolve their differences through friendly talks, while Ramos made little
fuss over naval encounters off Subic Bay with ships of possible Chinese origins.66 At a
later meeting between Ramos and Li Peng at the first Asia-Europe Meeting held in Bang­
62 The Straits Times, 12 August 1995.
63 The Straits Times, 11 August 1995.
64 Lee, 110. Also, see The Straits Times, 11 August 1995.
65 The Straits Times, 10 November 1995.
66 According to Lee, Beijing denied any knowledge of the suspect ships and their activities. Lee, 110. Also, 
see The Straits Times, 30 January and 12 February 1996.
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kok in March 1996, both sides agreed to keep their ships away from the disputed areas in
f\1the Spratlys to avoid possible conflict. Cooperation in the Spratlys between Beijing and 
Manila was subsequently furthered during bilateral meetings at the vice-ministerial level 
later that month, where several important confidence-building measures (CBMs) were 
established to facilitate cooperation in the areas of piracy, smuggling, fishing, environ­
mental protection, the establishment of communication systems for military garrisons in 
the Spratlys as well initializing military exchanges between the two sides.68 Concerning 
the Chinese presence on Mischief Reef, it was agreed that the issue would be set aside for 
the time being.69 The agreement to put the territorial issue on hold and pursue joint de­
velopment of the area was reiterated by the Chinese at subsequent interactions between
70Beijing and Manila
The marked improvement in Chinese-Filipino relations witnessed during the later 
half of 1995 and 1996 did not last. Nonetheless, Beijing’s bilateral diplomacy with Ma­
nila during this period did reveal hints of a change in the PRC’s overall position vis-a-vis 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea. While negotiations with Manila conformed, 
for the most part, to China’s traditional strategy of seeking bilateral resolution of its terri­
torial disputes in the Southeast Asian maritime environment, the Chinese acknowledg­
ment that multilateral venues and CBM mechanisms concerning the Spratlys dispute 
were a possibility in the future was highly significant. It suggested that shared knowl­
edge (ASEAN set a high value on China’s willingness to discuss the territorial disputes
67 The Straits Times, 3 March 1996.
68 The Straits Times, 15 March 1996.
69 Ibid. Interestingly, the Chinese used the bilateral meeting to assure that Beijing’s missile tests being con­
ducted at the time in the Taiwan Strait was not a threat to the Philippines nor to the 100,000 or so Filipinos 
living in Taiwan, and that China’s military maneuvers would not lead to war with the ROC.
70 During Philippine Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon’s June visit to China, an during President Jiang 
Zemin’s official visit to the Philippines following that year’s APEC summit held at Subic Bay in Novem­
ber.
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multilaterally in its threat evaluation of China) gained earlier by the Chinese through in­
teraction with ASEAN states at the yearly Track II Indonesian-sponsored workshops 
(discussed below) played a part in Beijing’s subsequent reevaluation of its diplomatic ap­
proach (both bilateral and multilateral) toward the most difficult problem in PRC- 
ASEAN relations.
Vietnam
The territorial dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea is ar­
guably the most serious of all the PRC’s disputes in the Southeast Asian maritime region. 
One reason is that both Beijing and Hanoi claim the whole South China Sea as their sov­
ereign territory. Another reason is that both countries have the most substantial military 
and defense presence of all the South China Sea states and, therefore, China and Vietnam 
constitute the major players in the conflicts. Since the end of the Cold War and the resul­
tant collapse of the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam are two of only a handful of social­
ist states remaining in the world. The normalization of relations between the PRC and 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in November 1991 was, in all likelihood, a con­
sequence of these major events and the resulting strategic situation facing both states.71 
According to Lee Lai To, a mutual fear of “peaceful evolution” and “attempts allegedly 
initiated by the West to undermine socialist regimes by stirring up issues such as human 
rights” was the chief reason for bilateral discussions leading to the normalization of Chi­
nese-Vietnamese relations.72 In any event, one of — if not the — major challenges facing 
both sides in establishing friendly relations remains the territorial disputes along the land 
border, as well as in the Tonkin Gulf and the South China Sea.
71 Lee, 92-93.
72 Ibid.
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At the Sino-Vietnamese Summit of November 1991, agreements were reached 
concerning trade and border affairs, and during Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen’s 
visit to Vietnam the following year agreements on economic cooperation and visa exemp-
n'X •  •  •tion were concluded. These diplomatic milestones were furthered during subsequent 
high-level meetings throughout the 1990s where the two states deepened relations (espe­
cially in economic cooperation): Premier Li Peng’s December 1992 visit to Vietnam; 
Vietnamese President Le Due Anh’s November 1993 trip to Beijing and President Jiang 
Zemin’s reciprocal visit to Vietnam late in 1994; the second visit of Communist Party 
General Secretary Do Muoi to China in 1995; and Premier Vo Van Kiet’s trip to Beijing 
early in 1996. The territorial issues were apparently placed on the sidelines during the 
early 1990s, and both sides agreed to settle these outstanding disputes through peaceful 
negotiations.74 However, as talks between Hanoi and Beijing were progressing, Vietnam 
further complicated matters concerning the territorial dispute with China by awarding 
contracts to quite a number of foreign firms for offshore oil and gas exploration in the 
Dai Hung oil field located off the southeast coast of Vietnam — an area of the South 
China Sea claimed by China.75 In reaction to Hanoi’s actions, the PRC published its 
1992 Proclamation of China’s Law on Territorial Sea and made known its May 1992 deal 
with the American oil exploration company Crestone Energy Corporation to drill in an 
offshore area claimed by Vietnam.
73 The Straits Times, 9 March 1992.
74 Ibid. During Qian Qichen’s 1992 visit, both sides agreed to establish a group of experts to discuss the 
disputes.
75 Hanoi had awarded contracts to firms from Great Britain, Australia, Canada, France, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, and the Netherlands to explore and develop the Dai Hung (or Big Bear) oil 
field off Vietnam’s southeast coast. See Lee, 94 and The Straits Times, 27 Junel992.
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China’s Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, ratified by the Na­
tional People’s Congress in February 1992, underlined a more assertive stance in Bei­
jing’s territorial claims in the region. In addition to reiterating China’s territorial claims 
to the Paracel and Spratly Islands, the Law on the Territorial Sea also asserted and docu­
mented China’s claim over most of the remaining territory in the entire South China Sea! 
Beijing’s assertiveness in establishing its legal claim of ownership over the maritime re­
gion was reinforced by an aggressive declaration of the legal right of hot pursuit against
• •  1 ( \ foreign ships if they violated Chinese laws and regulations. The PRC’s Law on the Ter­
ritorial Sea cast considerable doubt among the ASEAN states concerning China’s oft- 
stated peaceful and benign intentions in the South China Sea. As a result, China’s image 
in Southeast Asia moved again toward one of “threat” and perhaps even toward an image 
of “enemy-in-the-future” for certain ASEAN states. Additionally, as mentioned above, 
China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) had signed a contract in May of 
that year with Crestone Energy Corporation to explore for oil and natural gas in a large 
area of the Wanan Bei-21 (or Vanguard Bank-21) block. These provocative moves taken 
by Beijing in early 1992 were further highlighted by statements made by senior Chinese 
military officers indicating the need for a more assertive and aggressive defense of 
China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. General Zhang Xusan, the deputy 
commander-in-chief of the Chinese navy, argued in early 1992 that China should adjust 
its naval strategy and capabilities to better protect and develop offshore oil and gas re-
76 See Beijing Review, 30 March - 5 April 1992,6-7. The Chinese delegation distributed copies of the 
“Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone” to the other par­
ticipants attending the third workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea held in 
Yogyakarta, 28 June-2 July.
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77  • • •serves in the South China Sea. In addition, statements made by the president of 
Crestone, Randall Thompson, claiming that the PRC had promised to protect Crestone’s 
oil exploration operations in the Wanan Bei-21 area with its naval forces, further exacer-
•  • 78bated feelings of ill will between the two disputants.
The reaction from Hanoi was quick. Vietnamese officials reminded Beijing that 
both sides had reached an agreement that neither side should take any provocative actions 
that might complicate the situation in the South China Sea and demanded that China an-
70 #
nul the contract with Crestone. Hanoi, as the old saying goes, wanted to “have its cake 
and eat it too.” However, in spite of the row over offshore drilling in contested waters 
and the fallout from China’s 1992 Law of the Sea, Beijing and Hanoi nonetheless contin­
ued to seek a diplomatic solution to their territorial disputes along the mainland border, in 
the Tonkin Gulf, and in the South China Sea. These efforts focused primarily on resolv­
ing the contested mainland border and the territorial dispute in the Tonkin Gulf. The 
Paracels and Spratlys were apparently too controversial a topic for either side to broach in
a serious manner. An agreement was ultimately reached in October 1993 stipulating that
80both sides would follow a set of general principles on handling these disputes. In addi­
tion, the agreement established two working groups at the expert level to conduct follow-
81up talks, one for the land border and the other for the Tonkin Gulf. After many succes-
77 The Straits Times, 7 April 1992.
78 See Beijing Review (20-26 July 1992): 5; and The Straits Times, 23 June 1992. Thompson confirmed 
Beijing’s promise of military protection in Crestone’s area of operations during a telephone conversation. 
Randall Thompson, interview by author, telephone conversation, July 1992.
79 The Straits Times, 19 May 1992.
80 Both sides agreed to speed up negotiations on the border, avoid actions that could complicate the situa­
tion, and eschew the use of force over border disputes. The Straits Times, 20 October 1993.
81 Lee, 95.
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• 89sive rounds of talks, neither working group reach any tangible settlements. Talks on the 
South China Sea disputes were even less successful. In an attempt to jumpstart the 
stalled negotiations on the Paracel and Spratly islands, a special group of experts was es­
tablished to address these disputes specifically.
During Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s November 1994 trip to Hanoi, both sides 
agreed to establish a group of experts (GEM) to work on this most difficult problem. The 
GEM decided in July of 1995 that the Spratlys dispute could be negotiated, but not the 
dispute over ownership of the Paracels. It seems that Beijing’s refusal to discuss the 
Paracels was due to China’s complete military control of the archipelago. Beijing’s 
agreement to put the Spratlys on the negotiating table, however, is important in that it 
represented a significant and notable change in China’s historic position on the issue con­
sidering that as recently as Premier Li Peng’s visit to Hanoi in late 1992 the Chinese had 
been unwilling to discuss any of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. These 
moves made it apparent that during the first half of the 1990s Beijing had began to soften 
its stance toward Vietnam vis-a-vis territorial issues by agreeing to limited talks and co­
operative projects such as the joint working groups previously discussed. In doing so, 
Beijing prevented these issues from adversely affecting China’s warming relations with 
Vietnam.84
At a higher level of analysis, China’s image in Vietnam had, since the end of the 
Cold War, undergone change from one of “threat” and “enemy” toward an image of a
82 By January 1998, the working group on the land border had participated in eleven rounds of talks without 
any real progress, and by March, the group working on the border in the Tonkin Gulf had convened ten 
rounds of talks with results no more substantial than agreeing to base talks upon the spirit of international 
law and practice. See BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Part 3: Asia Pacific, FED3118, 01/07/98.
83 The Straits Times, 3 December 1992.
84 Lee, 97.
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more “friendly” and “cooperative” (while at the same time also a “competitive”) neighbor 
to the north. Admittedly, the positive transition of China’s national image in Vietnam 
during this period was affected mostly by increased cooperation between the two coun-
Of
tries in economic and social-cultural issues. Both sides realized that the territorial dis­
putes remained a very real and ever-present point of conflict between China and Vietnam 
and, as such, constituted the greatest obstacle to improving Sino-Vietnamese relations. 
Both sides, however, also believed that the benefits of warmer, closer PRC-DRVN rela­
tions were of greater importance than seeking a solution of the South China Sea disputes 
favorable to themselves. Both sides were, therefore, ultimately unwilling to allow the 
disputes over the Paracels and Spratlys to undermine progress toward good relations be­
tween the two socialist countries. The difficulty was that neither side completely trusted 
the other. Because of this lack of complete trust, each side continued to make aggressive 
moves and take assertive action to strengthen their territorial claims.
What is important for this case study is that Beijing’s diplomacy (however taci­
turn it appeared at the time) prevented the territorial disputes from jeopardizing China’s 
goal of forging closer relations with Vietnam. There is little doubt that as Vietnam 
moved closer toward full ASEAN membership, Beijing’s bilateral diplomacy with Hanoi 
concerning the territorial disputes became more urgent and focused, as the Chinese be­
lieved that it would be far better to reach some tentative understanding with Vietnam be­
fore it gained the advantage of direct ASEAN support. The Vietnamese, on the other 
hand, were stalling on the South China Sea issue while at the same time moving forward 
in bilateral talks and agreements with China in other areas such as trade, economic aid,
85 For example, during the visit of Premier Vo Van Kiet to China in February 1996, an agreement was 
reached for the resumption of railway connections between China and Vietnam. The Straits Times, 13 Feb­
ruary 1996.
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and cultural exchanges. Hanoi would wait until Vietnam was a full ASEAN member be­
fore seriously addressing the territorial disputes with China. After all, when confronting 
large powerful states, it is to the advantage of small weak states to form a unified posi­
tion, take collective action, and implement multilateral strategies to lessen the asymmet­
rical balance of power favoring the large powerful state. This explains, in part, the lack 
of any substantial progress in resolving the territorial disputes in the South China Sea be­
fore Vietnamese accession to full ASEAN membership. Progress made by Beijing and 
Hanoi through bilateral talks on the land border and maritime boundary in the Gulf of 
Tonkin was significant and impressive, but these achievements represent “easier” conces­
sions made by both sides that served to keep Sino-Vietnamese relations headed in the 
right direction and mitigate tensions over the disputed Paracel and Spratly islands. Bei­
jing could demonstrate its good neighborliness to Hanoi (and the ASEAN states), thereby 
lessen the image of China as a “threat,” and promote its “good neighbor” image in the 
region. Hanoi, on the other hand, chose both bilateral and multilateral venues to address 
the territorial dispute with China, but expected greater success through the multilateral 
ASEAN process. Hanoi, it seems, used the prospect of future multilateral discussion of 
the South China Sea issue (where Vietnam would have the advantage of being part of a 
collective in discussions with China) as advantage in its bilateral dealings with Beijing to 
maximize its gains.
Through its bilateral diplomacy with both Vietnam and the Philippines, Beijing 
came to realize in the mid-1990s that China would ultimately have to address the South 
China Sea disputes within ASEAN’s multilateral framework as both Hanoi and Manila 
sought the advantage of confronting China as a group and therefore were unwilling to
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address seriously the disputes on a bilateral level. This realization was also founded upon 
Beijing’s growing understanding and appreciation of the high level of importance 
ASEAN placed on Beijing’s willingness to accept a multilateralization of the territorial 
disputes in its evaluation of Chinese intentions. Clearly, if Beijing wished to change 
ASEAN threat perceptions of China for the better, Beijing had to accept multilateral talks 
thereby demonstrating a cooperative, good neighborly attitude. Moreover, only by doing 




A major turning point in Sino-ASEAN relations occurred in July 1991 when 
China received an invitation to attend that year’s ASEAN Ministerial Meeting as a guest 
of the hosting country, Malaysia. It was the beginning of ASEAN’s policy of engaging 
China so that this rising economic and military power might be “socialized” into accept­
ing the shared norms of behavior and interaction of the ASEAN states and thereby de­
crease or manage the “China threat.”86 The Chinese were eager as well to engage the 
ASEAN states and promote an image of China in Southeast Asia as a friendly, coopera­
tive “good neighbor.” To Beijing, this was part of a larger foreign policy strategy initi­
ated in the 1980s aimed at promoting a peaceful international environment conducive to 
China’s continuing economic growth and development, as well as breaking China’s post-
86 For an excellent discussion of the complementary economic and normative perspectives of China and 
ASEAN, see Gungwu Wang, “China and Southeast Asia: The Context of a New Beginning,” in Power 
Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2005), 187-204.
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Tiananmen isolation and balancing against American regional hegemony.87 Chinese For­
eign Minister Qian Qichen’s attendance at the July 1991 AMM held in Kuala Lumpur 
provided Beijing an excellent opportunity to implement its GND in the region. Qian 
made it clear that China desired closer relations with ASEAN and that increased coopera­
tion in the economic, political, scientific-technological, and security fields would yield 
mutual benefits. Chinese assistance in various high-tech sectors such as microelectron­
ics, telecommunications, and aviation would greatly benefit the ASEAN economies, as 
would Beijing’s backing of ASEAN’s effort at a settlement of the Cambodian issue, since 
without Chinese assistance (China was the main backer of the Khmer Rouge) a solution 
of the Cambodian situation was all but impossible.88 The South China Sea issue was not 
addressed at the meeting, as Qian quite obviously did not wish to sour the talks by dis­
cussing China’s claim of “indisputable” sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly islands. 
The ASEAN delegates, not wanting the first China-ASEAN interaction to go badly, also 
avoided this controversial issue. At any rate, the major security concern for ASEAN in 
1991 was Cambodia and Chinese assistance was deemed essential for a peaceful resolu­
tion of the conflict.
China’s next encounter with ASEAN at the July 1992 AMM hosted by the Philip­
pines was not as copasetic as the 1991 meeting had been, as ASEAN took the opportunity 
of raising the issue of the South China Sea. ASEAN states, especially the Philippines, 
brought up the South China Sea disputes with China, trying to determine what Beijing’s 
future moves might be. Beijing had passed its Law on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
87 See Jianwei Wang, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the new Millennium,” in China Rising: Power 
and Motivation in Chinese foreign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2005), 159-200.
88 T OT
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tiguous Zone in February 1992, and signed a contract in May with Crestone Energy Cor­
poration to prospect for gas and oil in disputed waters of the South China Sea. In addi­
tion, Washington had announced plans to withdraw American military forces from Subic 
Bay by the end of 1992, increasing the security concerns vis-a-vis China of ASEAN, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines in particular.
Qian Qichen anticipated a debate on the South China Sea and preempted the issue 
during his earlier bilateral talks with Philippine Foreign Minister Raul Manglapus in 
Brunei. Qian stated that China would not fill any power “vacuum” in Southeast Asia, 
and also that the “informal” workshop held in Bandung was a “positive” undertaking and 
that China would give positive consideration to some of the understandings reached at the 
workshop. Specifically, Qian maintained that Beijing fully supported the proposals of the 
Chinese experts at the workshop to increase cooperation among the maritime states of the 
South China Sea in the areas of navigation, meteorology, and scientific research. Qian did 
not believe that the South China Sea would become a new focus of conflict, insisting that 
China’s policy emphasized peaceful solution of the dispute through bilateral or multilat­
eral negotiations and that the disputes over the Spratlys could be put on hold until the 
time was ripe for discussion. Qian also indicated that Beijing was agreeable to joint ex-
OQ
ploration of the resources in the disputed areas.
The 1992 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila opened with a speech by Philip­
pine President Ramos who set the tone of the talks by stating that the Spratly dispute 
could no longer be put on hold. To the chagrin of the Chinese, Ramos called for an inter­
national meeting to settle the issue. As the meeting progressed, other ASEAN states be­
sides the Philippines asked specific questions concerning China’s intentions in the area,
89 FBiS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-92-141, Ql122192; my emphasis.
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especially about Beijing’s exploration deal with Crestone Energy Corporation. Foreign 
Minister Qian gave somewhat ambiguous answers, stating that Chinese actions in the 
area did not contradict the principles articulated earlier by Beijing.90 Not satisfied with 
the answers given by the Chinese delegates, and facing growing pressure from the Philip­
pines and Vietnam (attending as an “observer”), the ministers issued the ASEAN Decla­
ration on the South China Sea.91 The Declaration stated general principles based on the 
joint statement of the 1991 informal workshop held in Bandung and the 1976 Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation, urging disputant states to renounce the use of force and exercise 
self-restraint, and set aside issues of sovereignty while exploring joint cooperation in the 
area.92 The declaration, however, was for both the Philippines and Vietnam a much
QTweaker and watered-down version than what they had hoped. While Manila and Hanoi 
were unhappy with the declaration’s timidity, Beijing only accepted a few of the basic 
principles articulated in the Declaration, and rejected the remainder as China considered 
areas in the South China Sea such as the Paracels and Pratas to fall outside the purview of 
ASEAN. Further, the Chinese were obviously concerned that the Declaration might lead 
to multilateral discussions on issues of sovereignty and jurisdiction in disputed areas of 
the South China Sea, which could weaken China’s claim in the Spratlys. According to 
Qian, China would only enter into such talks when the conditions to do so were “ripe.”94 
Qian suggested that quiet diplomacy was the most prudent approach, as public discus­
90 FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-92-142, 07/23/92.
91 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Declaration on the South China 
Sea (22 July 1992). http://www.aseansec.org/3634.htm (accessed 5 August 2005).
92 Lee, 25.
93 Apparently, most ASEAN officials were afraid that a more strongly worded statement might offend Bei­
jing and pressure China into using the “Cambodian card” (perhaps resupply the Khmer Rouge with arms) 
in retaliation. See BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Part 3: Far East, FE/1438, A2/2, 7/21/92.
94 BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Part 3: Far East, FE/1441, Al/2, 7/24/92.
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sions might engender “a longer time for tensions to subside, or might in fact heighten cur­
rent tensions in the region.”95
China’s first major interaction with ASEAN on the South China Sea disputes at 
the Track I level revealed that Beijing was hesitant, to say the least, in discussing the is­
sue, except to state that the PRC intended to promote cooperation and joint development 
among the claimants by shelving the sovereignty issue (ideas, as we shall see below, that 
the Chinese learned through earlier interaction with ASEAN states at the Track II Indo­
nesian workshops). Clearly, the Chinese recognized by then that they would have to ad­
dress the territorial disputes within ASEAN’s multilateral process if Beijing’s desire of 
improved China-ASEAN relations was to be realized.96 Chinese participation at the 26th 
AMM as a guest of hosting Singapore the following year was significant in that it re­
vealed Beijing’s desire for stronger relations with ASEAN not only in economic, scien-
07tific, and technological areas, but also in security matters. In a move to assuage 
ASEAN fears of a growing “China threat” Qian emphasized that China did not, and 
would not in the future seek hegemony in Southeast Asia. Further, Qian stated that 
through dialogue at all levels and venues all parties could reach mutual understanding
08and agreement regarding the principles and mechanisms underwriting regional security. 
When the ASEAN ministers asked for a full Chinese endorsement and support of the 
ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Qian responded that following the 1992 
AMM he had written to Philippine Foreign Secretary Roberto Romulo (who had then
95 The Straits Times, 22 July 1992.
96 Lee, 26-27.
97 Even before the 1993 AMM, Qian Qichen made it known to Singapore’s Foreign Minister Wong Kan 
Seng that the PRC would be pleased to participate with ASEAN in regional security dialogues. See FBIS, 
Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-93-140, 07/23/93.
98 FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-93-141, 07/26/93.
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been chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee) stating that the Declaration’s princi­
ples were mostly identical with those of China." However, while Qian indicated Chinese 
support for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and Nuclear Weapons 
Free Zone (NWFZ) in Southeast Asia, he also made it clear that Beijing would not neces­
sarily sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, as China was not geo­
graphically situated in Southeast Asia.100 Nonetheless, Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng 
extended an invitation to China to join the new ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a con­
sultative partner during an “informal” dinner on 24 July 1993.101
The ARF was established at the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and Post Minis­
terial Conference held in Singapore in July 1993. During the ARF’s July 1994 inaugural 
meeting in Bangkok, the institution identified two primary objectives: (1) “to foster con­
structive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest 
and concern” and (2) “to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence- 
building and preventative diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.”102 Considering that the 
South China Sea disputes between China and several ASEAN states directly affected se­
curity interests of many of the region’s states (who were ARF members as well), it 
seemed logical that the territorial disputes should be included in the ARF’s agenda. 
Vietnam and the Philippines certainly hoped that this would be the case. As could have 
been expected, China objected to the disputes issue being included in the agenda.
Concerning the Spratlys problem, Qian Qichen indicated in April 1994 to senior 
Thai Foreign Ministry officials that China opposed including the issue in the ARF
99The Straits Times, 24 July 1993.
100 FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-93-141, 07/26/93.
101 Ibid.
102 ASEAN Regional Forum, http://www.aseanregionalforum.org (accessed 12 February 2006).
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agenda. Instead, Qian argued that the ARF should focus on confidence-building meas­
ures (CBMs).103 The inaugural ARF Bangkok meeting was premised upon the theme 
“Security in the Asia Pacific: Challenges, Opportunities and Confidence Building Meas­
ures in the Context of Preventive Diplomacy,” but the Spratlys issue did not become a 
point of contention. ASEAN officials had proposed that speakers not raise any conten­
tious issues, and Beijing was eager to avoid the issue altogether.104 During his address, 
Qian Qichen proposed some ideas concerning security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
and enunciated China’s policy on regional security. While side stepping the Spratlys im­
broglio, Qian stated that some territorial and border issues leftover from the past had to 
be resolved. And while Beijing supported the establishment of the ARF and saw it as an 
excellent forum for joint exploration for “effective ways to eliminate any destabilizing 
factors and strengthen and enhance peace and stability in the region,” Qian also empha­
sized the importance of bilateral diplomacy in mitigating specific issues between coun­
tries, citing China’s successful use of bilateral talks in building trust and confidence 
(CBMs) between itself and some of its Southeast Asian neighbors.105 Exemplifying Bei­
jing’s belief in bilateral negotiation, Qian utilized the occasion to pursue bilateral talks 
with other foreign ministers on the sidelines of the multilateral forum. Among others, 
Qian met with the foreign ministers of both the Philippines and Vietnam, but apparently 
these talks only touched upon South China Sea issues in a general way.106 In an effort to 
dispel fears expressed in Bangkok by some of the ASEAN states of the rise of Chinese 
military and economic power, Qian proclaimed at a press conference that China advo­
103 Lianhe Zaobao, 5 April 1994 as cited in Lee, 31.
104 The Straits Times, 13 July 1994.
105 FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-94-143, 07/26/94.
106 FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-94-142, 07/25/94.
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cated leaving sovereignty issues aside while exploring joint development of the natural 
resources in the South China Sea (again, a position that China learned would be wel­
comed by ASEAN at earlier informal workshops sponsored by Indonesia). Qian would 
not, however discuss issues of sovereignty. Clearly, neither China nor ASEAN were 
comfortable at the first meeting of the ARF with discussing the territorial disputes di­
rectly. Both sides at the time placed more importance on promoting cooperation between 
China and ASEAN at the higher level and using the ARF venue for discussing CBMs for 
the Asia-Pacific in general, than directly addressing the difficult South China Sea is­
sues.107 This reluctance of ASEAN to confront China over the maritime territorial dis­
putes, however, was not long-lived.
As mentioned above, the 1995 Mischief Reef affair between China and the Phil­
ippines increased anxiety among the ASEAN states, adding new fuel to the China threat 
thesis, especially in Manila and Hanoi. Furthermore, following the outbreak of the Mis­
chief Reef crisis, the United States (a member of the ARF) took concerted action at the 
Bangkok meeting to have the Spratlys issue discussed at the second ARF meeting while, 
at the same time, applying direct diplomatic pressure on Beijing concerning the Sprat­
lys.108 In addition to American concerns, other countries and users of the vital sea-lanes 
through the South China Sea, such as Japan, Singapore, the European Union, and even 
Moscow, expressed their concern and displeasure regarding the Spratlys imbroglio.109 
The failed attempt by the Philippines to gain consensus at the 1994 ARF meeting for a
107 Lee, 33-34.
108 During an April 1995 meeting in New York between Qian Qichen and Warren Christopher, Qian was 
told that Washington could not support a Chinese use, or threatened use o f force to resolve the Spratlys 
dispute. Additionally, the U.S. Department of State issued a statement on the South China Sea in May de­
claring that the U.S. would “view with serious concern any maritime claim, or restriction on maritime ac­
tivity, in the South China Sea that was not consistent with international law, including the 1992 United Na­
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea.” The Straits Times, 21 April 1995.
109 Lee, 35.
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collective ASEAN position on the Spratlys revealed a strong reluctance, on the part of 
ASEAN, to confront Beijing on the Spratlys issue for fear of jeopardizing improving rela­
tions with the PRC. Instead, the ASEAN ministers agreed to air their views on the Sprat­
lys individually at the upcoming ARF Senior Officials Meeting (ARF-SOM) in July 
1995.110
Then, in March 1995, ASEAN took a stronger position with China vis-a-vis the 
Spratlys dispute by issuing the Joint Statement on the South China Sea urging all con­
cerned parties to adhere to the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea of 1992.111 
ASEAN’s statement indicated that the Spratlys issue was increasingly becoming a major 
point of contention in China-A SEAN relations. ASEAN was determined to broach the 
issue with Beijing due in part to strong lobbying efforts by Vietnam and the Philippines, 
and a downturn in China’s image among the ASEAN states from “cooperative” and 
“friendly” toward China as a “threat.” Obviously, the territorial disputes were becoming 
a problem for Beijing and had the potential to destroy recent progress toward deepening 
relations with ASEAN. If China-ASEAN relations were to improve further, Beijing 
clearly had to find a solution to the problem. The Chinese had to prevent the South China 
Sea issues from jeopardizing relations with ASEAN while at the same time defending 
and maintaining the PRC’s claims of territorial sovereignty. An opportunity to do so pre­
sented itself in April 1995.
At the first ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting (ASEAN-China SOM) on 
political and security issues hosted by China in April 1995, the Spratlys dispute was
110 The Straits Times, 23 May 1995.
111 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, Twenty-eighth ASEAN Ministerial Meet­
ing, Post Ministerial Conferences and Dialogue Partners and ASEAN Regional Forum (Jakarta: 1995): 66, 
86 .
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raised, in light of the Mischief Reef Incident, even though it was not an agenda item. 
China had little choice but to respond. Tang Jiaxuan, China’s head delegate, made an 
unexpected move by discussing the Spratlys informally with key ASEAN officials after 
dinner in a separate room. While reiterating China’s position on the disputes and voicing 
Beijing’s rejection of a proposal to set up a working group to examine territorial and sov­
ereignty issues of the Spratlys, Tang suggested that the Spratlys problem could be dis-
119cussed at the next ASEAN-China SOM to be held the next year in Indonesia. To the 
Chinese, it was apparent that the Spratlys issue was becoming an international affair - the 
very thing Beijing did not want - and had the potential of derailing China-ASEAN rela­
tions. Clearly, the Spratlys dispute had to either be resolved or somehow made a non­
issue in China’s relations with ASEAN so that Beijing’s overall plan of forging closer 
relations with ASEAN and resisting American and Japanese influence in the region could 
move forward. Tang’s commitment at the first ASEAN-China SOM in Hangzhou to fix­
ture multilateral discussions about the Spratlys revealed, for the first time, that Beijing 
was investigating new approaches to mitigate the negative impact of China’s territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea on China-ASEAN relations. It appears that through 
China’s initial interactions with ASEAN beginning in 1991, some Chinese came to be­
lieve that the “ASEAN Way” of informal talks and the consensus-based approach could 
be used to China’s own advantage. By agreeing to discuss the Spratlys issue in the multi­
lateral ASEAN-China SOM, Beijing reasoned that China could more effectively control 
the pace of the discussions (maintain the slowest possible pace) while, at the same time, 
improve China’s image in Southeast Asia. A more “cooperative” and “friendly” image
112 Lee, 35. Also see Lianhe Zaobao, 24 March 1998 as cited by Lee where an article about Tang Jiaxuan 
mentions the arrangements made at the 1995 Hangzhou meeting.
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could help assuage ASEAN fears of a growing China threat and thereby move PRC- 
ASEAN relations ahead.
However, China’s commitment to multilateral discussion on the Spratlys at this 
time was limited only to the ASEAN-China SOM venue, as Beijing continued to resist 
the issue’s inclusion in the ARF agenda where the U.S. was a member.113 Nonetheless, 
this commitment to a multilateral approach is a key indicator of Beijing’s GND as it 
demonstrated Chinese commitment to cooperation and promoted China’s “good 
neighbor” image in the region. Apparently, the Chinese foreign policy establishment had 
not yet reached a consensus on the PRC’s approach to handling the South China Sea dis­
putes. While domestic Chinese politics is outside this study’s purview, it appears that the 
Foreign Ministry began to favor a more cooperative, multilateral approach to the disputes 
at the time, while hard-liners within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) believed that 
China should continue the traditional bilateral approach based on the “inviolability” of 
Chinese sovereign territory. At any rate, it is important to note here that an alternative 
approach to the South China Sea disputes was taking shape within the Chinese leader­
ship. To some, a new approach existed that would allow China to both mitigate the ill- 
effects of the territorial disputes on improving China-ASEAN relations and at the same 
time defend PRC claims of territorial sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys.
At the second ARF meeting held in August 1995 in Brunei, China proved unable 
to prevent discussion of the South China Sea issues, but Vice Premier and Foreign Minis­
ter Qian Qichen could, and did, manage to lessen the severity of the ARF Chairman’s of­
113 Beijing vehemently resisted the “internationalization” o f the Spratlys dispute, which explains China’s 
hesitancy to discuss the issue at the ARF.
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ficial report of 1 August 1995.114 Qian’s address of the ARF delegates on Asia-Pacific
security issues did not mention the Spratlys directly, but it did give an indication of the
Chinese position on the issue. Qian stated that China
advocates the development of regional cooperation in security matters in stages in 
the spirit of dealing with issues in ascending order of difficulty, and of seeking 
common ground while reserving differences. For some time to come, the coun­
tries concerned may hold preliminary informal discussions and consultations on 
the principles, content, scope and method of cooperation in security matters. 
Meanwhile, they should carry out specific activities of cooperation on which the 
parties concerned have reached a consensus or which are not highly contentious, 
and institute some practical and feasible confidence-building measures in a grad­
ual manner. It is not enough to limit confidence-building measures to the military 
sphere only; they should encompass various fields -  political, economic and so­
cial.115
Addressing the Spratlys specifically, Qian reiterated Beijing’s long-held position 
that a solution of the Spratlys issue should be pursued through bilateral talks, contradict­
ing his earlier 1992 statements as well as the promise of multilateral talks made by Tang 
in 1995 at the first ASEAN-China SOM in Hangzhou. Chinese diplomacy must have 
seemed schizophrenic to some ASEAN delegates attending the second ARF meeting in 
Brunei -  is China willing or not to discuss the Spratlys at a multilateral venue? In defer­
ence to growing concerns over China’s increasing military power on the part of ASEAN 
states, Qian emphasized that China’s military was defensive in its strategic posture and 
posed no threat to the region. Further, in an attempt at mitigating ASEAN fears, Qian 
announced that the PRC would promote greater military transparency in the region by
114 The chair’s report mentioned, for the first time, the South China Sea disputes specifically, stating that 
the foreign ministers of the ARF “expressed concern on overlapping sovereignty claims in the region. They 
encouraged all claimants to reaffirm their commitment to the principles contained in relevant international 
laws and convention, and the ASEAN’s 1992 Declaration on the South China Sea.” Association of South­
east Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, Twenty-eighth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Post Ministerial Con­
ferences and Dialogue Partners and ASEAN Regional Forum (Jakarta: 1995): 84.
115 FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-95-148, 08/02/95.
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publishing white papers on China’s military modernization and national defense policies 
at an appropriate time.116
Clearly, by 1995 Beijing’s approach to ASEAN and the South China Sea disputes 
had moved away from a complete reluctance to addressing the problematic issue multilat- 
erally, allowing for the possibility of such an approach in the future. This partial accep­
tance of multilateral talks indicates that Beijing understood the premium placed on multi­
lateralism by ASEAN as an indicator of China’s cooperative and friendly intentions. 
While some more hawkish elements in Beijing continued to favor the traditional, bilateral 
approach, others were coming to the realization that Beijing would have to address 
China’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea within a limited multilateral frame­
work if China-ASEAN relations were to widen and deepen in the future. The members 
of the latter group understood that it was necessary for Beijing to convince the ASEAN 
states that the PRC was not a threat, but rather a cooperative partner. Agreeing to discuss 
the South China Sea disputes at multilateral forums would afford Beijing an opportunity 
of improving China’s image among the ASEAN countries. After all, Vice Foreign Min­
ister Tang Jiaxuan committed China to multilateral discussion on the Spratlys at the inau­
gural ASEAN-China SOM in Hangzhou.
The question remained, however, if consensus yet existed in Beijing for imple­
menting the new approach. Three such multilateral forums scheduled for 1996 would 
allow Beijing excellent opportunities to promote a friendly, cooperative, “good neighbor” 
image of China in Southeast Asia: the ARF SOM (May); the second ASEAN-China 
SOM (June); and the third ARF meeting to be held in Jakarta in July. By putting forward
116 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, Twenty-eighth ASEAN Ministerial Meet­
ing, Post Ministerial Conferences and Dialogue Partners and ASEAN Regional Forum, 66. Beijing pub­
lished its first defense White Paper in November 1995.
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a friendly, more cooperative image, Beijing might deemphasize the South China Sea is­
sues since they were detrimental influences on China-ASEAN relations, dispel the 
“China threat” thesis, and thereby lessen American influence in the region. If Beijing 
succeeded in reaffirming its GND there would be no need for ASEAN to strengthen rela­
tions with Washington. In order to implement the new approach, however, Chinese lead­
ers opposing the plan needed to be convinced that China could “catch more flies with 
honey than with vinegar.”
At the May 1996 ARF SOM, the South China Sea disputes were discussed in 
preparation for the July ARF Jakarta meeting. Accepting the fact that the territorial dis­
putes would be an issue at the upcoming ARF meeting that could no longer be side­
stepped, Beijing proactively ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS)117 shortly after the ARF SOM in preparation for the upcoming ARF 
meeting. The UNCLOS treaty established an international legal framework for the 
world’s international waters to “contribute to the strengthening of peace, security, co­
operation and friendly relations among all nations in conformity with the principles of 
justice and equal rights and will promote the economic and social advancement of all 
peoples of the world, in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Na-
I  -I o
tions as set forth in the Charter.” The treaty also established a legal framework for de­
termining a country’s territorial borders and resolving territorial disputes, as well as de­
termining and demarking international waterways and international rights of safe pas­
sage. By ratifying the UNCLOS and thereby signaling to the world that the People’s Re­
public of China agreed to be bound by international law (as represented by UNCLOS),
117 UNCLOS was established on 10 December 1982 at Montego Bay.
118 United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law o f the Seas (UNCLOS), http://www.un.org/ 
Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm (accessed 9 July 2005).
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Chinese delegates would arrive in Jakarta with demonstrable evidence that China was 
indeed a “cooperative” player who accepted and followed international law and the law 
of the sea. In addition, by following through on its earlier promise to accede to the provi­
sions of UNCLOS119, Beijing reinforced an image in Southeast Asia (and beyond) of a 
“trustworthy” China.
The second ASEAN-China SOM held in Bukit Tinggi in June 1996 gave the Chi­
nese yet another excellent opportunity to make good on Tang Jiaxuan’s 1995 promise and 
thereby demonstrate that the People’s Republic of China honored its commitments and 
valued a cooperative relationship with ASEAN. Although discussion on the Spratlys is­
sue was not on the agenda, the Chinese did address the disputes directly and proposed the 
establishment of a working group of experts from both sides to exchange views on mari­
time law. In addition, China indicated that it was willing to contribute to an ASEAN 
fund to promote China-ASEAN relations.120 Beijing’s more cooperative attitude con­
cerning the South China Sea issues at the Bukit Tinggi meeting must have assuaged, to an 
appreciable amount, recent fears and concerns held by ASEAN associated with the rise of
China and the recent Mischief Reef affair, as well as Beijing’s 1995-96 aggressive mili-
101tary maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait. Consequentially, the ASEAN senior officials 
agreed to recommend that China be accepted as one of ASEAN’s dialogue partners. 
Clearly, China was no longer seen by ASEAN as an implacable “enemy,” but instead 
China was coming to be viewed by the Southeast Asian states as a “competitor” who,
119 The Straits Times, 17 May 1996.
120 The Straits Times, 12 June 1996.
121 While Chinese military maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait were undertaken as a warning to Taiwan against 
any moves that would nullify the “One China” policy, Beijing’s actions caused alarm in Southeast Asia as 
conflict between the PRC and ROC (and the USA?) would destabilize the region and detrimentally effect 
trade and the economies of the ASEAN states. Beijing was aware of this, and took steps to reassure the 
Southeast Asian states that their nationals in Taiwan would not be harmed.
122 The Straits Times, 12 June 1996.
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over time, was gaining an understanding and acceptance of the rules of the multilateral 
game.
At the third ARF meeting in July 1996, the South China Sea conflicts were di­
rectly mentioned for the first time as an issue of discussion on the agenda. Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, chair of the ARF meeting, welcomed the “efforts by coun­
tries concerned to seek solutions by peaceful means in accordance with international law 
in general and with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas of 1982 in 
particular.” Alatas also noted the contributions made by the unofficial Tract II multilat­
eral Workshop Series on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea.123 Repre­
senting a more skeptical point of view concerning Qian’s May 1996 declaration, Malay­
sian foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi indicated to Qian that China’s definition of its 
territorial baselines had raised questions among some ASEAN members, and requested 
that Qian clarify the declaration.124 The ASEAN delegates clearly desired a definitive 
statement from Qian on China’s position and intentions in the South China Sea. They 
wanted to know whether China constituted a continuing threat to peace and security in 
the region. Was Beijing still willing to use force in defending its territorial claims over 
the Paracels and Spratlys?
Lingering fears of an increasingly aggressive China among some ASEAN states 
precipitated calls for a regional code of conduct for the entire South China Sea during the 
1996 AMM preceding that year’s ARF meeting. Ali Alatas responded to the proposal in 
a way intended to mollify the Chinese by pointing out that the proposed code of conduct
123 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, Twenty-ninth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 
Post Ministerial Conferences and Dialogue Partners and ASEAN Regional Forum (Jakarta: 1996): 96.
124 Twenty-ninth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Post Ministerial Conferences and Dialogue Partners and 
ASEAN Regional Forum, 154.
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17^was only an idea at that stage that needed further study. Alatas apparently did not want 
to create undue friction between ASEAN and China at that time. However, Alatas had a 
change of mind by the time of the third ARP meeting and pursued the idea of a code of 
conduct in his opening address, stating that he was confident that the ARF could facilitate 
and agree upon a mutually fashioned regional security order based upon a code of con­
duct.126
In response, Qian Qichen made an important and unequivocal announcement that 
China was now open to negotiations and discussions concerning the South China Sea 
situation with ASEAN as a group}21 Qian explained that since China had declared its 
territorial baseline along the Chinese coast and the Paracels, Beijing was now prepared to 
discuss the Spratlys dispute. Referring to the Spratlys by their Chinese name, Nansha 
dao, Qian commented that the situation in the Spratlys was stable. Qian’s use of the Chi­
nese name for the Spratlys, however, indirectly reiterated China’s claim to the archipel­
ago. However, in the name of cooperation and good neighborliness, Qian suggested that 
the issue of sovereignty be shelved for the time being. China and the other disputants 
should pursue joint development of the region. Qian cited China’s recent talks with the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam on joint development of disputed territories to support 
China’s position. Qian did not address ASEAN’s call for a code of conduct, as it was a 
relatively new idea that the Chinese probably desired to study further before responding. 
However, Chinese Foreign Ministry representative Shen Guofang did not discount the 
idea of a code of conduct for the South China Sea in answering a reporter’s question con­
cerning the possibility, stating that China was willing to discuss the issue with ASEAN
125 The Straits Times, 22 July 1996.
126 BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Part 3: Asia Pacific, FED 2673, 07/25/96.
127 The Straits Times, 31 July 1995.
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countries.128 While agreeing in principle to multilateral talks on the Spratlys, Qian also 
made it clear that Beijing would not discuss other disputed territories in the South China 
Sea, such as the Paracels (Xisha dao)}29 Qian, however, did stress the importance Bei­
jing placed on bilateral discussions between China and other involved countries in ad­
dressing the maritime disputes. To demonstrate China’s faith in bilateral talks, as well as 
Beijing’s growing support of the ARF process in promoting security cooperation, Qian 
indicated that China and the Philippines would cosponsor a meeting on CBMs in Beijing 
the next year.
Qian’s actions and statements at the 1996 ARF meeting, directed at promoting a 
friendly, cooperative image of China in Southeast Asia that was now willing to address 
the territorial disputes multilaterally, were underscored by the fact that the upcoming Bei­
jing meeting would constitute the first official, multilateral international forum on secu-
1 TOrity issues hosted by the PRC. The change in Beijing’s approach to the disputes began 
with Tang’s 1995 promise during the first China-ASEAN SOM in Hangzhou that China 
would discuss the Spratlys within a multilateral framework at the next year’s meeting.
By making good on that promise the following year at the second China-ASEAN SOM, 
as well as adopting a more cooperative stance at the 1996 ARF meeting, Beijing began a 
concerted effort to promote a friendly and cooperative image of China that was willing to 
play by the rules. By doing so, Beijing also mollified the China threat thesis. Beijing’s 
acknowledgement and acceptance of key ASEAN norms (consensus-based, informal 
multilateral relations) indicates that, to a certain extent, ASEAN’s strategy to engage and 
socialize China had met with success. However, ASEAN’s success was also due, in part,
128 The Straits Times, 22 July 1996.
129 FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-96-144, 07/23/96.
130 Ibid.
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to a growing willingness on the behalf of Beijing to be socialized. Clearly, both sides 
were learning from their interaction with one another, and consequently moving closer 
toward recognition of shared interests. Interestingly, while Beijing accepted this reality 
at the official Tract I level, Chinese delegates at the Indonesian-sponsored Track II work­
shops, as we shall see below, were far less willing to discuss — much less reach any sub­
stantive agreement — on the Spratlys disputes or other South China Sea conflicts.
Track II
China first participated in the Indonesian-sponsored informal workshop on Man­
aging Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea at its second meeting held in Bandung in 
1991. Wang Yinfan, then Director of Asia Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
led the Chinese delegation. From the beginning, Wang made it perfectly clear that Bei­
jing would not compromise China’s claim of “indisputable” sovereignty over the Paracel 
and Spratly islands, but at the same time also mentioned that since the mid-1980s Beijing 
had been more than willing to shelve the sovereignty issue and pursue joint development 
of the natural resources in the Spratlys.131 Further, Wang argued that it would be more 
productive to begin joint development by first cooperating on less conflictual projects 
such as marine pollution and the protection of maritime living resources, search and res-
i o}
cue operations, anti-piracy, scientific research, and safety of navigations. In addition, 
the Chinese put forth the notion of basing cooperation upon both the spirit of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as well as observing the require­
131 See Yinfan Wang’s statement in Singgih M. Hadipranowo, ed., The Second Workshop on Managing 
Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (Jakarta: Research and Development Agency, 1991): 191; here­
after, The Second Report.
132 The Second Report, 127-136, and 229-232.
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ments of the International Maritime Organization and provisions of international law.133 
Wang explained, however, that China did not feel that it was necessary to seek the help of 
the UN nor any third party in pursuing a resolution of the South Sea disputes, nor would 
Beijing discuss issues relating to sovereignty.134
Having successfully deflected any substantive discussion of territorial sovereignty 
over the Paracels and Spratlys, and stressing that Beijing would not agree to the interna­
tionalization of the discussions, the Chinese delegation agreed that any territorial dispute 
in the South China Sea should be resolved peacefully through dialogue and negotiation, 
and that disputants should exercise self-restraint in order that the situation not be further
i i c
complicated. The Chinese supported their call for joint development by agreeing to 
have their own experts submit proposals for scientific cooperation in investigating the 
natural phenomena, meteorological conditions, and the promotion of safe navigation in 
the South China Sea. In short, Beijing was seeking a solution of the territorial disputes 
without addressing de jure the question of sovereignty.
Chinese representatives at the third Indonesian-sponsored workshop, held in 
1992, faced growing concerns among the ASEAN states regarding recent Chinese actions 
in disputed areas of the South China Sea. Along with Beijing’s promulgation of China’s 
Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone that year (which asserted Chinese 
sovereignty over most of the South China Sea), other actions and statements by the Chi­
nese reinforced perceptions in the region of a rising China threat. For example, state­
133 Lee, 62.
134 The joint statement signed by China at the second workshop states that the participants agreed to rec­
ommend that their respective governments consider cooperation in the South China Sea “without prejudice 
and jurisdictional claims.” The Second Report, 75.
135 The Second Report, 75.
136 The Second Report, 31.
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ments made by Vice Admiral Zhang Lianzhong to the effect that China had to be pre­
pared for military conflict in the region against other disputants, which the admiral be­
lieved would become increasingly likely as Chinese exploitation of the maritime re­
sources intensified, and similar bellicose statements and actions undertaken by Beijing 
preceding the third workshop insured a more suspicious and cautious attitude among the
1 37ASEAN delegates concerning China. As such, the delegates representing the People’s 
Republic at the workshop had a more difficult time reassuring the ASEAN states of 
China’s benign intentions in the South China Sea. They returned to China with a clear 
understanding that the South China Sea issue was becoming an obstacle for China that 
had the potential to jeopardize Beijing’s strategy of forging closer relations with ASEAN.
At the workshop, Chinese participants vigorously defended China’s right to award 
Crestone Energy Corporation a contract to explore for oil in an area long-claimed by 
China, and argued that China’s 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 
was the culmination of years of hard work and careful consideration, and only served to 
give legislative backing to Beijing’s long-held position on the South China Sea issue. 
They maintained that Beijing was sincere in its desire for, and efforts toward, a peaceful 
and cooperative relationship with the ASEAN states, and did not believe that recent Chi­
nese actions would hinder efforts towards greater cooperation. Toward that goal, the 
Chinese suggested that it would be better to put the issue of sovereignty aside and instead
138focus on joint development efforts, such as ensuring the safety of maritime traffic. At 
the same time, however, the Chinese let it be known that they would not accept any non-
137 Lee points out that these more assertive actions, and hawkish statements by some senior PLA officers 
concerning the South China Sea that seemed to contradict the position taken by the Chinese Foreign Minis­
try, revealed differences o f opinion among Chinese leaders on handling the territorial disputes. Lee, 63-67.
138 The Straits Times, 2 July 1992.
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regional power(s) becoming involved in the territorial dispute between China and some 
ASEAN states.139 Ultimately, an agreement was reached to form two Technical Working 
Groups (TWGs) to look into possible joint evaluation of the natural resources and means 
of joint development, and to conduct joint scientific research in the South China Sea. 
When it was suggested that it might be advisable, at some time in the future, to involve 
extra-regional powers or organizations such as the UN Development Program (UNDP) to 
lend technical assistance, the Chinese noted their displeasure but accepted the possibility 
that non-regional participation might be possible on specific projects agreed to by the 
disputants.140
Beijing seemed quite willing in 1992 to move forward on joint development and 
other cooperative activities in the South China Sea, but remained wary of internationaliz­
ing the dispute over the Spratlys, as this might constitute a Trojan horse through which 
some states (the Philippines) might bring in the United States to balance or even contain 
China. While promoting an image of China as an increasingly cooperative and reason­
able dialogue partner and “good neighbor” of the ASEAN states, Beijing at the same time 
had agreed to nothing that might have infringed upon China’s claim of sovereignty in 
both the Paracel and Spratly islands. For the moment, the issue of territorial sovereignty 
in the South China Sea had not become an inhibiting factor in the growth of China- 
ASEAN cooperation in general.141
By the time of the fourth workshop held in Surabaya in 1993, the two TWGs had 
met but had not reached any real agreements. Two stumbling blocks prevented progress; 
disagreement on whether or not the discussions should be raised to the formal level, and
139 The Straits Times, 3 July 1992.
140 Lee, 65-66.
141 T t i n
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whether or not non-South China Sea states should participate in the workshop.142 The 
Chinese indicated that Beijing was not in favor of moving discussion to the official level, 
as conditions were not right given the complicated nature of the South China Sea issue. 
They argued that it would be more helpful to continue discussion at the informal level 
where participants acted in their personal capacities.143 Regarding the dispute over own­
ership of the Parcel and Spratly archipelagos, the Chinese objected to raising the issue as 
an agenda item at the workshop. The PRC delegates argued that the workshop was not 
the correct venue for discussions concerning such political controversies, as it would only 
cause animosity and endanger cooperation. They then reiterated the familiar mantra that 
such discussions should take place between China and the other disputants on a bilateral 
basis.144 Beijing had not altered its traditional position concerning the Paracel and Spratly 
islands (and most of the South China Sea, for that matter) — they belonged to China. 
Therefore, the issue of sovereignty should not be an item on the workshop agenda.
The Chinese delegates were more enthusiastic about joint development, and had 
actively participated in the various TWGs investigating ways of establishing cooperation 
and CBMs between China and ASEAN. Concerning the TWG on marine scientific re­
search, the Chinese agreed to develop proposals for cooperative sharing of scientific in­
formation via networked databases, and agreed to host the first meeting of a newly estab­
lished TWG on the environment.145 By the end of the fourth workshop, it was clear that
142 Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas suggested a need to move the talks to a more formal govem- 
ment-to-govemment format to maintain the momentum of the workshop process and deepen dialogue, co­
operation, and self-restraint among the concerned parties. See Singgih M. Hadipranowo, ed., The Fourth 
Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (Jakarta: Research and Development 
Agency, 1993): 72; hereafter, The Fourth Report.
143 The Straits Times, 24 August 1993.
144 The Fourth Report, 36.
145 The Fourth Report, 76.
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China was willing to cooperate in CBMs concerning technical, scientific matters, but re­
mained steadfastly against any CBMs focusing on political and security issues.
By the fifth meeting of the Track II workshop on conflict in the South China Sea, 
China was a consultative partner of the ARF and could therefore join ASEAN Track One 
processes. As discussed earlier, China appeared reasonably comfortable with the tone 
and pace of multilateral discussions at the official Track I level, as they had agreed in 
principle to hold Senior Officials’ Meetings (SOMs) on political and security issues.
This was not the case, however at the informal Track II level, were the Chinese delegates 
continued to resist discussion about the “Spratly and Paracel Issues” and the participation 
of non-South China Sea states in projects proposed by the TWGs. It seemed that Beijing 
would only discuss such issues at the Track I level.146
The sixth meeting of the workshop held in Balikpapan in October 1995 was 
strongly influenced by the Mischief Reef affair earlier in the year between China and the 
Philippines, as well as Vietnam’s July entry into ASEAN. Additionally, as discussed 
above, the Chinese were forced into discussing the South China Sea conflicts at the Track 
One discussions with ASEAN in both April and August of 1995,147 which undoubtedly 
brought Beijing to the realization that the maritime territorial disputes between China and 
several South China Sea states could not be kept on the back burner any longer without 
jeopardizing China’s efforts of engaging ASEAN. Through interaction, the Chinese 
learned that ASEAN viewed China in more ominous and threatening terms than Beijing 
believed to be the case. China’s “good neighbor” image in Southeast Asia was appar­
ently tarnished. At any rate, Beijing acted bilaterally on this “shared” knowledge obtained
146 Lee, 71-74.
147 In April 1995, the first Senior Official’s Meeting (SOM) between China and ASEAN took place in 
Hangzhou, and the second ARF meeting convened in August of that year.
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through interaction with ASEAN by agreeing to a code of conduct and cooperation with 
the Philippines in the Spratlys (as discussed above) and multilaterally by stressing at the 
China-ASEAN consultative meeting of July 1995 that the PRC was prepared to settle the 
disputes according to international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS).148 Beijing was determined not to allow the South China Sea dis­
putes to tarnish China’s “good neighbor” image in the region and jeopardize improving 
China-ASEAN relations. However, as revealed at the informal workshop in 1995, Bei­
jing’s efforts of promoting China as a “good neighbor” were not yet uniformly imple­
mented in Chinese regional diplomacy.
At that year’s informal workshop on conflict in the South China Sea, the Chinese 
delegates refused to allow the South China Sea disputes to become formalized in the dis­
cussions because, as Beijing saw things, they were already being discussed at the Track I 
level. As for suggestions made by some workshop participants that new CBMs be set-up, 
the Chinese refused, stating that the Workshop itself was a CBM, and therefore no other 
CBMs were necessary.149 In fact, the Chinese successfully had deleted from an earlier 
draft of the workshop statement specific measures suggested for the claimants to ease 
tensions in the South China Sea, and were able to limit projects for joint development of 
shared maritime resources to only three: a biodiversity study; monitoring tide and sea- 
levels; and developing an exchange network of marine science data and information.150 It 
was clear that Beijing would not discuss issues of territorial sovereignty at the informal 
level, and favored a slow approach at the time toward joint development projects. Bei­
jing’s “good neighbor” strategy had, at the time, obviously not yet fully matured. The
148 Lee, 74-75.
149 The Straits Times, 13 October 1995.
150 Lee, 76.
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issue of territorial sovereignty was far too serious for the Chinese to address at a Track II 
dialogue.
The Seventh Workshop held in Batam in December 1996, following the Taiwan 
Straits Crisis, failed to produce any substantive progress in addressing the Spratlys dis­
pute or, for that matter, any of the problematic issues between the PRC and ASEAN 
states in the South China Sea. Indeed, it appeared as though the workshop participants 
were prepared to focus only on promoting the joint ventures already agreed upon (the 
various TWGs mentioned above) and leave the more contentious South China Sea issues 
for Track I discussion, now that many of the associated issues had become part of the 
ARF agenda. Indonesia’s foreign minister Ali Alatas underlined the point that Indonesia 
did not intend to transform the workshop into an intergovernmental forum, adding his 
hope that “the cooperative projects proposals which the workshop has approved will soon 
be implemented with the full support of the authorities concerned.”151 Much of the work­
shop discussions focused on the mechanics of implementing some of the joint projects 
and, as such, it was decided that many technical meetings were necessary within both the 
TWGs and Groups of Experts Meetings (GEMs), and that each participating state was
i m
entitled to host a TWG or GEM meeting. Beijing agreed to host the second meeting of 
the TWG on protecting the marine environment in 1997, while at the same time indicat­
ing that China was not yet prepared to commence on implementing the joint project on
1 S3biodiversity in the South China Sea. Since China’s initial participation in the South 
China Sea workshop in 1991, Beijing had intrinsically remained true to its original posi­
151 Statement o f the Seventh Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, 17 De­
cember 1996, 78; hereafter as Seventh Report.
152 The Fourth Report, 72.
153 Seventh Report, 78-79.
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tion of avoiding direct discussion of territorial sovereignty and instead moved slowly 
forward on certain CBMs such as the TWGs and GEMs. The direct impact of the work­
shops on Beijing’s regional foreign policy to this point in time was minimal. However, 
as we shall see in the following chapter, “complex” learning and knowledge gained of 
Self and Other through multilateral diplomatic interaction during the yearly workshop 
process (shared knowledge) would impact subsequent Track I interaction (both bilateral 
and multilateral) as an nascent “collective identity” was beginning to emerge. In other 
words, “complex” learning gained through multilateral interaction was beginning to af­
fect a change in China’s cognitive base and thus a change in China’s national identity. 
This, of course, did not occur at once. In fact, as we shall see in the following chapter, 
Beijing’s bilateral diplomacy concerning the territorial disputes appeared to confirm 
China’s traditional Cold War image in Southeast Asia, while at the same time Beijing’s 
multilateral diplomacy revealed (at least tentatively during 1995 -1996) a changing Chi­
nese cognitive base (Cognitive BaseA Cognitive Bases) and self-image away from 
China’s traditional “Cold War” image based upon revisionist ideology and egoistic pur­
suit of self-interest (Realpolitik politics), towards a “post-Cold War” image based upon 
status-quo entente ideology and a more holistic or collective pursuit of mutual interests. 
As discussed in the next chapter, the pace and intensity of China’s “complex” social 
learning at multilateral venues which began during the last year or so (1995 -  1996) of 
this first period of our case study, increased over time during the second period of our 
study (1997 -  2006) and led to the emergence of a noticeably changed Chinese cognitive 
base and national identity by 2002. This change in China’s identity due to “complex” 
learning gained through multilateral diplomacy would affect a change in Beijing’s bilat­
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
84
eral diplomacy exemplified by the 2005 Tripartite Agreement between China, the Philip­
pines, and Vietnam for joint offshore oil and natural gas exploration and development in 
and around the Spratly Islands.
CONCLUSIONS
Several observations are in order concerning Beijing’s diplomatic approach to 
China’s territorial disputes during the first half of the 1990s. Certainly, the territorial dis­
putes proved to be one of the most difficult issues in China’s ongoing relations with 
ASEAN. Beijing’s courtships of ASEAN, initiated at the end of the Cold War as a means 
of breaking China’s Western-imposed isolation after Tiananmen, limiting both American 
and Japanese influence in the region and resist a perceived American strategy of contain­
ing China, and also to counter the China threat thesis, were on several occasions almost 
ruined by the South Sea disputes. Beijing’s ratification of its Law on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone in February 1992, which legally established China’s territorial 
claim over most of the South China Sea, certainly reinforced traditional views and images 
held by ASEAN states of China as a rising threat. Further, Beijing’s contract with 
Crestone Energy Corporation to explore for oil and gas in disputed waters in the South 
China Sea, signed in May 1992, reinforced the traditional image in Southeast Asia of 
China as a “threat” or even as an “enemy.” The Mischief Reef affair between China and 
the Philippines early in 1995 only reiterated China’s threatening image in the region (as 
did the Taiwan Straits crisis which occurred during the same approximate period) and 
risked souring the burgeoning China-ASEAN relationship.
During 1995-1996, it became apparent to the Chinese leadership that a new approach 
needed to be found in dealing with the troublesome South China Sea issues if Beijing
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were to pursue successfully its strategy of forging closer relations with ASEAN.
Through diplomatic interaction with ASEAN and member states, Beijing learned that the 
Southeast Asians placed a high level of importance on resolving issues through multilat­
eral dialogue (the “ASEAN Way”), and that they expected China to conform to the 
ASEAN norm of consensus-based multilateral dialogue. The Chinese also learned that 
the ASEAN states were no longer willing to overlook the conflicting territorial claims 
over the Spratly islands because of a fear that doing so might cause ASEAN’s “engage­
ment” of China to fail. Mainland Southeast Asia was peaceful now that the Cambodian 
issue was resolved with Chinese help in 1991, so ASEAN no longer felt the same need as 
before to “tread lightly” in its dealings with China. Beijing also learned through its inter­
action with ASEAN that China’s “engagement” of ASEAN was being jeopardized by the 
South China Sea disputes and, if Beijing could not find a better way to alleviate fear in 
Southeast Asia of Chinese territorial aggression in the South China Sea, then the PRC’s 
regional strategy in Southeast Asia would also fail. High-ranking civilians within 
China’s foreign policy establishment had come to realize that aggressive and provocative 
actions by China in support of its territorial claims over the Spratlys were ultimately anti­
thetical to Beijing’s overall foreign policy and security strategies in the region. In addi­
tion, Beijing’s reluctance to directly discuss the disputes within ASEAN’s multilateral 
framework, where the smaller, weaker ASEAN states might have a better position vis-a- 
vis China as a collective group, directly contradicted the “cooperative” image of China 
that Beijing wished to promote. The lessons “learned” resulted mostly from “simple” so­
cial learning at the bilateral level that translated into mostly instrumental changes in Bei­
jing’s GND. However, having said that, it is important to note that “complex” learning at
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the multilateral level (mostly Track II venues) began to influence China’s cognitive base 
during this first period of our case study. As a source of change in Beijing’s GND, how­
ever, “complex” learning would exert a much stronger impact on Chinese policymaking 
during the second period of this study (especially after 2001).
Beijing’s dilemma concerning its tenuous relations with ASEAN vis-a-vis the territo­
rial disputes did have a solution. The solution was illuminated several times during 
1995-1996. Chinese vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan realized in 1995 at the inaugural 
ASEAN-China SOM in Hangzhou that the Chinese would have to move forward on the 
territorial disputes multilaterally if the PRC were to foster any trust among the ASEAN 
states. His promise to bring the issue to the table at the 1996 ASEAN-China SOM allevi­
ated some concern among the ASEAN officials about Chinese territorial intentions by 
reinforcing a “cooperative” image of China. By making good Tang’s promise at the sec­
ond ASEAN-China SOM, China’s “cooperative” image strengthened while the image of 
China as a “threat” or “enemy” diminished. By agreeing to multilateral discussions on 
the issue, China could assuage fear, promote a more positive, cooperative image in 
Southeast Asia, and thereby realize Beijing’s wider geo-strategic goals in the region. Be­
cause of Tang’s new approach to the territorial disputes, senior ASEAN officials agreed 
to recommend to their respective foreign ministers that China be accepted an ASEAN 
dialogue partner in 1996. As a result, relations between China and ASEAN continued to 
widen and deepen despite the contentious situation in the South China Sea. Additionally, 
Qian Qichen’s diplomacy during the May 1995 Brunei ARF-SOM and the subsequent 
July ARF meeting in Jakarta also began to promote a cooperative, friendly image of 
China in Southeast Asia by agreeing to address the South China Sea disputes multilater­
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ally. The Chinese were learning that they could assuage fears of China by promoting a 
more favorable image in the region, while at the same time using the “ASEAN Way” to 
China’s advantage by circumventing the issue of territorial sovereignty.154
In short, China’s traditional bilateral approach to the South China Sea disputes was, 
by 1995-1996, becoming increasingly problematic for Beijing. In order to promote 
deeper Sino-ASEAN relations, some within China’s foreign policy establishment began 
to understand and appreciate the necessity of pursuing a more cooperative, accommodat­
ing, and friendly approach with China’s small neighbors to the south. As discussed in the 
following chapter, shared knowledge (“simple” learning) obtained through interaction 
with the ASEAN states caused a change in Chinese regional foreign policy toward in­
creased participation in multilateral dialogue as a means of promoting a favorable image 
of China aimed at countering perceptions of a China threat and thus also intended to 
downplay the South China Sea issue in Sino-ASEAN relations. Promoting and deepening 
economic relations between China and the ASEAN states was not enough. The diplo­
matic element of China’s regional strategy had to be better developed and more intelli­
gently utilized in future relations with ASEAN if Beijing were to realize any substantive 
gains in China’s relationship with ASEAN. In effect, by the mid-1990s a new approach 
to China-ASEAN relations was beginning to crystallize in Beijing due, in part, to lessons 
learned from China’s earlier efforts at handling the territorial disputes in the South China 
Sea, and also due to subtle changes in the identity and interest of each actor, as explained
154 The “ASEAN Way” is premised on informal discussion, peaceful settlement of disputes, and consensus. 
In other words, the ASEAN processes move at the pace of the slowest member. By allowing China to be 
‘socialized’ into the “ASEAN Way,” Beijing could better control the pace at which discussion of the South 
China Sea issues progressed. The Chinese could use ASEAN’s multilateral norms of behavior instrumen- 
tally to both mitigate the Spratlys issue as a point of contention in PRC-ASEAN relations, while at the 
same time slow down the pace of discussion concerning the territorial disputes. PRC-ASEAN relations 
could move forward without any substantive Chinese concessions regarding its claim of territorial sover­
eignty.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
88
and discussed in the following chapter. As such, changes in Chinese foreign policy in 
Southeast Asia during 1989 -  1996 resulted mostly from “simple” social learning ac­
quired at the bilateral level. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, “complex” so­
cial learning, which initially occurred at multilateral Track II forums during the early-to- 
mid 1990s, intensified during the second period and increasingly affected a change in 
China’s cognitive base and identity, ultimately causing a reorientation of Beijing’s GND.
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CHAPTER III
CHINA’S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, 1997-2006:
BECOMING A GOOD NEIGHBOR.
“Joe Nye talked about soft power, and in traditional [Chinese] culture emphasized by 
Confucius and Lao-tzu, if you are powerful it is better to follow the kingly way [wang 
dao] than the way of the hegemon [ba dao]. So China in Asia is trying to use soft power. 
. . .  China . . .  [has] cultural power; there are many Oversees Chinese in Malaysia, Sin­
gapore, [and] Indonesia, and China’s culture is important in the region.”
- Chinese Scholar, November 2003 -
“China’s intention to increase economic relationships has been well received in 
Southeast Asia since it is seen as part of a “comprehensive security” strategy that 
intertwines economic benefits, diplomacy, and national security to provide a 
partnership for the developing nations. As a result, Beijing has garnered greater support 
in regional capitals than what is perceived as Washington’s single-minded focus on 
terrorism, which comes at the expense of a broader relationship, including issues of 
importance to Southeast Asian nations.”
- Bruce Klingner, March 2004 -
This chapter continues our construed vist-interactionist analysis of Beijing’s 
evolving foreign policy in Southeast Asia by examining the impact of interaction and so­
cial learning on the reorientation of Beijing’s GND during the second period of our case 
study (1997 - 2006). As we have seen, by 1995 - 1996 interaction between China and the 
ASEAN states concerning the territorial disputes affected a reorientation of Beijing’s 
GND to agree to address the South China Sea disputes with ASEAN as a group at Track I 
dialogue processes (ARF-SOM, ARF, ASEAN Plus One). Beijing’s acceptance of offi­
cial multilateral discussion concerning the disputes clearly evidences a change of China’s 
cognitive base, but does it also evidence a change of state identity and interests? Accord­
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ing to our constructivist-interactionist model, any change in China’s identity can only oc­
cur through an acknowledgment of the new identity by the Other (Wendt’s “reflected- 
appraisals”).155 Our analysis of China’s image in Southeast Asia indicates that by 1996 
China’s role-identity had not yet changed from that of “enemy” or “rival.” Increased 
multilateral interaction between China and ASEAN during 1997 - 2006 concerning the 
disputes, however, ultimately led to the social construction of a new Chinese role-identity 
(“partner”) and thus to China’s “post-Cold War” identity. China’s “post-Cold War” iden­
tity, however, first revealed itself within Beijing’s Track I multilateral relationship with 
ASEAN in 2002 - 2003, and then later within China’s Track I bilateral diplomacy by 
2005. I therefore argue below that most “complex” social learning occurred as a result of 
multilateral interaction (especially Track II), which ultimately had a “spill-over” effect on 
Beijing’s bilateral diplomacy. Only in 2005, when China’s “post-Cold War” identity fi­
nally replaced China’s traditional “Cold War” identity in Beijing’s official bilateral rela­
tions can we conclude that China’s identity and interests have indeed changed as a result 
of “complex” social learning. In order to illustrate and explain this social process of 
identity and interest construction which led to China’s new identity by 2005, our analysis 
focuses specifically on the territorial disputes between China and the two “frontline” 
ASEAN states Vietnam and the Philippines, as well as between China and ASEAN as a 
group.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. China’s increasing participation in 
multilateral dialogue with ASEAN concerning the South China Sea disputes as well as its 
influence on Beijing’s GND is discussed first. Specifically, the continuing metamorpho­
sis of China’s identity due to “complex” social learning, which began in 1995 -  1996 at
155 Social Theory o f International Politics, 327.
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the multilateral level, is addressed and analyzed. We next discuss Beijing’s bilateral di­
plomacy with Vietnam and the Philippines concerning the disputes, and analyze the in­
fluence of social learning on China’s “Cold War” identity (Cognitive BaseA) and tradi­
tional bilateral diplomacy. The effects of an emerging China-ASEAN “collective” iden­
tity on China’s South Sea disputes are discussed and analyzed, and an explanation of the 
importance of the South China Sea issue to Sino-ASEAN relations is offered below. As 
we shall see, both China and ASEAN came to see the territorial disputes as a side issue 
that neither side would allow to damage Sino-ASEAN relations. After all, economic and 
security “partners” can agree to disagree on certain issues and remove them from discus­
sion, while “rivals” cannot. China had passed ASEAN’s “litmus test” in the South China 
Sea by overcoming the territorial dispute issue through becoming an economic-security 
“partner” of ASEAN — and by behaving as a good neighbor. Most importantly, ASEAN 
threat perceptions of China (“Cold War” image) have changed. China is no longer per­
ceived in the region as a serious threat to the national security and territorial integrity of 
ASEAN states. Instead, China is increasingly perceived as a “good neighbor” and as an 
important economic and security opportunity in Southeast Asia (“post-Cold War” image).
MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY
Beijing’s initial moves towards accepting limited multilateral discussion on the 
South China Sea issue during 1995-1996, taken to reassure ASEAN and member states 
that China was not a threat, but rather a cooperative and responsible “friend” willing to 
settle its disputes peaceably, were followed and supported by moves demonstrating that 
“friendship” between states meant more than agreeable talk alone — it also meant helping 
a friend or friends overcome their troubles. As discussed later in the chapter, Beijing
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took advantage of the opportunity presented by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Aided 
by related perceptions held in Asia that the West (Washington) was not genuinely inter­
ested in making any sacrifice or taking any meaningful action to help Asian nations (es­
pecially those in Southeast Asia, where the crisis began and had the greatest impact) in 
their time of need, China demonstrated its friendship with Southeast Asian countries by 
assisting in the economic recovery of the financially-crippled states.
Besides widening the scope of China’s GND from its initial bilateral security ap­
plication in the South China Sea disputes with Manila and Hanoi into financial and eco­
nomic aspects of Sino-ASEAN relations, Beijing also began in 1997 to greatly deepen 
China’s multilateral interaction with ASEAN and thereby facilitate a continued strength­
ening of China-ASEAN relations by reiterating an image of China as a friendly, coopera­
tive, and responsible “good neighbor” that need not be feared. Beijing’s strategy of ex­
panding Chinese-ASEAN relations (especially in the realm of trade and economics) was 
subtly linked with Beijing’s bilateral approach in handling China’s territorial disputes 
with Vietnam and the Philippines. When China found itself facing amplified pressure 
from Manila or Hanoi over the South China Sea disputes, Beijing’s usual diplomatic 
countermove was to demonstrate China’s friendly and non-threatening intensions in the 
region by making concessions at either the bilateral or multilateral level. Examples of bi­
lateral concessions include joint cooperation in CBMs, proposals for joint offshore oil 
exploration and development in disputed territories, agreements to settle disputes peace­
ably, and favorable economic or trade agreements. On the multilateral level, an excellent 
example of Chinese concessions to ASEAN is increased participation in the various 
ASEAN processes demonstrating to the ASEAN states that China was indeed becoming
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“socialized” to the “ASEAN Way” (normative as well as constitutive norms). Beijing 
repeatedly demonstrated that China valued cooperation and dialogue over the use of 
force. Other examples of multilateral concessions include participation in the Indone­
sian-sponsored Workshop on Preventing Conflict in the South China Sea and the ARF- 
sponsored Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) workshops 
on maritime security, cooperation on transnational crime, CBMs, and human trafficking 
(both Track II mechanisms), and agreeing to discuss the South China Sea issue at the 
ARF, China-ASEAN summits and APT meetings. In the economic realm, Beijing made 
numerous concessions in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements with ASEAN and 
individual member states. Beijing’s proposal and support of the China-ASEAN Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA) is perhaps the best example of Chinese economic conces­
sions as it gives preferential treatment in some issues to China’s ASEAN trading part­
ners). Obviously, Beijing undertook these moves to widen and deepen Sino-ASEAN re­
lations in a general sense; but, as we shall see, these actions were also intended to exert a 
favorable influence (directly or indirectly) on China’s position in the South China Sea 
disputes by emphasizing and strengthening China’s positive image in the region. Con­
currently at the multilateral level, Beijing would strengthen China’s “cooperative” and 
“responsible” image in Southeast Asia by widening its participation with ASEAN in gen­
eral, and by agreeing to expand multilateral discussion of the South China Sea issues 
within certain ASEAN forums. Also, by employing an adapted version of the “ASEAN 
Way” of informal, consensus-based approach in Sino-ASEAN relations, Beijing could 
demonstrate good faith by discussing the Spratlys and thus mitigate the “China threat” 
thesis by strengthening China’s “good neighbor” image in the region while, at the same
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time, stall on the territorial sovereignty issue through participating in protracted talks, 
working groups, and cooperative projects in less controversial areas such as scientific re­
search and search and rescue operations in the South China Sea.156 As discussed later in 
the chapter, Beijing could sublimate the territorial disputes within the larger context of 
China’s improving and deepening economic and political relations with ASEAN and with 
its member states. Moreover, importantly, Beijing could accomplish this without directly 
compromising China’s claim of territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. China 
could “have its cake and eat it too.”
1997 Asian Financial Crisis
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998 marked an important turning point in 
Sino-ASEAN relations for several important reasons. First, Washington’s shortsighted 
and imperceptive response to the Asian financial crisis damaged American political capi­
tal and legitimacy in the region while at the same time presented Beijing with an excel­
lent opportunity both to underscore its GND approach to Sino-ASEAN with concrete, 
tangible action, and to increase Chinese influence and perhaps weaken the U.S. position 
in Southeast Asia. Washington’s refusal to assist Thailand after the devaluation of the 
Baht and support of a proposed Asian Monetary Fund, as well as the U.S. Treasury De­
partment’s implementation of anti-dumping measures that retarded the recovery of Asian 
export levels, clearly disappointed ASEAN and its member states. The United States 
seemed to be indicating that Southeast Asia as a region was no longer as critically impor­
tant as it had been during the Cold War. Second, by resisting a devaluation of the Ren­
156 The consensus-based approach allows progress in matters to proceed at the pace of the slowest, most 
hesitant participant. In essence, by agreeing to discuss the territorial disputes within some of the multilat­
eral processes of ASEAN, Beijing could better control the pace at which ASEAN handled the matter.
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minbi (Chinese Yuan) and taking actions to support and strengthen the weakened South­
east Asian economies, Beijing intensified China’s image as a “good neighbor” willing to 
act altruistically (indeed -- even act against China’s immediate self-interest) and coopera­
tively to help its neighbors in distress and, as a result, overcame much lingering mistrust 
of China in the region.157 Third, the 1997 Crisis reveals a changed Chinese “role- 
identity” in Sino-ASEAN relations, from that of “economic rival” to that of “economic 
cooperator.” Beijing’s understanding of global economic interdependence (interdepend­
ence is one of Wendt’s four “master variables” of systemic change) led to the view that 
Chinese security in the 21st Century could no longer be defined in traditional military- 
strategic terms alone, but also defined in economic terms. For China and many of the 
ASEAN states, national security after 1989 became defined in mostly domestic terms as 
internal threats such as social-political instability, insurgency and separatist movements 
posed the most immediate concern for the respective governments. Pronounced social - 
economic disparities in many ASEAN states is the basis of much domestic instability 
and, as such, economic growth and wealth creation are crucial factors in a government’s 
ability to maintain its legitimacy to rule (or its ability to control power, as the case may 
be). Therefore, Beijing’s promotion of “comprehensive security” in Southeast Asia link­
ing economic and security issues together — the “economic-security nexus”158 — was
157 In June 1997 Thailand devalued the Baht setting-off a chain-reaction of devaluations in other Asian 
countries, resulting in a 14% contraction of Indonesia’s economy, Singapore’s worst economic recession in 
40 years, and varying degrees of economic stagnation in Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan, and South Korea. See 
Paul Dibb, David P. Hale, and Peter Prince, “Asia’s Insecurity,” Survival 41 (Autumn 1999): 5-20. Also 
see Hugh De Santis, “The Dragon and the Tigers: China and Asian Regionalism,” World Policy Journal 
(Summer 2005): 24-25.
158 Thomas G. Moore makes a convincing argument that the emergence of economic security (jingji an- 
quari) as a central concept in China’s foreign policy discourse is a major factor in breaking down traditional 
conceptual barriers between security and economic affairs in the minds of Chinese leaders. See Thomas G. 
Moore, “Chinese Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalization,” in China Rising: Power and Motivation in
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well-received by ASEAN. As such, shared knowledge between China and the ASEAN 
states that they defined national security in the same terms (focus on internal threats) and 
had the same distaste for Washington’s human rights campaign in Asia (perceived as an 
American intrusion into the internal affairs of sovereign nations), led to “complex” learn­
ing of Self and Other, which began to change “role-identities” in the Sino-ASEAN rela­
tionship. A collective identity between China and ASEAN as “Asian states” began to de­
velop in 1997, which resulted in changing economic and social “role-identities” from 
those of “economic rival” and “ideological rival” to those of “economic cooperator” and 
“Asian-values state.” The change in economic “role-identities” in turn precipitated a 
change, beginning in 2002, in China-ASEAN security “role-identities” from “security 
cooperator” to “security partner.” Clearly, China was beginning to think and act in the 
context of a budding “collective identity” (holistic Self) between China and the ASEAN 
states by the time of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. In addition, besides not taking 
advantage of the financial crisis by devaluing its currency, China also extended financial 
help to both Thailand and Indonesia, an act that contrasted strongly with the austere 
measures taken by western financial institutions and the United States. Finally, if the 
West (U.S.) appeared to Southeast Asian leaders as being less-than-concemed about 
Asia’s financial problems, then Beijing’s actions during and after the Asian Financial 
Crisis demonstrated that China was concerned and was willing to help its neighbors to the 
south in substantial ways. Beijing reassured the ASEAN states that together, “we” will 
pull through these difficult times. Beijing demonstrated that its “good neighbor” diplo­
Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 
2005), 121-158.
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macy was more than empty words and that China was indeed sincere in its desire for co­
operative, friendly, and mutually beneficial relations with ASEAN.
According to David Shambaugh, “[China’s] assistance punctured the prevailing 
image of China in the region as either aloof or hegemonic and began to replace it with an 
image of China as a responsible power.”159 Alice Ba explains the significance of the 
Asian Financial Crisis to Beijing’s new diplomatic approach in Southeast Asia:
Specifically, the crisis provided China with opportunities to demonstrate its po­
litical and economic value as a partner, even a regional leader. China was espe­
cially able to take advantage of ASEAN’s disappointment with the international 
response to the economic crisis. ASEAN found International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) conditions intrusive, inappropriate, and insensitive to specific economic 
and political conditions in affected countries; however, its greatest unhappiness 
lay with the US, which was not only associated with the problematic IMF condi­
tions but also was viewed as benefiting from Southeast Asia’s financial prob­
lems.160
Beijing’s deft diplomacy and superb handling of the financial crisis gained China great 
credibility and trust among the ASEAN states by decisively demonstrating that the PRC 
was indeed a “good neighbor” whose actions were predicated upon cooperation, multilat­
eralism, and a non zero-sum mentality. The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998 pro­
vided Beijing the pretext and opportunity to widen the implementation of China’s new 
GND and demonstrate that China was a rising yet cooperative and friendly neighbor. 
Beijing’s actions in support of the ASEAN states’ economies during the Financial Crisis 
demonstrated that China did indeed support its rhetoric about pursuing mutual benefit and 
non-zero sum policies in its foreign relations with concrete, tangible action. Clearly, by
159 Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” 68.
160 Alice D. Ba, “China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-Centruy Asia,” Asian Survey 43, no. 
4 (July-August 2003): 635.
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the end of 1997, China was viewed by ASEAN as being an “economic cooperator” and a 
“good neighbor.”
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
Beijing used various multilateral forums to apply its GND approach directly to the 
territorial disputes. China’s earlier pledges to discuss the South Sea disputes at the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was honored, but Beijing steadfastly refused to enter 
into any discussion concerning issues of sovereignty, limiting Chinese participation to 
discussions concerning CBMs. This refusal was based on China’s adamant rejection of 
internationalizing the South China Sea disputes. And therefore, since the United States, 
Japan, Russia, and other ethnically non-Asian powers were ARF members, Beijing 
merely made minor concessions within the ARF mechanism designed to promote a coop­
erative, responsible “good neighbor” image as well as prevent any meaningful movement 
forward on the South Sea issue by stalling on substantial points and agreeing to cooperate 
in less contentious joint activities such as working groups and CBMs.
Beijing worked assiduously within the ARF framework to deepen China’s rela­
tions with ASEAN. In 1997, China and the Philippines co-hosted intercessional meetings 
on confidence-building measures. The PRC also hosted several other meetings of the 
ARF, such as the ARF Professional Training Program on China’s Security Policy, the 
fourth ARF Meeting of Heads of Defense Colleges, and the ARF Seminar on military 
logistics outsourcing (September 2002). Throughout the period, Beijing also regularly 
submitted annual defense policy white papers to the ARF.161 In May 2002, Beijing pre­
sented a position paper at the ARF arguing for improved cooperation on non-traditional
161 Bates Gill, “China’s Evolving Regional Security Strategy,” in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dy­
namics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 255-59.
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security issues. The paper committed China to playing a major role in working with
• 1 (s) • •other countries to resolve these issues. Again, this action served to strengthen China’s 
image as a cooperative and responsible “good neighbor” in Southeast Asia while in the 
same instance permitted Beijing to side step any specific discussion over the territorial 
disputes and prevent the issue from becoming internationalized. Most of Beijing’s dip­
lomatic activity at the ARF concerning the South China Sea disputes was undertaken in 
an indirect fashion. Substantive Chinese multilateral action directly concerning the dis­
putes, as we shall see below, took place within other ASEAN dialogues outside the ARF 
process.
Concerning the territorial disputes specifically, Beijing did expand its discussion 
of the South China Sea issues to several indigenous ASEAN Track I venues such as the 
ASEAN-China Summits, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Senior Officials Meetings 
(SOMs), Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMCs), and ASEAN Plus Three (APT), while 
avoiding discussion of the disputes at other multilateral venues where non-Asian powers 
(the United States and its allies) were present. However, China refused to discuss (and 
continues to refuse) the issue of territorial sovereignty at multilateral forums while, at the 
same time, promoting a cooperative, friendly image of China in the region by proposing 
joint development of the disputed areas as well as increasing economic, technical, scien­
tific and social interaction between China and the ASEAN states in general. At the same 
time, Beijing deemphasized the military component of its grand strategy. The fact that the 
territorial disputes have not had a detrimental effect on the deepening of China’s relations 
with ASEAN and ASEAN member states (especially Vietnam and the Philippines) offers
162 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Position Paper on Enhanced 
Cooperation in the Field o f non-traditional security issues, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn /eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/ 
gizzyhy/2612/2614/tl5318.htm (accessed 6 February 2006).
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evidence of the salience and success of Beijing’s GND in Southeast Asia. As in China’s 
bilateral relations with Vietnam and the Philippines, Beijing has pursued a strategy since 
1996 of defining security in much wider and inclusive terms (“comprehensive security” 
or “new security”) to include, in addition to military security, political, economic, and 
cultural security.163
The New Security Concept
The “economic-security nexus” constitutes the foundation of what Beijing has 
come to call the “New Security Concept” (xin anquan guandian, or NSC). At the multi­
lateral level, Beijing’s application of the NSC as a component of China’s GND approach 
to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea allows Beijing to deemphasize military 
security — and thus lessen perceptions in Southeast Asia of possible Chinese military ag­
gression — by placing much greater emphasis on economic security. In this way, Beijing 
has linked the South China Sea issue to wider aspects of Sino-ASEAN relations in which 
the PRC has more latitude in making concessions to promote China’s “good neighbor” 
image in the region and thereby dispel the “China threat” thesis. Most of these concilia­
tory moves have been in the form of increased Chinese trade and intensifying economic 
relations with the ASEAN states — areas in which Beijing can utilize China’s expanding 
economy and increasing national wealth in pursuing the PRC’s foreign policy objectives. 
This became especially true during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 -  1998, that sub­
stantially weakened the Southeast Asian economies and led to related domestic security
163 See Tang Yongsheng, “Zhonghe anquan yu zongti zhanlue,” [Comprehensive security and grand strat­
egy], Shijie Zhishi [World Affairs] (Beijing), no. 20 (October 16, 1996): 16-17 cited by Fei-ling Wang, 
“Beijing’s Incentive Structure: The Pursuit of Preservation, Prosperity, and Power,” in China Rising: 
Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowan 
& Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 26.
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problems for some ASEAN states (Philippines and Indonesia). By emphasizing eco­
nomic aspects in Sino-ASEAN relations and lessening the traditional political-military 
focus of China’s grand strategy, Beijing successfully refuted the “China threat” thesis 
and, more specifically, greatly diminished perceptions in Southeast Asia of the use of 
force by China in asserting its claims of territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea.
China’s NSC represented a conclusion reached by the Chinese leadership in 1997 
that economic and security issues were becoming increasingly linked in the 21st Century 
due to the effects of economic globalization on world order. As early as 1999, the NSC 
was used as a medium by Beijing for applying the GND indirectly to the South China Sea 
disputes — the “economic-security nexus.” China’s NSC stresses that relations among 
states should be based upon the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, that states 
should not interfere in others’ internal affairs, that the promotion of mutually beneficial 
economic contacts creates a stable security and economic environment, and that greater 
dialogue promotes trust and allows the peaceful settlement of disputes.164 Even without 
mentioning the South Sea disputes directly, the broad design of China’s NSC was also 
salient vis-a-vis China’s territorial disputes as they represented one, if not the most seri­
ous security concern for ASEAN in the South China Sea. The stipulations and reasoning 
behind the NSC would be meaningless and empty (and therefore most likely rejected by 
ASEAN) if not also applied to the South China Sea issue. The linkage between the all- 
encompassing design of China’s NSC and the territorial disputes did not need to be stated 
specifically. Chinese leader Jiang Zemin elaborated on the NSC in a major foreign pol­
icy speech given in March 1999:
164 Robert Sutter gives a good overview of similarities between ASEAN’s cooperative security concept and 
China’s NSC. Robert Sutter, “China’s Regional Strategy and Why It May Not Be Good for America,” in 
Power Shift, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 289-305.
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The world is undergoing profound changes which require the discard [sic] of the 
Cold War mentality and the development of a new security concept and a new in­
ternational political, economic, and security order responsive to the needs of our 
times.. . .  The core of the new security concept should be mutual trust, mutual 
benefit, equality and cooperation. The UN Charter, the Five Principles of Peace­
ful Coexistence and other universally recognized principles governing interna­
tional relations should serve as the political basis for safeguarding peace while 
mutually beneficial cooperation and common prosperity are its economic guaran­
tee. To conduct dialogue, consultation and negotiation on an equal footing is the 
right way to solve disputes and safeguard peace.. .. Only by developing a new 
security concept and establishing a fair and reasonable new international order 
can world peace and security be fundamentally guaranteed.165
Jiang’s Geneva speech in 1999 articulated publicly a conclusion reached by the Chinese 
leadership in 1997 concerning economic globalization and its influence in shaping a new 
21st Century world order; economic and security issues would increasingly share a com­
mon vision and, as such, the “economic-security nexus” should become the central focus 
of Chinese foreign policy discourse.166
In May 2002, China presented a position paper at the ARF arguing for improved 
cooperation on non-traditional security issues. The paper committed China to playing a
•  •  ♦ 1 f\lmajor role in working with other countries to resolve these issues. A formal position 
paper followed in July, explaining China’s New Security Concept (NSC) and linking the 
NSC to the mission of the ARF.168 In a speech made on 31 July at the 2002 ARF Minis­
terial Meeting (AMM), Tang Jiaxuan referred to a change in the global security situation 
“in which traditional and non-traditional security factors are intertwined,” and stressed
165 "Promote Disarmament Process and Safeguard World Security," Address at the Conference on Disar­
mament, Geneva, by Jiang Zemin, President of the Peoples Republic of China (26 March 1999). 
http://www.clw.org/archive/coalition/jiang99.htm (accessed 24 June 2006). The principles of China’s New 
Security Concept were reiterated in China’s National Defense (Beijing: Information Office of the State 
Council, October 2000).
166 For a clear explanation of the economic-security nexus in Chinese foreign policy, see Moore, “Chinese 
Foreign Policy in the Age of Globalization,” 121-158.
167 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Position Paper on Enhanced 
Cooperation in the Field o f non-traditional security issues, http://www.finprc.gov.cn /eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/ 
gizzyhy/2612/2614/tl5318.htm (accessed 6 February 2006).
168 “China’s Evolving Regional Security Strategy,” p. 256.
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the need for countries to address security issues in a new, mutually cooperative way.
Tang maintained that individual states could no longer adequately deal with the new 
global security issues by themselves, and that “multilateral cooperation is the only way to 
tackle them.”169 Interestingly, the NSC (as explained by Tang) strongly resembled the 
“ASEAN Way” as the NSC was based “on building mutual trust through dialogue, set­
tling disputes through negotiation, and seeking security through cooperation.”170 China’s 
concept of mutual security was subsequently reiterated that same year during Tang Ji- 
axuan’s address of the UN General Assembly.
In his UN speech of 2002, Tang declared, “security is no longer a zero-sum game. 
Its mutuality is obviously on the increase, as countries have to come to realize that they 
have common security interests and feel a greater sense of interdependence.”171 Tang 
continued, stating that in response to the new global security environment, China had de­
veloped a New Security Concept (NSC) based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, 
and cooperation:
By mutual trust, we mean that countries should rise above their differing ideolo­
gies and social systems, abandon the Cold-War mentality and power politics 
mindset, and refrain from misgivings and hostility against each other. Instead, 
they should go in for frequent dialogues and briefings on their security and de­
fense policies or the major actions they are about to take.
By mutual benefit, we mean that a country, in keeping with the objective re­
quirements of the development of globalization, should respect the security inter­
ests of others while pursuing the interests of its own, help create conditions for the 
better security of others while making itself more secure, thus achieving universal 
security.
By equality, we mean that every country, big or small, strong or weak, is a mem­
ber of the international community. All countries should respect each other, treat 
each other as equals and refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs, so
169 Tang Jiaxuan, speech at the 9th ARF Foreign Ministers Meeting, 2002.
170 Ibid.
171 Tang, speech to UN General Assembly, 14 September 2002.
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that international relations will become more democratized.
By cooperation, we mean that countries should resolve their disputes through 
peaceful negotiations, carry out extensive and deep-going cooperation on their 
shared security concerns and help eliminate hidden dangers and prevent wars and 
conflicts from happening.
All in all, our new security concept is aimed at increasing mutual trust through 
dialogue and promoting common security through cooperation.
It is in the spirit of this new security concept that we in China have been working 
hard to promote the mechanisms for regional security dialogue and cooperation, 
cherishing and actively participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
and the ASEAN Regional Forum and endeavoring, together with other countries 
in the region, for the establishment of an Asia-Pacific security framework geared 
to dialogue, rather than confrontation.172
David Shambaugh argues that Chinese participation in multilateral organizations, 
especially the various ASEAN forums, precipitated a change in Beijing’s view of multi­
lateralism from traditional suspicions that the U.S. used such venues as a means of con­
taining China, toward a new supportiveness of the multilateral process:
After a year or two of sending observers to the meetings of the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF), the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), 
and nongovernmental track 2 meetings, China’s Foreign Ministry became more 
agnostic and more open to learning about them. Chinese analysts soon discovered 
that the United States did not control these organizations; to the contrary, it be­
came evident to China (and other Asian participants) that Washington tended to 
dismiss of ignore them. Chinese delegates to these organizations further discov­
ered that the cooperative security approach adopted by these organizations, as 
pushed by the ASEAN states and Japan, was compatible with China’s new secu­
rity concept (NSC), which Chinese officials had begun to discuss in the late 
1990s.173
Interestingly, while China’s image as a friendly, cooperative, and peaceful ascending 
power in Southeast Asia was becoming stronger, the United States was increasingly per­
172 Tang, speech to UN General Assembly, 14 September 2002.
173 “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” 69.
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ceived in the region as a growing threat to world peace due to Washington’s preparation 
for the American (almost) unilateral invasion of Iraq. Considering the authoritarian na­
ture of some ASEAN states, it is not surprising that Washington’s intervention policy 
(regime change) in the Middle East was not well received in some Southeast Asian capi­
tals — especially in the Islamic states of Malaysia and Indonesia. As such, Beijing’s 
championing of state sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of sover­
eign states was well received in Southeast Asia and helped to promote a favorable image 
of China in the region. As one Singapore businessman observed, China was trying to 
help its neighboring countries while, at the same time, the United States was perceived in 
Southeast Asia “as a country involved more and more on it own foreign policy agenda, 
and strong-arming everyone onto that agenda.”174 Beijing capitalized on the world’s in­
creasing concern about Washington’s hawkish and aggressive unilateral foreign policy by 
stressing and strengthening China’s image in Southeast Asia as a peaceful, cooperative, 
and responsible neighbor.
The “Peaceful Rise” Thesis
In addition to the NSC component of the GND, Beijing began in early 2003 to ar­
ticulate the “peaceful rise” (hepingjueqi) thesis that China could ascend to great power 
status in Asia without upsetting the international order. The “peaceful rise” thesis di­
rectly contradicted the conventional realist wisdom underwriting the “China threat” thesis 
promoted by mostly American analysts, that rising powers pose an increasing challenge 
to the hegemonic power (as well as threaten the international system organized and main­
174 As quoted in Jane Perlez, “Asian Leaders Find China a More Cordial Neighbor,” New York Times, 18 
October 2003.
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tained by the hegemon), that necessarily results in conflict between the rising and hege­
monic powers.
Zheng Bijian, senior CCP adviser, first advanced China’s “peaceful rise” thesis in 
Spring 2003. According to Ming Wang, the Chinese leadership became greatly con­
cerned about foreign perceptions of a growing “China threat” after Zheng returned from 
heading a Chinese mission to Washington in December 2002. Zheng, a former executive 
vice president of the Central Party School and currently head of the China Reform Fo­
rum, used his high standing in the CCP to empress upon the Chinese leadership the im­
portance of alleviating foreign (American) concern of China’s rise. Zheng argued that 
China’s peaceful rise, begun in 1978 and continuing into the mid-twenty-first century, 
would mark a transition in Chinese foreign policy from a traditional approach based upon 
China being a developing country focused on domestic issues to one predicated upon 
China’s potential as a regional and global power.175 Zheng was subsequently placed in 
charge of the Central Party School’s large “Peaceful Rise” project in early 2003.176 Ap­
parently, Hu Jintao personally and promptly approved the project (as well as Zheng head­
ing the project) and decided to allow the school to take a leading role in formulating Chi­
nese foreign policy as evidenced by the project’s “unheard of sum” of over 2 million 
Yuan funding.177 In late 2003, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated the “peaceful rise” 
theme in a speech at Harvard University. In his 11 December speech, Wen stressed 
China’s peaceful intentions, stating, “we are determined to secure a peaceful international
175 Elizabeth Economy, “China’s Rise in Southeast Asia: Implications for the United States,” Journal of 
Contemporary China 14, no. 44 (August 2005): 412-413. Also see Yiwei Wang, “The dimensions of 
China’s peaceful rise,” Asia Times. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/printN.html (accessed 16 April 2006).
176 Ming Wang, “Democracy and Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in China Rising: Power and 
Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, eds. Yong Deng and Fei-ling Wang (New York: Rowan & Little­
field Publishers, 2005), 296.
177 Wang also points out that Zheng’s team included scholars outside the Party school, also indicating the 
great level o f importance given the project. Ming Wang, 296.
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environment and a stable domestic environment in which to concentrate on our own de­
velopment and, with it, to help promote world peace and development."178
One of the central tenets of the peaceful rise thesis, stressed repeatedly by Chinese 
political leaders and academics, is that the PRC would never seek regional hegemony in 
Asia and that China’s rise would benefit other Asian nations. Li Junru, Vice-President of 
the Central Party School, pointed out the benefits of China’s rise to neighboring coun­
tries, stating that it would not “damage the interests of other Asian countries. That is be­
cause as China rises, it provides a huge market for its neighbors. At the same time, the 
achievements of China’s developments will allow it to support the progress of others in 
the region.”179 Ruan Zongze, Vice Director of the China Institute of International Stud­
ies, furthered the benefits argument concerning China’s rise by emphasizing that a 
stronger China could play a larger role in regional stability. Ruan argued that China’s 
development “is conducive to security and stability in the region.” He continued:
China lies at the joint of the “curve of turbulence” through Eurasia continent to 
northeast Asia and this region is where the interests of major powers converge 
and therefore has many “hotspots.” A stronger China would have more leverage 
in mediating regional conflicts, and thus contributing to cooperation.”180
ASEAN-China Summits
Quite interestingly, China’s approach to the South Sea disputes and to Southeast 
Asian security issues in general, from the late 1990s on has been based upon initiating 
many dialogue processes with ASEAN outside the ARF framework. Beijing’s growing
178 Chinese Embassy in the United States, “China’s Peaceful Rise Relies on Own Efforts for Development: 
Premier.” http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/first%20beginning/t56059.htm (accessed 15 May 2006).
179 Jifan Zan, “Peaceful Rise,” Beijing Review. http://www.bjreview.com.cn/200416/BoaoSpecial- 
200416(B).htm (accessed 9 July 2006).
180Zongze Rong, “What are the implications of China’s peaceful rise to the world?” 
http://www.crf.org.cn/peaceful rise/ruanzongze2.htm (accessed 12 February 2006).
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commitment to accept ASEAN norms continued within the annual ASEAN-China Sum­
mits. At the 1997 summit, Chinese President Jiang Zemin signed a joint statement on 
“ASEAN-China Co-operation towards the 21st Century” that outlined basic principles for 
expanding PRC-ASEAN relations in economic, political, and security issues. Specific to 
the South China Sea disputes, the joint statement reiterated earlier agreements between 
China and ASEAN on the rejection of the use of force to settle outstanding territorial dis­
putes in the region and the necessity of continuing dialogue based on international law 
and the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Importantly, the state­
ment also made clear the fact that both the ASEAN states and China desired a more co­
operative and mutually beneficial relationship, and that both sides agreed, “not to allow
1 O 1
existing differences to hamper the development of friendly relations and co-operation.” 
By signing the joint statement, Jiang also reaffirmed China’s support of other ASEAN 
initiates, such as the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), and the Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in Southeast Asia.182 In return for Beijing’s expanded ac­
ceptance of ASEAN norms, the joint statement included a brief declaration of ASEAN’s 
continued support of the “one China” policy.
During the November 2002 China-ASEAN meeting, Beijing took a significantly 
different approach regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea by agreeing to the 
terms of the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea of 
1992. In doing so, China relaxed its traditional South China Sea strategy of pursuing bi­
181 See BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Part 3: Asia-Pacific, FED 3105(18 December 1997).
182 Jiang indicated that China had reservations about the wording of the NWFZ concerning the accession of 
nuclear weapons states to the protocol of the treaty, and pointed-out that negotiations were still ongoing.
At the time, it seemed that China was concerned that ratifying the NWFZ treaty would adversely affect its 
territorial claims over the South China Sea. However, Beijing overcame its reservations, and announced in 
July 1999 that the PRC would be the first nuclear weapons state to accede to the NWFZ. See Lee, “China’s 
Relations with ASEAN: Partners in the 21st Century?”, 65, 70, and The South China Morning Post, 28 July 
1999.
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lateral talks with other disputants while avoiding multilateral venues,183 by accepting an
1 S iessentially multilateral code of governance. The Declaration was the first political 
document signed between China and ASEAN concerning the territorial disputes, and 
marked a most significant and important step toward lessening the possibility of conflict 
in the South China Sea. The agreement stipulated that China and ASEAN reaffirm their 
commitment to the principles of the UN Charter, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the principles of international law, 
and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). In addition, the dec­
laration committed concerned parties to reject the use of force and pursue a peaceful reso­
lution of territorial and jurisdictional disputes through friendly negotiations between 
states directly concerned, as well as exercising self-restraint in conducting activities that 
would complicate or exacerbate tensions, including refraining from inhabiting uninhab­
ited islands, reefs, shoals, etc. The Declaration also stipulated that pending a comprehen­
sive and lasting settlement of the disputes, disputant states could explore and undertake
cooperative projects concerning marine pollution, search, and rescue operations, scien-
1 8̂tific research, and combating transnational crime. China’s acceptance of the Declara­
tion in 2002 represents the first manifestation of China’s changed security “role-identity” 
from that of “security cooperator” to that of “security partner.”
183 Even as late as August 1999, the Chinese Foreign Ministry denounced a multilateral approach to the 
South Seas issue. During a news briefing at the 1999 ARF Ministerial Meeting, Chinese spokesman Zhang 
Qiyue, stated that the PRC did not favor discussing the dispute “at any multilateral forum because this can 
only lead to further complication of the matter. . . .  The China Sea [disputes] should be resolved through 
bilateral negotiations between countries concerned in peaceful means.” See “China Rejects ASEAN ‘Code 
of Conduct’ for Spratlys,” Kyodo News International, 2 August 1999.
184 See Gill, “China’s Regional Security Strategy,” 256-7.
185See Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Declaration on the South 
China Sea (22 July 1992). http://www.aseansec.org/3634.htm (accessed 5 August 2005); “China, ASEAN 
Sign Code of Conduct on South China Sea,” Xinhuanet, 4 November 2002; and “ASEAN Cooperation 
Surges Ahead,” China Daily, 6 January 2002.
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China-ASEAN “Strategic Partnership” and Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
Beijing’s growing acceptance of multilateral cooperation in China’s relations with 
ASEAN was strengthened when in October both parties established the Strategic Partner­
ship for Peace and Prosperity and China acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co­
operation (TAC). The declaration establishing the Strategic Partnership committed both 
parties to, among other things, “implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
the South China Sea” and also to convene “ASEAN-China security-related dialogue to
• • • • 1 X fienhance mutual understanding and promote peace and security in the region.” By 
agreeing to enter into the Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, China became 
the first strategic partner of ASEAN.187 Following the National People’s Congress 
(NPC) approval in June that year of China’s accession to the TAC treaty, China formally 
joined the TAC treaty at the seventh ASEAN-China Summit held as part of the larger 
ASEAN Plus Three (APT) summit that year in Indonesia. By doing so, the PRC became
1 RRthe first non-Southeast Asian major power to sign the treaty. The TAC committed all 
signatories to employ peaceful means to settle disputes between themselves, including 
territorial disputes. In the event that direct negotiations between disputants failed to re­
solve the dispute, the TAC provided for the possibility of third-party mediation. Further, 
the treaty stipulated that countries agreed not to “participate in any activity which shall 
constitute a threat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integ-
186 See Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Joint Declaration o f the Heads o f State/Government o f the 
Association o f Southeast Asian Nations and the People’s Republic o f China on Strategic Partnership for 
Peace and Prosperity (8 October 2003). http://www.asean.org/15265.htm (accessed 19 August 2006).
187 ASEAN is the first regional grouping with which China formed such a relationship, indicating an in­
creased level of political and strategic relations between China and ASEAN. See Wang, “China’s Multi­
lateral Diplomacy in the new Millennium,” 171-172, and “ASEAN, China Forge Strategic Partnership,” 
People’s Daily, 9 October 2003.
188 See “China Joins Treaty of Amity, Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” People’s Daily, 9 October 2003, and 
Jane Perlez, “Asian Leaders Find China a More Cordial Neighbor,” New York Times, 18 October 2003.
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1 OQrity” of other signatories. By agreeing to accede to the TAC, Beijing enhanced 
China’s image in Southeast Asia as a “good neighbor” and “cooperative” power which 
would “foster cooperation in the furtherance of the cause of peace, harmony, and stability 
in the region,” and not undertake or participate in any activity constituting “a threat to the 
political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity” of the other signa­
tory states and to “refrain from the threat or use of force” and settle disputes through 
“friendly negotiations.”190 In addition, by signing the TAC, China also broke from its 
traditional diplomatic posture by allowing ASEAN states essentially to dictate the norms 
of behavior concerning the South China Sea disputes.191
By acceding to the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea 
in 2002, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, and participating in the 
ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership in 2003, Beijing significantly reinforced China’s 
peaceful, cooperative “good neighbor” image in Southeast Asia while, at the same time, 
substantially decreased perceptions in the region of a “China threat.” Further, Beijing’s 
diplomatic activity demonstrated to the ASEAN states that China was indeed becoming 
“socialized” as reflected by China’s increased acceptance of ASEAN’s regulatory and
192constitutive norms.
189 Association o f Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, Treaty o f Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia (24 February 1976). http://www.aseansec.org/1654.htm (accessed 18 January 2007).
190 The complete Treaty o f  Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia was first ratified 24 February 1976. 
Also, see Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, Instrument o f Accession to the 
Treaty o f Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (8 October 2003). http://www.aseansec.org/15271.htm 
(accessed 11 April 2006).
“China, Southeast Asia Conclude Strategic Partnership Pact,” Xinhua, 8 October 2003.
191 Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping argue that by doing so, Beijing is pursuing the “most effective way for 
China to show that it is a responsible power” by demonstrating its “benign intentions by exercising self- 
restraint and displaying willingness to be restrained.” See Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, “China’s Re­
gional Strategy,” in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: Uni­
versity of California Press, 2005), 52.
192 Yuen Foong Khong provides a good analysis of norm-building, the “ASEAN Way,” and Sino-
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ASEAN Plus Three (APT)
Another ASEAN multilateral process in which Beijing directly applied the GND 
to the South Sea disputes is the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) forum. Constituted by 
ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea, the APT mechanism was initially established as 
an informal dialogue intended to increase regional economic cooperation. Beijing enthu­
siastically supported the creation of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) in 1997 in response to the 
Asian Financial Crisis. Beginning in 2000, however, the annual informal APT meetings 
were upgraded in status to formal East Asia summits and thus became a key component 
of the annual ASEAN gatherings on par with the ARF, AMM, and PMCs.193 Beijing was 
instrumental in elevating the APT mechanism’s status within the ASEAN process, and 
continues to actively promote the APT as a “main framework of East Asia regional coop­
eration.”194 In fact, some of Beijing’s boldest initiatives in Sino-ASEAN relations have 
been proposed at the APT. For example, in his speech at the 2001 annual APT summit, 
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji suggested, “efforts should be made to gradually carry out 
dialogue and cooperation in the political and security field.”195 In November 2002, China 
signed a joint declaration with ASEAN to increase cooperation on nontraditional security 
issues and, the following June, proposed the establishment of a new “ARF Security Pol­
icy Conference” in which military and civilian personnel would participate in developing 
an ARF security pact acknowledging the principles such as noninterference in the internal 
affairs of other states, and the peaceful resolution of international disputes through dia-
ASEAN relations in “Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Institutions and Soft Balancing in 
Southeast Asia’s Post-Cold War Strategy,” in Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Effi­
ciency, eds. J. J. Suh, Peter Katzenstein, Allen Carlson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 172- 
208.
193 Wang, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium,” 176-177.
194 Ibid.
195 Rongji Zhu, “Strengthening East Asian Cooperation and Promoting Common Development,” 5 Novem­
ber 2001. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/end/21861.html (accessed 14 March 2006).
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logue.196 Due largely to Beijing’s efforts, the APT process has expanded its scope to 16 
areas of cooperation, including economic, monetary and finance, political, security, tour-
1Q7ism, agriculture, environment, and energy. In regards to the territorial disputes, the 
security area of cooperation is most salient.
Beijing’s new approach to the South China Sea disputes successfully prevented 
the issue from souring Sino-ASEAN relations. By agreeing to discuss the disputes multi- 
laterally and indicating a willingness for joint development of the disputed regions, Bei­
jing was able to diplomatically prevent the South China Sea disputes from have a detri­
mental effect on the intensification of Sino-ASEAN relations by reassuring the Southeast 
Asian states that they had little reason to fear the rise of China. In short, the China threat 
thesis in Southeast Asia was being incrementally reduced by Beijing’s proactive and co­
operative diplomatic approach in the region. Moreover, Beijing accomplished this with­
out compromising China’s claims of territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea
Track II Diplomacy
Chinese diplomacy concerning the South China Sea disputes at the informal 
Track II level has been less spectacular than that at the various Track I dialogues. Due to 
the overall lack of tangible progress in resolving the disputes at both the unofficial Indo­
nesian sponsored Workshops on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea and 
the ARF sponsored Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), many 
observers have discounted the effectiveness of these Track II venues, calling them “talk
196 For details, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Position Paper 
on the New Security Concept, http://www.finprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/xw/t27742.htm (accessed 22 Decem­
ber 2006).
197 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation (2004). 
http.V/www.aseansec. org/16580.htm (accessed 23 March 2006).
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shops.” However, I disagree with this assessment. What is interesting and important 
about the Track II processes it that they provided a venue and opportunity for the free ex­
change of ideas, which allowed the participants to understand better the positions of the 
other disputant states. Further, the workshops allowed for an exchange and sharing of 
knowledge that facilitated progress at the Track I dialogues. Two good examples of 
shared knowledge leading to tangible cooperation at the official Track I level are the 
1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, and the 2002 ASEAN Declaration on 
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Both ASEAN initiatives were actually 
first suggested and discussed at the Track II workshops. By the conclusion of the second 
Workshop held in Bandung in 1991, a statement was issued on the need to resolve the 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea by “peaceful means through dialogue and ne­
gotiation” and that “force should not be used to settle territorial and jurisdictional dis­
putes” and that the involved parties should “exercise self-restraint in order not to compli­
cate the situation.”198 This statement was adopted at the Track I level as the 1992 
ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea. The same holds true for the 2002 ASEAN 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, as the idea for a code of 
conduct originated within the Indonesian workshop process.199 In addition, the notion of 
joint development of the disputed areas in the South China Sea advocated by China in its 
mid-1990s bilateral dialogues with the Philippines and Vietnam (and finally implemented 
by the 2005 tripartite agreement between Beijing, Manila, and Hanoi) for joint offshore
198 See Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault, “Preventive Diplomacy: Managing Potential Conflicts in 
the South China Sea,” in Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, ed. Hampson Crocker, 
107-133, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999.
199 Hasjim Djalal, “South China Sea Island Disputes,” The Raffles Bulletin o f Zoology, Supplement No. 8 
(National University o f Singapore, 2000): 9-21. http://rmbr.nus.edu.sg/exanambas/rbzs8-scs/Djalal.html 
(accessed 23 August 2006).
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oil development in the Spratlys was first broached within the Workshop process.200 It 
seems reasonable to assert that shared knowledge (“complex” learning) gained by the 
Workshop participants at the Track II level facilitated the eventual agreements reached 
concerning the South China Sea issue within the Track I ASEAN dialogues. The Track II 
dialogues allowed the participants to socialize with one another on a personal basis, and 
thereby better familiarize themselves with the positions and points of view of other par­
ticipants. This process of “social learning” must be seen as an important factor that sub­
sequently led to the formal agreements on the South China Sea discussed in this study.
As discussed in Chapter Two, the Workshop meetings focused on establishing 
confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the South China Sea in areas such as joint 
search and rescue operations, scientific studies of the tide and sea level, and the maritime 
region’s biodiversity, and scientific databases. Several technical working groups (TWG) 
and groups of experts were established in the 1990s to study and facilitate cooperative 
programs. By the sixth Workshop held in Balikpapan in 1995, the Chinese delegates re­
sisted efforts towards additional CBMs, as they perceived the workshop itself as a CBM
901  •and therefore did not believe that additional CBMs were warranted. By the conclusion 
of the Balikpapan workshop, it was decided to recommend only three projects to the re­
spective governments — biodiversity studies, sea level and tide monitoring, and a marine 
science data and information exchange network. Interestingly, while Chinese delegates 
resisted efforts at the workshop to establish these CBMs, Beijing was simultaneously 
moving slowly toward such talks at the Track I level.
200 Ibid. A Special Technical Working Group on Resources Assessment and Ways of Development initially 
met in Jakarta (July 1993) to discuss joint development of the South China Sea, where the Chinese dele­
gates expressed China’s willingness to shelve territorial or sovereignty claims in favor of joint develop­
ment.
201 The Straits Times, 13 October 1995.
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Beijing’s initial refusal to cooperate in the biodiversity project was seen by others 
as yet another example of Chinese stalling the process. In addition, the Mischief Reef 
affair between Beijing and Manila (1995) continued to have a detrimental influence on 
the workshop process. Carolina Hemandes, president of the Institute for Strategic and 
Development Studies, commented that China’s 1995 occupation of Mischief Reef “shat­
tered the image of China as a trustworthy neighbor,” while a Singapore analyst blamed 
Beijing for intensifying the dispute: “So far, it has largely been a case of China ‘advanc- 
ing’ in the region through the show and use of force.” However, by the end of the 
1997 workshop, an agreement was reached to implement several cooperative projects: 
biodiversity; study on tide and sea level change; and database and information network­
ing for scientists. By finally agreeing to the cooperative biodiversity study, the Chinese 
delegates reinforced China’s “cooperative” and “responsible” image and at the same time 
by doing so lessened negative fallout from China’s reluctance at the time to support the 
workshop’s call for a code of conduct for the South China Sea.
BILATERAL DIPLOMACY
Throughout much of the second period of our case study, Beijing’s bilateral di­
plomacy regarding the territorial disputes reflected a continuation of the traditional ap­
proach to the issue associated with China’s “Cold War’ identity. At this level, most 
learning gained through interaction was “simple,” which led only to instrumental changes 
in Beijing’s GND. This, however, began to change as Beijing’s bilateral actions increas­
ingly came into line with the new multilateral approach. “Complex” learning gained 
through multilateral interaction influenced China’s bilateral diplomacy with the Philip­
202 “The Smiling but Unrelenting Dragon,” The Asian Wall Street Journal, 7 November 1997.
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pines and Vietnam. Beijing’s schizophrenic identity (Cognitive BaseA — bilateral diplo­
macy; Cognitive Bases -  multilateral diplomacy) appeared to be on the mend.
The Philippines
The 1995 Mischief Reef Affair between China and the Philippines in the Spratlys 
certainly marked a low point in relations between the two countries. Manila’s protests 
and diplomatic activities concerning Beijing’s provocations in the South China Sea were 
the most vociferous and concerted of the ASEAN states. Efforts made by Manila to in­
ternationalize the Spratlys dispute, as well as a growing American interest in the disputes 
and reproving statements from Washington, pressured Beijing, as discussed in the previ­
ous chapter, to reappraise its approach to the territorial disputes. Following the initial 
crisis, bilateral talks between Beijing and Manila produced a joint “code of conduct” to 
defuse the situation in August 1995. This diplomatic breakthrough was made possible, in 
large part, to Beijing’s new stance on accepting international law and UNCLOS in seek­
ing a resolution of China’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea, as well as China’s 
increased flexibility concerning multilateral cooperation and the possibility of multilat­
eral talks on the Spratlys at an “appropriate time,” as indicated by Chinese Foreign Min­
ister Qian Qichen at the 1995 ARF meeting hosted in July by Brunei.203 In addition, per­
sonal diplomacy on the part of Chinese leader Jiang Zemin and Philippines President 
Ramos also played a significant role in mitigating tensions between both countries caused 
by the Mischief Reef affair. However, actions taken subsequently by both sides in the 
Spratlys in support of their respective claims of territorial sovereignty (as discussed in 
Chapter 2), renewed tensions in Sino-Philippine relations. In March 1996, the Spratly
203 Lee, 107.
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disputes were one of the most urgent issues on the agenda during vice-ministerial level 
talks between Manila and Beijing. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, agreements 
were reached at the end of the talks for establishing cooperation through several CBMs 
including military-to-military contacts, and both countries decided that the Mischief Reef 
issue would be set aside for the time being. The March 1996 talks succeeded in reducing 
tensions between China and the Philippines.
During the second half of 1996, Sino-Philippines relations were further improved 
by personal interactions between leaders from both states. In June, Philippine Foreign 
Secretary Domingo Siazon visited Beijing and was reassured that Beijing would resolve 
the territorial disputes with Manila in a peaceful fashion within the framework of interna­
tional law and UNCLOS.204 Siazon’s trip to China was reciprocated when Jiang Zemin 
paid an official visit to the Philippines following the November APEC summit convened 
at Subic Bay. During their talks, Ramos attempted unsuccessfully to persuade Jiang that 
China should withdraw from Mischief Reef. Both men did agree, however, not to discuss 
issues of sovereignty and instead work toward building confidence and develop disputed 
areas of the Spratlys jointly.205 In addition, Jiang made a pledge that China would not 
aggravate the situation by militarizing the disputed area.206 The improved atmosphere in 
Sino-Philippine relations, however, was short-lived.
On Christmas Day 1996, Philippine Army Chief of Staff Amulfo Acedera for­
mally opened an airfield runway on one of the more substantial islands in the Spratlys 
and declared that Manila would develop the area into a tourist resort.207 Protest came
204 The Straits Times, 14 June 1996.
205 The Straits Times, 27 November 1996.
206 Lianhe Zaobao, 28 November 1996 as cited in Lee, 113.
207 The Straits Times, 31 December 1996.
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quickly from Beijing, admonishing and warning Manila to refrain from actions that could 
threaten relations between the two countries.208 Then, after rounds of protests and 
counter-protests, tensions between Beijing and Manila worsened in April 1997 when the 
Philippines accused China of aggravating the situation by dispatching armed naval ves­
sels in the Spratlys to patrol near islands occupied by Filipinos. Beijing responded by 
accusing the Philippines of violating Chinese sovereignty in the Macclesfield Bank area 
north of the Spratlys by removing Chinese territorial markers and hoisting a Philippine 
flag on Scarborough Shoal.209 In addition, Filipino politicians made trips to Scarborough 
Shoal to defend Philippine sovereignty in front of the Philippines press, while others 
urged President Ramos to ask Washington to increase its military presence in the region
9 1 0to counter China. As tensions between Beijing and Manila mounted, Ramos did ex­
plore diplomatic initiatives to prevent conflict with China in the Spratlys and Scarbor­
ough Shoal.
The Ramos Administration argued that the code of conduct agreed to in 1995 by 
both sides was not specific enough to prevent incidences of hostility in disputed waters. 
Manila therefore suggested that the two countries establish clearer rules of engagement in 
the South China Sea to prevent armed clashes between PRC and Philippines naval
71 1
units. As a result, talks were held in Beijing late in May and it was agreed that a work-
208 The Straits Times, 30 December 1996.
209 Additional aggressive actions were taken by both sides in and around the Scarborough Shoal area that 
heightened tensions in the dispute. Philippine moves to order Chinese Boats out of the area and arrests of 
more Chinese fishermen near the Shoal in May intensified the rift between the PRC and the Philippines. In 
July, Philippine troops destroyed concrete markers and removed two of three Chinese buoys on Sabina 
Shoal located 75 miles west of the Philippines island of Palawan. See The Straits Times, 14 May, 25 June, 
and 5 July 1997.
210 The Straits Times, 29 May 1997.
211 General Amulfo Acedera suggested that a mechanism for cooperation be established through which 
China and the Philippines could announce plans for military deployments before they are implemented.
See Lee, 114-115.
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ing group on CBMs be established to examine the legal issues of the conflicting territorial 
claims and the movement of ships and personnel in the disputed regions, as well as the 
possibilities of cooperation in issues such as search and rescue, exchanges between mili­
tary garrisons in the Spratlys, and disaster relief.212 Endeavoring to promote good will, 
Ramos later released Chinese fishermen arrested earlier near Scarborough Shoal, an­
nounced that Chinese fishing boats could pass through Philippine waters in route to other 
fishing grounds in international waters, and invited the Chinese navy to make a port call 
to Subic Bay in May 1998.213 The “role-identities” of China and the Philippines were by 
this point moving away from “enemy-enemy” toward “competitor-competitor.”
Because of bilateral negotiations begun in May 1997, China and the Philippines 
reached a preliminary understanding on how to handle their disputes in the South China 
Sea. It appears that both sides worked out the details concerning how Chinese warships 
could approach (and Chinese fishing vessels transit through) Philippine waters. Addi­
tionally, agreement was reached in principle for cooperation in areas such as marine sci­
entific research, fishery, and search and rescue. From the Chinese perspective, Beijing’s 
response to Manila’s provocative moves in the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal was re­
strained. By avoiding moves that might have exacerbated tensions between China and 
the Philippines and instead pursuing a diplomatic resolution, China reinforced its image 
in Southeast Asia as a “good neighbor” willing to forgo the use of force and pursue a 
peaceful settlement of its disputes with Manila. Beijing’s approach in handling the Sprat­
lys crisis with Manila was also informed and influenced by wider considerations.
212 The Straits Times, 3 June 1997.
213 The invitation was accepted by Beijing, and in April 1998, three Chinese warships arrived in the Philip­
pines and participated in celebrating Philippine independence. The Straits Times, 14 April 1998.
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Other ASEAN states having territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea 
were monitoring the situation in the Spratlys and closely observing Chinese actions -  es­
pecially Vietnam. Beijing was aware that its announcements and actions concerning the 
Philippines would affect China’s relations with other ASEAN nations and, as such, it was 
extremely important that China not be seen by the wider audience in the region as a 
threat. By talking instead of shooting, China could reinforce its national image in South­
east Asia as a “responsible” and “cooperative” country — a “good neighbor” — and thus 
prevent the South China Sea disputes from endangering Sino-ASEAN relations.
Talks between the two states continued until an agreement was reached on the 
sidelines of that year’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit held in 
Kuala Lumpur in November 1998. Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Philip­
pine Foreign Secretary Domingo Siazon agreed in principle to joint use of disputed Mis­
chief Reef once the “modalities for joint use (and) the technical details of access” were 
negotiated by an expert working group on confidence-building measures that was sup­
posed to meet in January 1999. This agreement was subsequently endorsed at the APEC 
summit during a one-on-one meeting between Presidents Jiang Zemin and Estrada.214
Early the following year, however, accusations and recriminations over encoun­
ters between fishing boats and naval patrols of both countries in and around Scarborough 
Shoal, as well as continued construction projects in the Spratlys, led to heightened ten-
214 “Philippines, Mainland China Agree to Jointly Use Mischief Reef,” Central News Agency (Taiwan), 22 
November 1998.
215 According to Manila, the Chinese had constructed facilities in Mischief Reef of the Spratlys “with pos­
sible gun emplacements and navigational radar . . . ,  which could be used for military purposes.” See 
“China remains firm on Spratlys,” BBC News: Asia-Pacific, 23 March 1999. http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/ 
world/asia-pacific/301876.stm (accessed 7 October 2006).
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91  ftsions between China and the Philippines. Philippine Vice-Admiral Eduardo Santos, 
the Navy Chief, and the Vice-Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines, 
commented to reporters that Chinese structures on Mischief Reef were “definitely not for 
fishing alone,” and that these structures could become the next base of operations of Chi-
•  917nese naval forces in the Spratlys. Orlando Mercado, Secretary of Defense of the Phil­
ippines, also underlined Manila’s perceptions of a growing Chinese threat at a press con­
ference. Concerning the Chinese structures on Mischief Reef, Mercado stated “They 
[Chinese] say these are structures for fishermen who may be marooned in a typhoon, but
91 o
of course we have never been naive enough to believe that.” During two days of talks 
between Philippine Foreign Undersecretary Lauro Baja and Chinese Assistant Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi concerning recent provocative actions and statements by both sides in 
the dispute, Wang repeated Beijing’s assurances that the structures on Mischief Reef 
were only shelters for Chinese fishermen and not intended for military purposes. Wang 
added that once the structures were completed (and when China-Philippines relations im-
910proved), China would consider allowing Filipino anglers to use the facilities. Manila 
responded by demanding that China demolish the structures. The Chinese rejected the 
demand, stressing that Mischief Reef was Chinese sovereign territory. Mr. Baja re­
marked to reporters following the talks that he was “not deliriously happy” with the re-
216 In May, a Chinese fishing boat was sunk after a collision with a Philippine warship, and late in Novem­
ber, China demanded that a “stranded” Filipino naval vessel near Scarborough Shoal be towed away as its 
presence posed a challenge to Chinese sovereignty. See “Spratlys continue to loom as Asian flashpoint,” 
World Socialist Web Site, 13 December 1999. http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/decl999/spra-dl3.shtml 
(accessed 23 October 2006).
217 See “The Mischief Reef Affair,” The Wall Street Journal, 16 December 1998 and “Mischief Reef a ma­
jor Chinese fortress, says Philippine navy,” The Straits Times, 25 January 1999.
218 “Diplomatic Storm Over Islands,” Newsday, 4 February 1999.
219 “Philippines to discuss use of Mischief Reef structures with China,” Associated Press Newswires, 19 
March 1999.
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suits. Philippine President Joseph Estrada indicated after the two-day talks with the 
Chinese that he might “elevate the issue to the United Nations.”221
Shortly after the Chinese-Filipino meetings, Manila intensified its protest by re­
porting that Chinese forces on Johnson Reef had recently opened fire against a Philippine 
Air force plane-an incident that had not been made public at the time.222 A week later 
President Estrada announced a postponement of his planned trip to Beijing.223 Two 
weeks later at the Inter-parliamentary Union meeting in Brussels, Bias Ople, head of the 
Philippine 18-man delegation and Senate President Pro Tempore, demanded a Chinese 
withdrawal from Mischief Reef during his speech at the IPU, which triggered a dispute 
with the Chinese representatives: “We ask that the parties commit themselves to the 
status quo in the area. This means that China must withdraw from Mischief Reef which 
it has illegally occupied since 1995 in violation of the Manila Declaration of 1992.” Lia 
Daoyu gave the Chinese response, accusing Ople of “distorting the facts and making false 
accusations.” Lia stated, “we are deeply surprised at the intervention of the Philippine 
delegation. This intervention will have negative effects on the Filipino people.”224 
China’s cooperative image in the Philippines was quickly becoming tarnished, as the tra­
ditional ‘China-as-a-threat’ image strengthened. Relations between Beijing and Manila 
worsened the following month.
220 “China remains firm on Spratlys,” BBC News: Asia-Pacific, 23 March 1999. http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/ 
world/asia-pacific/301876.stm (accessed 14 November 2006).
221 Ibid. Shortly thereafter Estrada met with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in New York asking him to 
help find a peaceful resolution to the disputes with China. Also see “Trouble brews on Mischief Reef,” 
BBC News: Asia-Pacific, 22 January 1999.
222 “Spratlys pose multiple problems for China-Philippine relations,” Agence France-Presse, 24 March 
1999.
223 “Estrada delays Beijing trip over Mischief Reef spat,” The Straits Times, 1 April 1999.
224 “Chinese mischief at Reef to IPU,” Manila Standard, 16 April 1999.
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On 20 May 1999, Beijing called for a settlement of its dispute with the Philip­
pines over Mischief Reef. Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said that China 
“deeply regrets” the comments made by President Estrada in Hong Kong that Chinese 
territorial ambitions in the South China Sea were harming regional security, but stated 
that China desired a peaceful settlement of the dispute in accordance with international 
maritime laws including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Zhu continued; 
“China hopes the parties concerned will jointly commit themselves to peace and stability 
in the South China Sea region. Remarks or actions that contradict this will not help solve 
the problem and are not desirable.” Two days after the Chinese statement, the Philip­
pine House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning Chinese intrusions into 
the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and commending the Philippine Navy for “gal­
lantly protecting our territorial integrity.” The resolution stated that the “presence of the 
Chinese fishing boat in the Scarborough Shoal is part of the ploy and strategy of the 
PROC to maintain and gradually increase their presence therein like what they did in 
Mischief Reef which ended up in the construction of concrete, high rise buildings, some­
thing the PROC undoubtedly dreams of doing in Scarborough Shoal.”226 Manila also 
widened its dispute with China when the Philippines proposed that ASEAN establish a 
regional code of conduct to govern activities in the South China Sea.227 Manila’s relent­
less diplomatic pressure against China continued through 2000 and into early 2001, when 
former Philippine President Fidel Ramos characterized China as a threat to Southeast 
Asia during the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos, Switzerland. At a
225 “China urges peaceful talks on Spratly Islands dispute,” Asian Political News, 24 May 1999.
226 “Legislative Resolution on Foreign Affairs,” House Resolution No. 944, House of Representatives, Re­
public of the Philippines (26 May 1999).
227 Wang, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the New Millennium,” 170.
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working dinner on “Security and Stability in Asia,” Ramos commented on the rise of
China and its implications for Asia:
Economic growth has also set off a sea change in Chinese strategic thinking. To­
day, China’s ambition is to project power -beyond mainland East Asia, where its 
strategic authority is already widely accepted-initially into East Asia’s maritime 
regions, and ultimately into the world-ocean.
Because China has been a land-power since the early 15th century, its build-up of 
sea-and air power is liable to become Asia’s key security issue over these next 10- 
15 years. Already other powers with maritime interests-like India and Japan-are 
beginning to react to what they must see as a threat to their own sea-lanes of 
communication.
The Spratlys and Taiwan Straits problems are vital components of China’s mari­
time interests.
How China exercises its potential political and military power must concern all 
the countries of the Asia-Pacific-a«c/ none more so than we o f Southeast Asia, 
who lie in the direction o f its historical expansion [emphasis mine].
China’s territorial dispute with the Philippines over the Spratlys was quickly be­
coming a liability for Beijing that potentially could undermine Chinese efforts at 
strengthening Sino-ASEAN relations. Beijing would have to dispel growing mistrust of 
China by reinforcing China’s cooperative, friendly image in Southeast Asia by taking the 
initiative at both the bilateral as well as multilateral levels. Through bilateral negotiations 
with the Philippines, Beijing could make some measured concessions to Manila such as 
increased Chinese cooperation in various CBMs in the South China Sea, as well as eco­
nomic “carrots” such as favorable trade deals and increased Chinese technical assistance. 
These measures would strengthen China’s “good neighbor” image by demonstrating that 
the PRC was a “cooperative” and “responsible” rising power desiring peaceful, mutually 
beneficial relations with the Philippines. By talking instead of shooting, and by demon­
228 Remarks of Fidel Ramos at Hotel Caprice, Davos Switzerland, during a working dinner on “Security 
and Stability in Asia,” 29 January 2001. http://www.dfa.gov.ph/archieve/speech/fvr/ fVr_dinner.htm (ac­
cessed 19 September 2006).
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strating that closer relations with China had substantial economic and political benefits 
far outweighing any Manila might realize by continuing to focus on the issue of territorial 
sovereignty, Beijing could maintain the status quo in the Spratlys while at the same time 
strengthen and deepen economic ties between the two countries.
In December 2001, Beijing took a step forward by agreeing to discuss joint use of 
the Mischief Reef structures with the Philippines. This concession was apparently not 
enough to assuage Filipino (and Vietnamese) suspicions of China’s ulterior motives in 
the region. Beijing would have to make a larger concession; it appeared, to accomplish 
the task of reassuring the ASEAN states that China was sincere in its efforts of coopera­
tion and seeking a peaceful resolution of the disputes. In November 2002, Beijing made 
such a move by signing the ASEAN Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China 
Sea, crossing a new threshold in China’s direct application of the GND on the territorial 
disputes. Even though the ASEAN states (especially the Philippines and Vietnam) had 
pushed for a stronger, legally binding code of conduct but were, however, eventually per­
suaded by the Chinese to accept a non-binding declaration, Beijing’s accession to the 
Declaration was a major Chinese concession and marked a turning point for Beijing to­
ward an increasingly liberal application of the GND in Sino-ASEAN relations. China’s 
accession to the Declaration apparently reduced tensions between Beijing and Manila, 
which allowed movement forward in the bilateral dialogue concerning their territorial 
dispute in the South China Sea. As we have seen, the process of “collective” identity 
formation is not unidirectional. As with personal relationships, in which shared knowl­
edge of Self and Other can change because of interaction and affect the “role-identities” 
in the relationship, the same holds true for corporate (state) relations. Sometimes interac-
229 Manila Standard, 9 December 2001.
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tion results in positive (holistic) identity change, sometime it results in negative (egoistic) 
identity change.230
During Philippine President Gloria Arroyo’s state visit to China in late August 
2004, an agreement to begin a joint three-year seismic survey of potential oil deposits in 
the Spratlys was signed. Importantly, the agreement between Beijing and Manila stated, 
“[tjhere is an understanding between the Philippines and China that the PNOC [Philip­
pines National Oil Company]-CNOOC [Chinese National Offshore Oil Company] under­
taking will be open to the participation of a third party, such as companies of other claim­
ant states.” The “third party” mentioned was Vietnam’s offshore oil company PetroViet­
nam, whose participation in the survey was strongly supported by Manila.231 The bilat­
eral agreement between Beijing and Manila for joint oil exploration in the Spratlys by 
their respective national oil companies marked a diplomatic success for China.
By undertaking joint offshore oil exploration in the disputed Spratlys, Beijing 
strengthened China’s “cooperative” and “responsible” image in the region by demonstrat­
ing a willingness to work with the Philippines in resolving the territorial dispute as well 
as “share” the resources of the area despite the absence of a final solution of the dispute. 
In doing so, Beijing both paved the way for closer China-Philippines relations and miti­
gated the negative political fall-out in the region due to China’s most recent spat with the 
Philippines over Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal. By agreeing to allow “third par­
ties” to participate in the joint seismic survey, Beijing essentially indicated a softening in
230 Wendt argues that the kind of representational practice (“reflected appraisals”) that produces enemies is 
known as Realpolitik, “which involves treating others in self-interested terms, casting them as if they were 
nothing but objects, without standing or rights, to be killed, conquered, or left alone as one sees fit”, and 
that which produces friends is known as “prosocial”, “which involves treating others as if one not only re­
spected their individual security concerns but also ‘cared’ for them, a willingness to help them even when 
this serves no narrowly self-interested purpose.” Social Theory o f International Politics, 341.
231 See “Philippines, China to map potential oil in Spratlys; Vietnam invited,” Agence France Presse, 2 
September 2004.
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its position against multilateral approaches to the South Sea disputes. However, the joint 
PRC-RP survey of the Spratlys caused friction between Beijing and Hanoi (as discussed 
below) that was not mitigated until Hanoi finally agreed to join the seismic survey in 
March 2005.232
The 2005 tripartite agreement between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines for 
joint offshore oil and gas prospecting in disputed areas of the South China Sea, according 
to Beijing, had turned a “sea of disputes” into a “sea of cooperation.” Chinese ambassa­
dor Wu Hongbo stated that the trilateral accord, based on mutual understanding and 
common interest, would set a good example for resolving the South China Sea issue in a 
peaceful way, while Philippine Foreign Secretary Alberto Romulo said that the agree­
ment signified “the growing level of trust and confidence among claimants and their 
commitment to pursue peaceful options on the issue.” Philippine Energy Secretary Vin­
cent Perez also underlined the significance of the tripartite agreement by stating, “in con­
trast to the gunbattle [sic] diplomacy of the last century, we call this seismic vessel di­
plomacy.”233 Even former Philippine President Ramos, who had sounded the alarm bell 
of a China threat so directly and impassionedly at the 2001 Davos meeting of the World 
Economic Forum, had modified his analysis of the “China threat” by September 2005. 
Demonstrating a new, more upbeat attitude concerning Chinese intentions in the Spratlys, 
Ramos commented to reporters that the tripartite oil exploration deal between China, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines was a win-win proposition for all participants. Ramos re­
marked, “with the major claimants to the islands [Spratlys] supervising the oil explora-
232 See “Philippines, China, Vietnam to explore S. China Sea areas,” Kyodo News, 14 March 2005, “China, 
Philippines, Vietnam sign joint South China Sea oil search accord,” Agence France Presse, 14 March 2005.
233 See “Turning “sea of disputes” into “sea of cooperation,” Xinhua News Agency, 15 March 2005 and 
“Trio sign deal for Spratlys surveys,” Upstream, 18 March 2005 respectively.
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tions, we could also gain a defense and security benefit from it. Instead of fighting over 
the islands we are coming together to bring about the joint exploration and development 
of the islands.” Vietnam’s accession to what had originally been a bilateral agreement
between Beijing and Manila for joint exploration of the Spratlys transformed the enter­
prise into a multilateral undertaking. Significantly, this multilateralization occurred be­
cause of bilateral talks outside of ASEAN’s multilateral processes. This diplomatic ac­
complishment served to reinforce Beijing’s long-standing assertion that the disputes 
should be resolved initially and primarily through bilateral dialogue between disputant 
states.
Beijing’s concession towards multilateralism was viewed by Manila and ASEAN 
positively and helped to reduce China’s image as a “threat” in Southeast Asia. From Ma­
nila’s point of view, Beijing’s move allowed for the possibility of a joint Philippines- 
Vietnam position in the Spratlys vis-a-vis China, which would strengthen Manila’s nego­
tiating position, while at the same time allow for increased trade and economic relations 
with China. From ASEAN’s point of view (discussed in the following chapter), Beijing’s 
agreement with Manila for joint development of the Spratlys further proved that the strat­
egy of “engaging” and “socializing” China was working. Further, the invitation to Viet­
nam to join the joint PRC-RP exploration project illustrated to ASEAN leaders that the 
Chinese were becoming more comfortable with ASEAN’s special multilateral approach 
to international relations and dispute resolution. In effect, it was obvious that China was 
increasingly becoming “socialized” into accepting ASEAN norms. As such, perceptions 
in Southeast Asia of a rising Chinese threat were greatly reduced. From Beijing’s per­
spective, Chinese GND at the bilateral level had successfully prevented the Spratlys dis­
234 “Ramos: Spratlys oil exploration deal to promote peace in region,” BusinessWorld, 2 September 2005.
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pute with the Philippines from derailing a further deepening of relations between the two 
countries and, at the same time, reinforced the “cooperative” and “responsible” images of 
China increasingly held by ASEAN leaders. Most significantly, Beijing accomplished 
this without directly compromising China’s claim of territorial sovereignty.
A recent event in the Spratlys further exemplifies the success of Beijing’s “good 
neighbor” diplomacy in China’s relations with the Philippines, as well as the remarkable 
change in China-Philippine “role-identities.” On 26 April 2006, the Chinese fishing ves­
sel Jinghai 03012 was attacked and boarded by unknown assailants while operating in an 
area of the Spratlys disputed by China and the Philippines. The attack left four Chinese 
dead and three others wounded. According to the Chinese newspaper Southern Daily, 
a survivor stated that a Philippine boat was behind the attack and that six of the attackers 
“wore camouflage clothes while the other seven were casually dressed.”236 The incident 
prompted Beijing on 3 May to request officially that Manila investigate the attack. 
Commenting on the Chinese request, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita cautioned 
against immediately assuming that the attackers were Filipinos, while at the same time 
expressing his confidence that Sino-Philippine relations would not be hurt by the event: 
“this is a very minor [incident] and our diplomatic ties remain strong.” The Chinese 
insinuation that the Philippines was behind the attack angered Philippine Senator Rodolfo 
Biazon, who denounced the Chinese paper’s report and retorted that pirates were proba­
bly responsible for the attack: “that area [Spratlys] is teeming with pirates, so it’s not fair
235 See “Beijing asks RP to probe killings,” Manila Standard, 4 May 2006, and “AFP probes Spratlys inci­
dent,” Manila Standard, 5 May 2006.
236 “Beijing asks RP to probe killings,” Manila Standard, 4 May 2006, and “Spratly Ship Remains A Phan­
tom,” The Manila Times, 7 May 2006.
237 “Beijing asks RP to probe killings,” Manila Standard, 4 May 2006.
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to accuse our nationals of being responsible for that [attack].” After concluding its in­
vestigation, Manila officially denied any role in the attack on Jinghai 03012. On 8 May, 
Philippine military spokesman Colonel Tristan Kison told reporters “there were no [Phil­
ippine] military units in the area when that incident happened,” and that pirates appeared
9TQto be responsible.”
As subsequent statements and counterstatements concerning the incident were is­
sued by Beijing and Manila, the attack on the Jinghai 03012 might have led to renewed 
friction and conflict between China and the Philippines — as had occurred in the past as 
outlined in Chapter 2 — but this time the outcome was much different. In response to the 
violent event, Beijing, Manila, and Hanoi agreed to strengthen security cooperation be­
tween the three countries in the Spratlys. Commenting on the agreement, Philippine mili­
tary chief General Generosa Senga stated, “we have agreed that we will continue our di­
rect communication and direct cooperation. . .  so that such problems in the area -  piracy, 
smuggling, transnational crimes and others, other issues and concerns that are bothering 
all of us in common -  will be resolved.”240 Unlike the past, when violent encounters in 
the Spratlys led to worsening relations between the two countries, the April 2006 attack 
on the Chinese fishing vessel led to increased cooperation and improved Sino-Philippine 
relations. Even more significant, neither side made mention of its claim of territorial sov­
ereignty in the Spratlys! Clearly, by 2006 the traditional enmity between Beijing and 
Manila over the Spratlys had transformed into amity and cooperation. Perhaps more im­
portantly, the “role-identities” between both actors had become “partner-partner” and
238 “AFP probes Spratlys incident,” Manila Standard, 5 May 2006.
239 “Philippines denies role in attack on Chinese fishermen in Spratly Islands,” AFX Asia, 8 May 2006.
240 See “Pirates attacked Chinese fishermen in Spratlys, says Philippine military chief,” Associated Press 
Newswires, 19 May 2006, and “RP, China, Vietnam to cooperate in Spratlys security,” Manila Bulletin, 19 
May 2006.
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showed no indication, now that the territorial dispute issue was willingly placed on a 
back burner by both parties, of reverting to “competitor-competitor” or “enemy-enemy.”
Vietnam
As with China’s bilateral relation with the Philippines, so too would Beijing learn 
that Chinese and Vietnamese interests shared much in common — a focus on domestic 
economic development, and a desire for a stable, peaceful international environment. In 
addition, Beijing learned that Hanoi was willing to put the South China Sea issue on the 
“back burner” for the time being, as long as China exemplified its peaceful “good 
neighbor” rhetoric with concrete action. Beijing’s initial “simple” learning and corre­
sponding instrumental modifications in its GND, however, began over time to change 
towards “complex” learning which caused a transformation of China’s cognitive base and 
traditional “Cold War” identity bringing it in line with the “post-Cold War” identity al­
ready discemable in China’s multilateral diplomacy with ASEAN. The shift in China’s 
identity resulting from “complex” learning at the multilateral level took more time to oc­
cur at the bilateral level. This is understandable, given the directly confrontational nature 
of bilateral negotiations, as opposed to the more diffused, nuanced setting of multilateral 
forums. As we shall see, a change in China’s identity eventually influenced Beijing’s 
bilateral diplomacy and relations with Vietnam. The role-identities shared between 
China and Vietnam had also changed from “enemy-enemy” to “partner-partner” by 2005. 
Hanoi’s China threat perceptions decreased as China’s new “post-Cold War” identity be­
came more discemable and believable to the Vietnamese.
As noted earlier, territorial disputes along the land and sea borders, and over the 
Paracel and Spratly islands in the South China Sea, had long been a major point of con­
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tention in Sino-Vietnamese relations. Normalization of PRC-DRV relations in 1991, 
along with an increase in bilateral diplomacy between Beijing and Hanoi, by 1996, had 
produced tangible results even while the South China Sea disputes continued to threaten 
improving relations. The resumption of rail links between China and Vietnam early in 
1996 was perhaps the best manifestation of the positive change in relations, reflecting the 
diligent efforts of both Beijing and Hanoi toward preventing conflict over territory as 
both countries perceived a peaceful, stable Southeast Asia as being critical for their na­
tions’ interests. Additionally, Chinese minesweeping along the border cleared previously 
mined areas and restored farmland as well as increased border trade between China and 
Vietnam. By 1997, border trade between the two countries increased to almost four times 
that of 1992.241 However, even while trade and cross-border contact substantially in­
creased between the PRC and DRV, territorial disputes continued to menace relations 
between both socialist countries.
Mistrusting one another, both Hanoi and Beijing took unilateral steps to consoli­
date their respective territorial claims even while Sino-Vietnamese relations deepened in 
other areas. The “role-identities” of China and Vietnam were no longer “enemy-enemy,” 
now rather “competitor-competitor.” One strategy employed by both sides was to grant 
oil and gas exploration and drilling concession areas to foreign oil companies in disputed 
regions of the South China Sea. In March 1997, the Chinese drilling rig Kan Tan III was 
observed to be operating in an area between Hainan Island and the central coast of Viet­
nam, at the entrance of the Gulf of Tonkin.242 When Hanoi protested, the Chinese with­
drew Kan Tan III from the area and entered into special talks with their neighbor to the
241 The volume of border trade in 1992 was 100 million dollars; in 1997, the volume of border trade had 
risen to 360 million dollars. BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Part 3: Asia Pacific, FED3135, 01/27/98.
242 The Straits Times, 8 April 1997.
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south to resolve the new territorial dispute.243 Even as Beijing took a conciliatory posi­
tion regarding the incident by withdrawing the oilrig from the disputed waters and enter­
ing into new talks with Hanoi concerning that specific territory, the Chinese leadership 
did not waiver in its claim of Chinese territorial sovereignty.244 After the March incident 
and subsequent Sino-Vietnamese talks, however, Beijing renewed tensions with the DRV 
by granting in October 1997 offshore oil and gas exploration rights to Atlantic Richfield 
Corporation (ARCO) nearby the area where Kan Tan III had operated in March.245
Early in 1998, a dispute over the land border near the Vietnamese town of Hoanh 
Mo strained Sino-Vietnamese relations, indicating that both sides still mistrusted one an­
other. Hanoi initiated this new round of squabbling over the land border by accusing 
China of reclaiming land along a river border, which diverted the flow of water, and thus 
causing flood damage along the Vietnamese side of the river. Beijing responded by as­
serting that Vietnam had built an outcrop into the river initially, causing damage to the 
Chinese river bank, forcing Beijing to reinforce its river bank to prevent damage to Chi­
nese land and crops. 246 Yet, the working group on the Chinese-Vietnamese sea border in 
the Gulf of Tonkin reached an agreement by the tenth round of talks in March 1998 to 
accelerate the pace of negotiations that a resolution of the dispute could be reached by 
2000.247 Qian Qichen and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam agreed in 
July 1997 that the best way to speed up resolution of the outstanding territorial disputes
243 Apparently, Hanoi successfully played the “ASEAN card’ during the dispute with China by calling in 
and presenting Vietnam’s case to the ASEAN ambassadors. See Carlyle Thayer, “Vietnamese Perspectives 
of the ‘China Threat’” in The China Threat: Perception, Myths, and Reality, Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, 
eds. (New York: Routledge, 2002), 227.
244 The Straits Times, 15 April 1997.
245 Arco and China’s state-owned offshore oil company CNOOC agreed to exploit jointly the Ledong gas 
field near the Yacheng gas field where the two companies were building an offshore pipeline to the Chinese 
mainland. The Straits Times, 24 November 1997.
246 The Straits Times, 24 and 26 January 1998.
247 BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Part 3: Asia Pacific, FED3190, 04/01/98.
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between the two countries was to seek solutions to the comparably easier land and sea 
borders first, and then work out the South China Sea disputes over the Paracel and
' J A Q
Spratly islands. At the eleventh round of talks in January 1998, a draft agreement de­
marcating the Sino-Vietnamese land border was reportedly commented upon by both 
sides in preparation for a final resolution of that particular border dispute.249 Even while 
Beijing and Hanoi were about to conclude an agreement on the mutual land border, the 
South China Sea disputes continued to test the resiliency of Sino-Vietnamese relations. 
Both countries continued to affirm their territorial claims in the region during 1998-1999 
by awarding oil contracts to foreign companies to drill in disputed areas, as well as con­
structing buildings and structures in the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes, such as the 
ground satellite station in the Parcels and telephone booth in the Spratlys built by the 
Chinese.250
However, irrespective of the intractable position taken by both sides in the South 
China Sea disputes, the two countries finally signed in 2000 the Agreement on Friend­
ship, Good Neighborliness, and Long-standing Stability, followed by additional treaties 
that same year settling major points of dispute concerning the land border and outlining 
the pathway toward resolving the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin.251 As for the 
South China Sea claims, a forum was established to continue efforts of reaching a resolu­
tion of the most difficult territorial dispute between the two countries. Talks between
248 FBIS, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-97-196, 07/15/97.
249 BBC Summary o f World Broadcasts, Part 3: Asia Pacific, FED3133, 01/24/98.
250 See Cheng Guan Ang, “Vietnam-China Relations Since the End of the Cold War,” Asian Survey 38, no. 
12 (1998), 1122-1141, and “Vietnam: Another Milestone and the Country Plods On,” Southeast Asian Af­
fairs (2002), 352-353.
251 See “China and Vietnam Sign Land border Treaty,” (15 November 2000), Ministry o f Foreign Affairs of 
the People’s Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/tyfl/2631/tl5493.htm (ac­
cessed 3 July 2006) and “China’s Maritime Demarcation and Bilateral Fishery Affairs,” (9 July 2001). 
http://www.finprc.gov.cn/ eng/wjb/zzjg/tyfls/tyfl/2626/2628/tl5476.htm (accessed 9 July 2006).
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China and Vietnam concerning the Spratlys, as well as the remaining procedural issues 
and problems inherent in the recent agreements settling the land border and maritime 
boundary in the Tonkin gulf, continued the next few years as PRC-DRV relations 
strengthened within wider (especially economic) context. Both sides realized that further 
progress on territorial issues was essential for maintaining the forward momentum in 
Sino-Vietnamese relations. However, both Beijing and Hanoi also realized that neither of 
them had much room for maneuver on the Spratlys-Paracels dispute. Therefore, talks 
between the two states focused instead on resolving smaller, easier territorial issues. 
Progress in these negotiations ultimately led to subsequent agreements.
By 2002, China and Vietnam had essentially resolved their mutual territorial dis­
putes concerning the land border and in the Gulf of Tonkin. The remaining outstanding 
(minor) issues were subsequently resolved. On 24 February 2004, China and Vietnam 
signed a supplementary protocol for cooperation in fisheries issues, demonstrating tangi­
ble progress toward a resolution of remaining difficulties in the bilateral relationship. 
While this supplemental protocol was not as monumental an agreement as one resolving 
the Spratlys dispute might be, it was nonetheless important in furthering Sino-Vietnamese 
relations. This was a point well stressed by both sides. At the reception given in honor of 
the visiting Chinese delegation, Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan praised 
the common effort at reaching an agreement on fisheries in the Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf, 
adding that the agreement was important to “long-term stability in the Gulf of Tonkin 
while helping to strengthen trust, friendship and co-operation between the people living 
on its shores [as] well as the people of Viet Nam and China.”252 However, even as both 
sides were able to reach agreements settling the land border and outlining the necessary
252 Viet Nam News, 26 February 2004.
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steps for resolving the sea boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin, disputes over the Paracels and 
Spratlys in the South China Sea continued to vex Sino-Vietnamese relations.
In March 2004, yet another row concerning ownership of the Spratlys erupted be­
tween China and Vietnam. Conflicting claims of sovereignty over the Spratlys archipel­
ago (or Truong Sa in Vietnamese) were made by both China and Vietnam. Vietnamese 
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Le Dung rejected recent Chinese territorial claims in the 
Spratlys, calling the claim “groundless.” Dung stated, “Viet Nam has time and time 
again asserted its indisputable sovereignty over both the Truong Sa and Hoang Sa 
(Paracel) archipelagos.” After reaffirming Vietnamese sovereignty, Dung continued by 
stressing the 2002 Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea and advised all parties 
to “restrain themselves and cease issuing unnecessary statements over the issue.”253 Sub­
sequently, Vietnam announced plans to send tourists to the Spratlys, further complicating 
relations with Beijing while at the same time gaining support for Hanoi’s plans from the 
Philippines who, as we have seen, was keen at the time to foster better cooperation with 
Vietnam vis-a-vis China.254
In September 2004, the row between Hanoi and Beijing-Manila intensified when 
Vietnam accused China and the Philippines of planning surveying activities in its territo­
rial jurisdiction. Within one week of the announcement of the PRC-RP deal for joint oil 
exploration in the Spratlys, Hanoi accused Beijing and Manila of disregarding the 2002 
ASEAN Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea. Vietnamese foreign ministry 
spokesperson Le Dung stated, “as a signatory to the code of conduct on the South China
253 Viet Nam News, 26 March 2004.
254 Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Delia Albert was quoted to say that the Philippines did not oppose 
Vietnamese plans to send tourists to the Spratlys and that Hanoi’s moves did not violate the Declaration on 
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. See Viet Nam News, 8 and 19 April, 2004.
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Sea signed between ASEAN and China in November 2002, Vietnam has committed with 
relevant parties to implement the code towards the maintenance of peace and stability.” 
Dung went on to urge “all parties to seriously implement the agreement,” while at the 
same time reiterating Vietnamese sovereignty over the Spratlys.255 Still dubious of 
China’s “smiling” diplomacy in Southeast Asia and uncertain whether Beijing’s recent 
cooperative attitude with Vietnam would continue in the ongoing effort to reach a resolu­
tion of the South China Sea disputes, Hanoi launched a new campaign reaffirming Viet- 
nam’s territorial sovereignty in the Spratlys. Shortly thereafter, Beijing responded by 
accusing Vietnam of violating Chinese territorial sovereignty in the Spratlys by inviting 
bids for offshore oil exploration in the region.257 The territorial dispute between China 
and Vietnam over the Spratlys again threatened to tarnish Beijing’s GND in Southeast 
Asia. With the intension of reinforcing China’s “good neighbor” image in the region, 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao suggested at the eighth ASEAN-China summit of Novem­
ber 2004 that a senior-level working group be established to examine the issues of joint 
development.258
The DRV undertook a conspicuous media campaign in 2005 and early 2006 that 
stressed Vietnamese sovereignty over the Spratlys and highlighted the determination and
9 SOdedication of the country’s armed forces in the archipelago. In April 2005, Vietnam 
celebrated the 30th anniversary of the “liberation” of the Truong Sa archipelago (Sprat-
255 “Vietnam hits out at China, Philippines over Spratly oil plans,” Agence France Presse, 9 September 
2004.
256 “Truong Sa Island celebrates 30th anniversary of liberation,” Viet Nam News, 29 April 2005.
257 See Gilbert Felongco, “Manila unfazed by Spratly Isles tensions,” Financial Times Information, 11 Sep­
tember 2004 and “China protest Vietnam’s bid in South China Sea,” Agence France Presse, 20 October 
2004.
258 “Major points of Premier Wen’s speech at the 8th China-ASEAN summit,” Xinhua New Agency, (30 
November 2004).
259 For example, see “Gifts arrive for soldiers on Truong Sa islands,” Viet Nam News, 26 January 2006.
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lys). Speaking at a ceremony celebrating the anniversary, Deputy Chief of the General 
Staff of the Vietnamese People’s Army, Lieutenant-General Nguyen Khac Nghien, hailed 
the efforts and sacrifices of the Vietnamese people and soldiers in overcoming “difficul­
ties to protect the sovereignty of the country.” Before ending his address, General 
Nghien asked the armed forces in the islands to maintain their vigil in protecting Viet­
namese sovereignty. Interestingly, Hanoi’s media blitz on the Spratlys was not only 
aimed at foreign ears, but was apparently also intended for domestic consumption.
A 2006 article appearing in the Viet Nam News, an English language newspaper 
published by the state Vietnamese News Agency, reported the arrival of gifts for the sol­
diers stationed in the Spratlys for the Tet (Lunar New Year) celebration. The Viet Nam 
News reported that in addition to fresh vegetables, fruits, and “healthy” pigs, soldiers also 
received copies of nationalistic literature celebrating several Vietnamese heroes who mar- 
tyred themselves in the war against the United States. Clearly, the Vietnamese gov­
ernment was concerned about the morale of its military garrison in the Spratlys, but it 
seems more likely that Hanoi’s “media blitz” was largely intended to strengthen Viet­
nam’s negotiating position in the South China Sea disputes vis-a-vis Beijing and Manila. 
Hanoi had historically rejected proposals for joint development because Vietnamese 
leaders felt that doing so would weaken Vietnam’s legal claims of territorial sovereignty 
over both the Spratly and Paracel archipelagoes.
The reassertion of Vietnamese sovereignty in the South China Sea during 2005- 
2006 was most likely a consequence of this reasoning rather than a move undertaken out 
of genuine concern that China might again flex its growing military might in the Spratlys.
260 The works, distributed by the Communist Youth Union o f Khanh Hoa Province, were “Mai mai tuoi hai 
muoi, ” and “Nhat ky Dang Thuy Tram” (The Diary of Dang Thuy Tram). Viet Nam News, 26 January 
2006.
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It makes sense that if Hanoi indeed feared future Chinese territorial aggression in the 
South China Sea, the Vietnamese would not have signed the tripartite agreement in 
March 2005. One must consider, however, that the long history of enmity, animosity, 
and conflict between Vietnam and China cannot be reversed overnight, and that the diffi­
cult shared history must account for lingering suspicions between the two countries. The 
momentous 2005 tripartite agreement for joint development in the disputed Spratlys, 
along with increased PRC-DRV trade and Chinese economic and technical assistance, did 
ease mutual suspicions to an appreciable extent. It remains doubtful that Sino- 
Vietnamese relations would have progressed as far as they have during the last decade if 
Vietnamese perceptions of China as a “threat” had not lessened.
Beijing’s diplomatic activities in Southeast Asia, undertaken since the mid-1990s 
to promote a friendly and cooperative “good neighbor” image of China had lessened 
Vietnamese fears and suspicions of China to an extent that allowed this remarkable im­
provement in Sino-Vietnamese relations. China’s friendly, “good neighbor” image in 
Vietnam had strengthen to the point that dining a March 2005 visit to Hanoi, Chinese 
leader Jia Qinglin commented to Vietnamese General Secretary Nong Due Manh that 
China-Vietnam relations were at one of the most inimitable highpoints in history. Jia 
continued:
China is ready to work with Vietnam to continuously enrich the content of the 
guideline of long-term stability, orientation to the future, friendship and good- 
neighborliship [sic] and all-round cooperation and the goals of being good 
neighbors, goodfriends, good comrades and good partners [emphasis mine]. All 
these are aimed to pass on the friendship between China and Vietnam from gen­
eration to generation, promote the profound development of bilateral cooperation 
for more mutually beneficial results.261
261 “China-Vietnam relations in best time in history,” Xinhua News Agency, 21 March 2006. This was the 
lead story for Xinhua.
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General Secretary Manh responded by agreeing with Jia’s comments, and then 
praised China’s remarkable achievements in national development. Manh added that 
China’s developmental model was an encouragement for the “reform and opening drive” 
of Vietnam’s own development and that Vietnam placed “great importance” on learning 
from the PRC’s experiences. Manh also stated that Vietnam was ready to expand the ex­
change of high-level visits with China, increase cooperation in various fields, advance 
bilateral and party-to-party relations between the two countries, and deepen coordination 
in regional and international affairs.262 The statements made by both Jia and Manh were 
not, as it turned out, premised upon polite, but empty words.
Both Beijing and Hanoi took further actions to demonstrate concretely their sin­
cere desire for closer, more cooperative relations between the two socialist countries. On 
the same day that Jia and Manh officially celebrated the improvement in Sino-
thVietnamese relations in general, the 15 round of negotiations at the chairperson level of 
the Vietnam-China Joint Committee on Land Border Delineation and Marker Planting 
were underway. The event was described by the Thai News Service as “an event of 
friendship and frankness where the two sides discussed effective measures to fulfill high- 
level commitments on border demarcation and speed up the planting of border mark­
ers.”263 In addition to demonstrating their “good neighborliness” by finalizing agree­
ments on the land border and the maritime boundary in the Tonkin Gulf, China and Viet­
nam confirmed cooperation in the security area by conducting the first joint PRC-DRV 
navy patrol in the Tonkin Gulf during the 27thand 28th of April to mark the implementa­
tion of an agreement between the armed forces and navies of both countries. The Viet
262 “China-Vietnam relations in best time in history,” Xinhua News Agency, 21 March 2006.
263 “Vietnam, China continue border negotiations,” Thai News Service, 21 March 2006.
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Nam News Agency remarked that the success of the first joint naval patrol helped “pro­
mote friendly and cooperative relations between the two armed forces and navies of 
Vietnam and China, and achieve the goal of peace, stability, prosperous development in 
the Tonkin Gulf and the region.”264 These agreements were followed on 1 May by the 
signing of 16 economic cooperation projects between Chinese businesses from Zhanjiang 
City and their Vietnamese counterparts in Ho Chi Minh City worth $158 million US dol­
lars, and on 11 May by the signing in Beijing of a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) concerning Chinese-Vietnamese cooperation in combating cross-border crime.
Clearly, Beijing’s diplomatic approach of the last decade or so to Sino- 
Vietnamese relations in general and to the territorial disputes specifically, was a stunning 
success. The mutually held goal of achieving a closer, more friendly and cooperative re­
lationship between the two countries in the economic and security sectors was largely 
attained in spite o f the unresolved and emotionally charged territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea. Beijing’s GND had successfully replaced the traditionally held image 
in Vietnam of China as a “threat” with a new friendlier, cooperative “good neighbor” im­
age of China to such an extent that the most problematic issue in Sino-Vietnamese rela­
tions (the South China Sea issue) did not prevent the achievement of enhanced and deep­
ened relations between both states. In addition, as in the above-mentioned incident be­
tween China and the Philippines, another recent event in the Spratlys serves to illustrate 
the great success of Beijing’s GND in Sino-Vietnamese relations.
264 “Vietnam, China make first joint navy patrol,” Thai News Service, 2 May 2006.
265 The MoU was reached at the 2nd Vietnam-China Meeting on Cooperation in Fighting Crime and Ensur­
ing Security in Border Areas, mutually-chaired by Vietnamese Deputy Minister of Public Security Nguyen 
Khanh Toan and his Chinese counterpart, Meng Hongwei, who spoke highly of the regular meetings be­
tween the two Ministries and considered them “an effective measure to promote . . .  cooperation.” See 
“Vietnam, China sign agreement on economic projects worth 158m dollars,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 
12 May 2006.
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In May 2006, Vietnam suffered substantial losses in both property and human life 
during powerful typhoon Chanchu. On 19 May, the Vietnamese government sent an SOS 
message asking for Chinese assistance in search and rescue operations in the Spratlys to 
locate and help approximately 32 Vietnamese ships in the area. The Vietnam News Brief 
Service reported on 22 May that, as of the previous evening, “the Chinese partnership 
found and rescued 15 Vietnamese ships with 330 fishermen, including 21 deaths and six 
injuries.”266 No mention was made by either side of their respective territorial claim in 
the Spratlys during or following search and rescue operations in the disputed waters. 
Obviously, Beijing’s GND had successfully sublimated the South China Sea issue within 
a wider context — Moore’s “economic-security nexus” — of Sino-Vietnamese relations in 
such a way as to lessen the comparable benefits of Vietnam pursuing a “hard” stance in 
the territorial disputes, and increase the comparable economic rewards of a “soft” or “co­
operative” Vietnamese approach to the South China Sea disputes with China. The bene­
fits of increased trade and economic relations with the PRC far outweighed any benefits 
Vietnam might gain by pushing China too hard on the South China Sea issue. After all, 
Vietnam could, in a way, “have its cake and eat it too” by agreeing to put the sovereignty 
issue aside for the moment and gain the economic benefits associated with joint devel­
opment of the disputed regions as well as benefits associated with increased Sino- 
Vietnamese trade and economic relations. Beijing’s GND had transformed the tradi­
tional zero-sum approach of both Beijing and Hanoi concerning the disputes into a shared 
vision of a “win-win” methodology toward resolving (or at least diminishing the detri­
mental effects of) the South China Sea issue.
266 “Vietnam Suffers Unforeseen Hugh Losses Caused by 1st Powerful Typhoon,” Vietnam News Brief Ser­
vice, 22 May 2006.
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However, this transformation in bilateral relations between China and both 
ASEAN states, the Philippines and Vietnam, away from conflict and toward cooperation, 
could not have occurred without a corresponding transformation of “role-identities” of 
all actors begot by a budding “collective” identity as “fellow Asians” established as a 
result of “complex” learning from multilateral interaction. In short, as “enemies,” the 
Sino-Vietnamese relationship, in all probability, would not have witnessed the positive 
change that has occurred. In China’s bilateral (traditional) relations with Vietnam and the 
Philippines during the first period of our study (1989-1996), little “complex” learning 
took place because the “role-identities” of the actors were too egoistic and conflictual 
(economic and security “rivals”). “Simple” learning about Self and Other served to rein­
carnate a hostile shared Lockean strategic culture. Only through multilateral interaction 
between China and the ASEAN states was “complex” learning possible because “role- 
identities” other than those above were possible (“cooperator-cooperator,” “equal mem­
ber-equal member,” “partner-partner,” etc.). In other words, the birth and growth of a 
collective “we-ness” between China and the ASEAN states, conceived through multilat­
eral interaction, made the transformation of bilateral relations possible.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter concludes that the positive change in economic and security relations 
(territorial disputes) corresponds with two changes in China’s “role-identity” in Sino- 
ASEAN relations; from “enemy” or “rival” to “cooperator,” and then from “cooperator” 
to “partner” (economic “cooperator” 1997, “partner” 2001; security “cooperator” 1996,
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“partner” 2003). Further, these changes in “role-identity” resulted from “complex” 
learning about Self and Other obtained through multilateral interaction. This is not to 
say, however, that only “complex” social learning took place via multilateral interaction - 
- “simple” social learning also took place because of multilateral interaction. What I am 
arguing is that over time the frequency of “complex” learning increased (and thus its 
causal impact on Beijing’s GND as well), while that of “simple” learning (and its causal 
impact on Beijing’s GND) either remained steady or decreased, thus lessening its rele­
vance in China’s evolving “good neighbor” diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Further, the 
changes in Beijing’s GND invoked by “complex” social learning during this second pe­
riod of our case study were not all constitutive changes — instrumental changes in China’s 
“good neighbor” diplomacy also occurred, but in a decreasing frequency inversely related 
to the change in China’s identity. In other words, as China’s cognitive base became in­
creasingly influenced by “complex” learning via multilateral interaction, Beijing’s appli­
cation of the GND became less instrumental and more constitutive. I argue, therefore, 
that by 2002 -  2003 “complex” social learning via multilateral interaction became the 
principal causal factor eliciting constitutive change in China’s identity (from China’s 
“Cold War” identity to the new “post-Cold War” identity), and thus a change in Beijing’s 
GND resulting in a positive change in Sino-ASEAN relations.
Beijing’s “good neighbor” diplomacy has met with stunning success in Southeast 
Asia considering that Sino-ASEAN relations have never been better in spite of the still 
unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea. This is remarkable, considering 
that only a decade ago the South Sea disputes were seen as a likely point of regional con-
267 Wendt defines “role-identity” as “the meanings that actors attribute to themselves when seeing them­
selves as an object. . .  from the perspective of the Other.” Each actor is at each stage of interaction “jointly 
defining who each of them is.” Social Theory o f International Politics, 334-335.
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flict between China and some ASEAN states, as well as a probable obstacle in Sino- 
ASEAN relations. Yet Vietnam and the Philippines agreed in 2005 to ignore the sover­
eignty issue for the time being and signed a Tripartite agreement with Beijing for joint 
exploration and development of offshore oil reserves in and around the disputed Spratlys. 
The two ASEAN states most wary and suspicious of Chinese intentions in the South 
China Sea, and most vociferous in their demand for a stronger ASEAN position on the 
disputes, are now partners with China in developing the natural resources of the Spratlys. 
Moreover, who might have imagined in 2000 that an armed attack on a Chinese fishing 
trawler in disputed waters by a “Philippine boat,” leaving four Chinese dead and three 
wounded, would not precipitate a crisis in China-Philippine relations? The 2006 “pirate” 
attack on Jinghai 03012 did not result in the traditional accusations, denials, and counter­
accusations of the past. As we have seen, only one Chinese newspaper accused Manila of 
culpability, and following a brief investigation of the incident, both Beijing and Manila 
concluded that cooperation in the Spratlys between the Chinese and Philippine navies 
should be increasedl How can we explain such an unexpected turnabout in the most con­
tentious issue in China’s relations with ASEAN and member states?
The simple (and incomplete) answer is that China’s GND represents a stunning 
success of hardnosed Realpolitik on the behalf of Beijing. Informed by knowledge 
gained through interaction with ASEAN and member states, Beijing carefully de­
emphasized the South Sea disputes in Sino-ASEAN relations to the degree that this most 
difficult issue no longer poses a serious obstacle to good relations between China and the 
ASEAN nations. With China’s superior economic wealth as advantage, Beijing manipu­
lated Vietnam, the Philippines, and ASEAN to accept China’s position of putting the
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sovereignty issue on hold and, until a final resolution of the disputes is reached, pursuing 
joint development of the contested areas. The 2005 tripartite agreement between China, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines evidences this assertion, as do the other bilateral agreements 
between China and Vietnam, and between China and the Philippines, as well as the multi­
lateral agreements concluded between China and ASEAN. In short, Beijing’s skillful di­
plomacy manipulated the ASEAN states into accepting China’s position of inviolable ter­
ritorial sovereignty in the South China Sea in exchange for better economic relations with 
China.
Some of the conclusions above are correct. Beijing did succeed in mollifying 
ASEAN fears of a rising China “threat” and consequently was successful in sublimating 
the South China Sea disputes within wider concerns and shared expectations in Sino- 
ASEAN relations. However, this rationalist (realist) mainstream explanation fails to ex­
plain the rapidity and intensity of positive change in China’s relations with the ASEAN 
states and in Beijing’s bilateral relations with Vietnam and the Philippines. After all, 
China’s claims of “inviolable” territorial sovereignty overmuch of the South China Sea 
still stand, and the power projection capabilities of the Chinese military continue to im­
prove, increasing Beijing’s ability of using force to defend Chinese territorial sovereignty 
in the region. The logical answer is that the ASEAN states no longer believe that China 
has aggressive territorial intentions in the region. The PRC may be acquiring the neces­
sary military capabilities to “resolve” unilaterally the territorial disputes, but that does not 
mean that Beijing will do so. In fact, from the ASEAN perspective, the use of force by 
Beijing in the region is now only a remote possibility.
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The more complete answer to the question is that China and the ASEAN states 
have “learned” about one another (self and other) through multilateral interaction that, 
because of shared knowledge and “complex” learning, challenged and changed tradi­
tional “role-identities” in the relationship. Beijing learned that the “ASEAN Way” of un­
official multilateral dialogue was not incompatible with Chinese interests and approach to 
regional foreign policy. This knowledge came in part from participation in the Indone­
sian workshops, and in part from interaction at various ASEAN processes such as the 
China-ASEAN summits, ARP, APT, and PMC. The Chinese learned that the “ASEAN 
Way” respected cultural and political differences among member nations, and valued the 
principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states — both China and 
the ASEAN states identified with a “hard” conception of state sovereignty. This became 
clear to China and ASEAN as both sides rejected the internationalization of the territorial 
disputes issue. In this issue, a collective (holistic) identity associated with resisting U.S. 
interference in the domestic affairs of other states (human rights campaign, military in­
terventions) was further strengthened. The effect of this “complex” learning on the evolu­
tion of Beijing’s approach to the disputes is obviously present in China’s NSC. The NSC 
defines equality in holistic terms: “equality means that all countries, big or small, are 
equal members of the international community and should respect each other, treat each 
other as equals, refrain from interfering in other countries' internal affairs and promote 
the democratization of the international relations.” The NSC also stresses diversity (plu­
ralism, again a holistic idea) and presents China as a “member of the group” (holistic 
identity):
China believes that ours is a world of diversity, and this is particularly true of the
Asia-Pacific region. Given such reality, only mutual-accommodation, mutual-
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learning and greater cooperation can serve to achieve common progress and de­
velopment of all nations. Therefore, security cooperation is not just something for 
countries with similar or identical views and mode of development, it includes 
cooperation between countries whose views and mode of development differ.268
Another example of “complex” learning affecting China’s identity and interests is 
found in Beijing’s decision to sign the 2002 ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Par­
ties in the South China Sea. As discussed above, Chinese participation in the Indonesian 
Workshops on Preventing Conflict in the South China Sea allowed Beijing to gain a bet­
ter understanding and appreciation of the positions of the other disputant states, as well as 
become more familiarized and comfortable with the multilateral process. Beijing learned 
through Chinese participation in the annual workshops that the ASEAN states (especially 
the Philippines and Vietnam) placed great value on establishing a code of conduct for the 
South China Sea. China’s hesitation in accepting such a code appeared to the ASEAN 
states as being contrary to the cooperative “good neighbor” image Beijing actively pro­
moted in the region. While China’s economic “role-identity” in Southeast Asia was 
quickly becoming that of “economic partner,” her security “role-identity” at the time 
seemed schizophrenic — wavering between egoistic (defender of Chinese sovereignty) 
and holistic (supporter of NSC and “comprehensive” security) identities. Through multi­
lateral Track II dialogue (interaction), Beijing learned that the ASEAN states could not 
really trust China until this contradiction in China’s national identity was rectified. While 
not acting on this knowledge at the Track II level, Beijing did employ this knowledge at 
the official Track I level by acceding to the ASEAN Declaration on Conduct in the South 
China Sea in 2002. This move served to greatly enhance China’s “good neighbor” image
268 See China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept (31 July 2002). http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ 
wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/2612/2614/tl5319.htm (accessed 27 March 2006).
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in the region by further lessening fears of future Chinese territorial aggression to support 
its territorial claims over the Paracel and Spratly islands. In addition, Beijing learned 
early on at the workshops that a joint development strategy might mitigate the detrimen­
tal effects of the territorial disputes on Sino-ASEAN relations and allow China to cir­
cumvent the issue of territorial sovereignty. As a result, Beijing has consistently pro­
posed joint development of the disputed territories in both its bilateral dialogues with 
Manila and Hanoi, as well as in China’s multilateral dialogue with ASEAN. This strat­
egy, learned in part through Chinese participation in the Track II multilateral workshops, 
finally bore fruit with the above-mentioned 2005 Tripartite agreement for joint offshore 
oil exploration and development between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines in the 
Spratlys. China’s schizophrenic security identity was “cured” by a dose of “complex” 
learning, as China’s “role-identity” changed from that of “security cooperator” (1996- 
2001) to one of “security partner” (2002-present). This would not have been possible 
without two key changes: a change in China’s national identity and interests (from egois­
tic to holistic), and a corresponding change in ASEAN perceptions of China (from China 
as a “threat” to China as a “partner”). The empirical evidence supporting this argument is 
presented next.
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CHAPTER IV
THE IMPACT OF BEIJING’S GOOD NEIGHBOR DIPLOMACY 
ON THE PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOR OF SIX ASEAN STATES 
TOWARD CHINA, 1989 -  2006
As regional integration process accelerates, China has found itself more and more 
closely linked with the rest of East Asia. China's development could not be possi­
ble without the common development of the countries in the region. Enhancing 
regional cooperation is a major part of China's foreign policy of making friends 
and partners with its neighbors and building a harmonious, secure, and prosperous 
neighborhood. China will, as always, enthusiastically support and take part in East 
Asian cooperation. I believe, with concerted efforts, East Asian cooperation will 
surely have a brighter future.
- Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing -
This chapter analyzes the effects of Beijing’s Good Neighbor Diplomacy on 
threat perceptions of China in Southeast Asia concerning the South China Sea disputes 
specifically and the rise of Chinese economic and military power in general, as well as an 
analysis of recent security behavior of six ASEAN states towards China. The previous 
chapters make the argument that China’s identity and interests have changed because of 
interaction with the ASEAN states, imparting a positive impact on Sino-ASEAN rela­
tions. Over time, the ASEAN states have become less apprehensive of Chinese inten­
sions in the South China Sea. In short, the ASEAN states no longer view China as a 
“threat” because interaction and social learning have changed Beijing’s “role-identity” in 
the relationship -  and thus moved the regional strategic culture increasingly toward a 
Kantian logic of anarchy.269 This chapter offers empirical support of my argument
269 Wendt argues that Kantian culture, like its counterparts (Hobbesian and Lockean), is susceptible to three 
degrees of internalization, 1st degree, 2nd degree, and 3rd degree, which are not mutually exclusive; “I be­
lieve it is more useful to see them as reflecting three different “degrees” to which a norm can be Internal-
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through an analysis of China’s changing national image in six ASEAN states (Vietnam, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand) regarding the South China 
Sea disputes, from that of “threat” to one of “partner.” The four additional states are in­
cluded in our study to afford a more balanced assessment of regional perceptions of 
China. As earlier discussed, Vietnam and the Philippines are the two ASEAN states with 
the most pronounced China threat perceptions. Of the two, Vietnam is the ASEAN state 
historically most distrustful of China. Besides Vietnam and the Philippines, Singapore 
represents another difficult test for our case study of Chinese regional foreign policy. 
While Singapore is largely responsible for initiating ASEAN’s “engagement” of China, 
the city-state has the closest informal defense relations with the United States in the re­
gion (construction of naval facilities for visiting American aircraft carriers, for example). 
As such, while remaining open to the possibilities of improved relations with China, Sin­
gapore “hedges” its security strategy by supporting a continuing American military pres­
ence in the region. On the other hand, both Thai and Indonesian perceptions of China 
have changed during the period of our study in almost an inverse relationship to one an­
other. Thailand’s perception of China has changed from one of optimism (along with 
Singapore, Thailand was an early advocate for a policy of “engaging” China) to a more 
cautious position, given deepening Sino-Myanmar relations, while China’s image in In­
donesia has changed from that of a troublemaker and threat to one as a cooperative “good 
neighbor.” Malaysia represents the least challenging test of our thesis. Although both 
countries share a territorial dispute over parts of the Spratly archipelago, Beijing and
ized, and thus as generating three different pathways by which the same structure can be produced -  
‘force,’ ‘price,’ and ‘legitimacy’. It is an empirical question which pathway occurs in a given case. It is 
only with the third degree of internalization that actors are really ‘constructed’ by culture up to that point 
culture is affecting just their behavior or beliefs about the environment, not who they are or what they 
want.” See Social Theory o f International Politics, chapter 6.
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Kuala Lumpur agreed early on in their relationship not to allow their differences in the 
Spratlys interfere with the overall improvement of Sino-Malaysian relations.270
Data for this analysis were obtained from three sources. This study’s primary 
data was obtained through content analysis of articles appearing in major regional Eng­
lish-language newspapers during 1994-2006 concerning the South China Sea territorial 
disputes. The second set of supportive data was obtained from regional and global opin­
ion polls and surveys concerning security (threat) perceptions of China and Chinese for­
eign policy. A third source of data was derived through an analysis of the security behav­
ior of ASEAN states towards China. The six ASEAN countries where chosen for our 
study because they represent a collectively “balanced” regional perception of China in a 
region noted for its exceptionally diverse ethnic, cultural, religious, economic, and politi-
971cal composition.
THE DATA
Methodology of Content Analysis
Articles concerning China and the South China Sea disputes were collected from 
the following regional English-language newspapers: The Manila Standard and the Phil­
ippine Daily Inquirer (the Philippines); Vietnam News Service and the Saigon Daily 
Times (Vietnam); the Straits Times (Singapore); The Nation and the Bangkok Post (Thai­
land); the New Straits Times and the Malaysian National News Agency Bernama (Malay­
270 It should be noted that Malaysia was the first ASEAN state to establish formal relations with Beijing in 
1974. In addition, Malaysia established strong economic and military ties with Beijing during the 1990s, 
and supported China’s position of dealing with the South China Sea issue bilaterally. In fact, Malaysian 
Prime Minister Bin Mohammad Mahathir’s foreign policy closely mirrored that of China. Mahathir consis­
tently refuted the “China threat” thesis, argued the need for a multipolar international system to balance 
American power and influence, and took other anti-Western postures that pleased Beijing. See Lee 17-125.
271 D. R. SarDesai makes an excellent discussion of ethnic and cultural diversity in Southeast Asia and 
gives an informed explanation of its impact on the history of the region. D. R. SarDesai, Southeast Asia: 
Past & Present 5th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003).
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sia); and the Jakarta Post (Indonesia). The articles were analyzed and coded according 
to the image of China presented. Articles coded “favorable” presented a friendly, coop­
erative, peaceful “good neighbor” image of China (“post-Cold War” identity). Friendly,” 
in the sense that China’s actions and statements regarding the territorial disputes are per­
ceived to be undertaken in a spirit of mutual benefit, as opposed to one based solely upon 
self interest. “Cooperative,” in the sense that Beijing’s diplomacy, actions, and participa­
tion in joint activities concerning the South China Sea disputes are perceived as sincere 
efforts to reduce tension and seek rapprochement with the contestant states. “Peaceful,” 
in the sense that China is not perceived as seeking a military resolution of the disputes, 
but rather a political solution. Articles coded “unfavorable” expressed an unfriendly, un­
cooperative, hostile or threatening image of China vis-a-vis the disputes (traditional 
“Cold War” identity). Articles not clearly falling into either of these categories were 
coded “neutral.” The data for each ASEAN state (percentage of “favorable,” “unfavor­
able,” and “neutral” articles -  Y-axis) was tallied by year (X-axis) and plotted on a graph. 
Trend lines for each characteristic (“favorable,” “unfavorable,” and “neutral) were calcu­
lated and plotted.
Opinion Polls and Surveys
The availability of this type of data concerning China’s image in Southeast Asia is 
limited and does not necessarily represent the entire population of a country. Nonethe­
less, these data are heuristic for out understanding of the ASEAN countries’ perception of 
China. Therefore, opinion poll and survey data are utilized to supplement the primary 
data set mentioned above. The available data reveal much about China’s image in South­
east Asia (and globally) — especially since 2004.
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The earliest data available come from a 1995 Social Weather Stations Survey of 
public opinion in the Philippines.272 A portion of the survey contains questions directly 
concerning the Mischief Reef crisis with China, as well as more generalized (but impor­
tant) questions concerning relations with China and with the United States that indirectly 
inform our study. This Social Weather Stations survey also serves as a representative 
“benchmark” of Southeast Asian perceptions of China in 1995 (as survey and opinion 
poll data for the other ASEAN states is unavailable until 2004) that can be compared and 
contrasted with the results of more recent and regionally-inclusive surveys and opinion 
polls. These include two 2004 BBC World Service Polls, View o f China (22 nations)273 
and Who Will Lead the World? (23 nations);274 a 2005 BBC News 22 Nation Poll on
•  77*5 •China (March); an April 2005 Globescan-PIPA (Program on International Policy Atti­
tudes) Poll, Evaluating the World Powers (23 nations)276; the June 2005 Pew Global Atti­
tudes Project 16-Country Global Attitudes Report: China;277 the November 2005 (up­
dated 2006) Office of Research Opinion Analysis, Asian Views o f China (7 East Asian
272 Social Weather Stations. Social Weather Stations Survey [Philippines]: Quarter II, 1995 [Computer file] 
ICPSR version. Quezon City, Philippines: Social Weather Stations [producer], 1998. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter­
university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1998.
273 The study conducted by GlobeScan and PIPA for the BBC World Service polled 22,953 people in 22 
countries. Available online at www.worldpublicopinion.org.
274 The poll of 23,518 people was conducted for the BBC by the international polling firm GlobeScan to­
gether with the Program on international Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland during De­
cember 2004. Available online at www.worldpublicopinion.org.
275 This BBC World Service Poll of people in 22 countries was undertaken by GlobeScan and PIPA from 
November 2004 to January 2005.
276 This BBC World Service Poll o f22,953 people in 23 countries was undertaken by GlobeScan and PIPA 
in April 2005
277 The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 16-Country Global Attitudes Report: China (23 June 2005).
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China’s image in Southeast Asia concerning the South China Sea disputes im­
proved in all six ASEAN states investigated in this study. Surprisingly, China’s image 
improved the most markedly in the two “frontline” states Vietnam and the Philippines, 
which previously viewed China as an “enemy” or “rival.” China’s “favorable” image 
also rose dramatically in another claimant state in the scramble for the Spratlys, Malay­
sia.
The Philippines
Figure 6 summarizes the results of the content analysis of the Manila Standard 
and the Philippine Daily Enquirer. While data for the content analysis of the first four 
years of this study was unavailable, it is not needed to establish that China’s image in the 
Philippines during those years was quite unfavorable, given the history of Sino-Philippine 
relations concerning the territorial disputes. Manila clearly perceived China as a threat 
and a likely enemy by the time of the Mischief Reef affair in 1995. However, survey 
data for 1995 concerning China’s image in the Philippines vis-a-vis the dispute in the 
Spratlys does exist. When asked “If your trust/faith in China is very big, big, maybe 
big/maybe small, small or very small?”, 32.5% answered “small,” 29.0% expressed a
278 U.S. Department o f State, Office of Research and Opinion Analysis, Asian Views o f China (November 
2005, updated 2006).
279 This poll of 39,435 people was conducted in 33 countries for the BBC World Service by GlobeScan and 
PIPA between October 2005 and January 2006.
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Figure 6. China’s National Image in the Philippines (Manila Standard, Philippine 
Daily Enquirer). Note: Total number of articles by year: 1998 (19),
1999 (29), 2000 (33), 2001 (13), 2002 (11), 2003 (4), 2004 (31),
2005 (20), 2006 (6). Data unavailable for 1994-1997.
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more cautious view of China by selecting “maybe big, maybe small,” while only 15% of 
those polled expressed a “big” trust in China and roughly twice that amount (32.5%) ex­
pressed a “small” trust in China. Only 1.5% of those polled had a “very big” trust in
^ O f i
China. When asked if they agreed with the statement, “The Armed Forces of the Phil­
ippines should be strengthened so that other nations will not be tempted to occupy the 
national territories of the Philippines,” 80.1% agreed with the statement (64.1% “agree,” 
16.0% “strongly agree”), while only 6.7% disagreed with the statement (5.9% “disagree”
• 781 •  •  •and 0.8% “strongly disagree”). Interestingly, even while most Filipinos believed that 
the Philippine armed forces should be strengthened, most also believed that the best 
course of action for Manila to take regarding the territorial dispute with China was to 
pursue a diplomatic rather than a military solution of the problem (See figures 7, 8, and 
9). China’s national image in the Philippines during the first half of the 1990s concerning 
the Spratlys issue then, was clearly a threatening and hostile image.
In our content analysis, the trend lines in Figure 6 for both “favorable” and “unfa­
vorable” during 1994-1997 confirm this initial unfavorable (threatening) image of China 
in the Philippines. Beginning in the first year of available newspaper articles for our 
analysis (1998), China’s image becomes less threatening as reflected by the substantial 
increase in “favorable” images of China and a corresponding decrease in “unfavorable” 
images. During the same period, “neutral” images also witnessed a marked increase in 
frequency. Interestingly, this positive overall trend continues through 2001 for “neutral’ 
and “unfavorable” images of China, but “favorable” images witnessed a slight decline.
280 Social Weather Stations Survey [Philippines] (1995), question #91.
281 Social Weather Stations Survey [Philippines] (1995), question # 109.




























PERCENTAGE 1.3 15.4 28.7 33.5 2.7 0.7
OPINION
Figure 7. What Is Your Trust and Faith in China? 1995 Social Weather 
Stations Survey [Philippines], question # 91/96.





















PERCENTAGE 66.3 12.2 5.7 1.9 0.1
OPINION
Figure 8. Should Armed Forces of the Philippines be Strengthened? 1995 Social 
Weather Stations Survey [Philippines], question # 109.




























PERCENTAGE 4.9 72.3 19.6 3.2
ACTION
Figure 9. What Is Best Step For Philippines To Take On Spratlys? 1995 Social 
Weather Stations Survey [Philippines], question # 188.
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For 2002, the frequency of “neutral” images of China decreased slightly, while 
the frequency of “favorable” images increased, probably representing the influence of 
China’s accession to the ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea in November of that year. In 2003, the frequency of “unfavorable” images of 
China increased, as the frequency of “neutral” images witnessed a corresponding de­
crease. However, the frequency of “unfavorable” images in 2004 decreased to only 7% 
and, for 2005-2006, no “unfavorable” images of China vis-a-vis the Spratlys were ob­
served. In 2005, “favorable” images increased in frequency to 86.7%, while the fre­
quency of “neutral” images of China decreased to only 13.3% and, for the second year, 
no “unfavorable” images were observed. Data for 2005 clearly reflects the influence of 
the bilateral agreement that year between Beijing and Manila for joint offshore oil explo­
ration and development in the Spratlys (which, as we have already seen, was expanded 
later that year to include Vietnam). Data for 2006 indicate a 100% frequency of “neutral” 
images of China. This is likely due to a lessening in importance of the South China Sea 
issue in relations between Beijing and Manila because of the 2005 Tripartite Agreement. 
China and the Philippines no longer view one another as an “enemy” in the South China 
Sea. Rather, they have come to view the Other as a “partner.” While it remains true that 
partners are not necessarily friends, it is difficult to conceive partners as enemies (usu­
ally). Concerning the dispute with Manila over the Spratlys, China’s “role-identity” has 
transformed from one of “enemy” or “rival,” to one of “partner.” As discussed later in 
the chapter, data derived from opinion polls and surveys concerning China’s national im­
age in the Philippines support the results of our content analysis.
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Vietnam
Collecting data for Vietnam was problematic due to a lack of newspaper articles 
and Vietnam News Service reports before 1999, and the small numbers of relevant articles 
and reports until 2003, when the volume of data increases almost exponentially the last 
three years of our study. Nonetheless, a change in Vietnam’s perception of China regard­
ing the territorial disputes is clearly discemable. Figure 10 summarizes the results of the 
content analysis of the Vietnam News Service and the Saigon Daily Times. As this graph 
indicates, since 1999 China’s national image in Vietnam concerning the South China Sea 
issue changed from “unfavorable” to “favorable” in 2003 (where the “favorable” and 
“unfavorable” trend lines intersect). The frequency of “unfavorable” images is highest in 
1999, when Beijing and Hanoi had not yet concluded the land border agreement and Bei­
jing appeared to be stalling on the issue of a code of conduct in the South China Sea. 
However, in 2001 and 2002 the frequency of “unfavorable” images of China decrease, 
and “neutral” and (in 2002) “favorable” images of China begin to emerge. This is under­
standable in light of the 2000 settlement of the China-Vietnamese land border and mari­
time boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin, as well as China’s decision to sign the ASEAN 
Declaration on the Conduct of parties in the South China Sea in November 2002.
China’s image in Vietnam improved the following year reflecting China’s accession to 
the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). However, in 
2004 China’s unfavorable image increased due to renewed tensions over the Spratlys. In 
2005, China’s image in Vietnam changed considerably as the frequency of unfavorable 
images dropped and the frequency of favorable images rose. This can be explained by 
Hanoi’s decision to participate with China and the Philippines in joint development of 
offshore hydrocarbon reserves in the Spratlys (Tripartite Agreement). As the plotted
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Figure 10. China’s Image in Vietnam {Saigon Times Daily and Vietnam News 
Service). Note: Total number of articles by year: 1999 (3), 2001 (4), 
2002 (6), 2003 (9), 2004 (18), 2005 (22), 2006 (12).Data unavailable for 
1994-1998, and 2000.
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trend lines indicate, China’s national image in Vietnam concerning the most contentious 
issue in Sino-Vietnamese relations has clearly changed for the better. Beijing and Hanoi 
no longer perceive one another as “enemies” or “rivals” in the South China Sea. Instead, 
they now increasingly view the one another as a cooperative “partner.”
Thailand
The data for Thailand indicate that China’s national image as reflected by the ter­
ritorial disputes improved only slightly, as the trend lines for both “favorable” and “unfa­
vorable” remain flat in comparison with those of other ASEAN states (Figure 11). The 
frequency of “neutral” images of China in Thailand is comparably high to that of the 
other states, reflecting the fact that Thailand does not have a territorial dispute with China 
and, therefore, Bangkok can be less critical of China concerning the South China Sea is­
sue. In addition, the high frequency of “neutral” images also reflects Thailand’s chang­
ing regional strategic relationship with China in mainland Southeast Asia (elaborated 
upon below) vis-a-vis the growth in relations between the PRC and Myanmar, which the 
Thais perceive as troubling. Not wishing to be provocative (nor timid) in relations with 
China, Bangkok’s attitude has become more reserved toward China than during the late 
1980s and early 1990s when both states faced a common enemy — Vietnam. The overall 
neutral image of China in Thailand concerning the territorial disputes is consistent with
'JO'}
what one would expect of Bangkok’s famous “bamboo diplomacy.”
282 Thailand is the only country in Asia that successfully resisted Western imperialism and maintained its 
independence. Like bamboo that is blown about by the high winds, from this side to that, bending but not 
breaking, Thai foreign policy swayed with the “wind” of imperialism without breaking.
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Figure 11. China’s Image in Thailand (.Bangkok Post, The Nation). Note: Total 
number of articles by year: 1994 (3), 1996 (4), 1997 (9), 1998 (7), 
1999 (10), 2000 (9), 2001 (5), 2002 (5), 2003 (6), 2004 (3), 2005 (6), 
2006 (5). Data unavailable for 1995.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
167
During 1997, “favorable” images of China increased in frequency, while a de­
crease in frequency of “neutral” images was observed in Thailand. These results proba­
bly reflect a positive impact of Beijing’s unselfish actions during the Asian Financial Cri­
sis. Beginning in 1997, an increasing frequency in “unfavorable” images of China is ob­
served, continuing until reaching a peak of 42.9% in 2000. The frequency of “unfavor­
able” images of China from 2001 until 2004 falls to 0%. Beijing’s accession to the 
ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, and to the 
TAC the following year, played crucial roles in changing the image of China in Thailand. 
The trend line for the frequency of “neutral” images of China decreases over time in an 
inverse relationship with the trend lines for “favorable” and “unfavorable.” Further, the 
height of the “neutral” trend line indicates that the Thais remain cautious in their percep­
tions of China. Curiously, during 2002-2003 the frequency of “favorable” images of 
China decrease markedly while, at the same time, the frequency of “neutral” images in­
crease in a similar but opposite (inverse) relationship.
Singapore
Figure 12 represents the frequency of “favorable,” “neutral,” and “unfavorable” 
images over time of China in Singapore concerning the territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea. While data for 2000, 2001, and 2006 were unavailable, data for the remaining 
years of the study is sufficient to reveal trends in Singaporean perceptions of China. As 
with the other ASEAN states, China’s national image in Singapore has changed favora­
bly. The trend line for “favorable” images rises, albeit less dramatically than those of 
Vietnam and the Philippines, but more so than that of Thailand. “Unfavorable” images 
are the most frequent during 1994-1995, and then again during 1997-1998, which reflect
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Figure 12. China’s Image in Singapore {Straits Times). Note: Total number of articles 
by year: 1994 (5), 1995 (32), 1996 (14), 1997 (8), 1998 (4), 1999 (12), 
2002 (6), 2003 (3), 2004 (3), 2005 (4). Data unavailable for 2000, 2001, 
and 2006.
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corresponding periods of increased tension between China and Vietnam, and between 
China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. However, during 2003-2005 no “un­
favorable” images of China are observed, reflecting again Beijing’s acceptance in 2002 
of ASEAN’s Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and 2003 
singing of the TAC. For 2004, the frequency of “neutral” images is 100%, while the fol­
lowing year the frequency of “favorable” images is 100%. In sum, China’s image con­
cerning the territorial disputes in Singapore is more benign and less threatening than it 
was during the mid-to-late 1990s.
Indonesia
As with the data for the preceding ASEAN states, the data for Indonesia also indi­
cate a measurable change of China’s national image during our period of study (Figure 
13). As one would expect of the country that spearheaded efforts toward functional co­
operation in the South China Sea, and since 1990 chaired the annual informal Workshops 
on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea, the frequency of “neutral” im­
ages of China is high, especially during 1999, 2001, and 2006. As the trend lines indi­
cate, “neutral” and “favorable” images of China increase over time, while “unfavorable” 
images decrease in frequency at a faster rate (steeper slope) than the rate of frequency 
increase of the other images. No “unfavorable” images of China are observed for six of 
the nine years for which we have data. Moreover, as with the other ASEAN states thus 
far in our study, a decrease in “unfavorable” images of China is accompanied by a corre­
sponding increase in frequency of “neutral” images. The frequency of “favorable” im­
ages peaks at 60% in 2003, reflecting the positive influence of Beijing signing the 2002
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Figure 13. China’s Image in Indonesia {Jakarta Post). Note: total number of articles 
by year: 1996 (2), 1997 (8), 1998 (6), 1999 (5), 2000 (4), 2001 (3),
2003 (3), 2004 (4), 2006 (2).Data unavailable for 1994-1995,2002, and 
2005.
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Declaration and acceding in 2003 to the ASEAN TAC. In short, Indonesian perceptions 
of a China “threat” in the South China Sea decrease over time.
Malaysia
The data for Malaysia clearly indicate a sharp increase in frequency of “favor­
able” images of China concerning the disputes in the South China Sea, and a significant 
decrease in frequency of “neutral” images (Figure 14). The trend line for “unfavorable” 
images of China decreases at a more modest rate than that of “neutral” images, but this is 
understandable given the low initial frequency rate of “unfavorable” images (only 8.3% 
in 1995) of China. As with Indonesia, no “unfavorable” images of China are observed in 
six of the ten years (1996, 2000-2004) of available data for Malaysia. Most significantly, 
a 100% frequency rate for “favorable” images is observed twice (2003, 2004). Singapore 
is the only other country in our study with a 100% frequency for “favorable” images of 
China (2005) -- and no territorial dispute exists between Singapore and China. The fre­
quency of “unfavorable” images of China peaks in 1997 (22.2%), but steadily decreases 
until 2000 when the frequency drops to zero percent for the remainder of the study. 
China’s image in Malaysia, even though Beijing and Kuala Lumpur dispute ownership 
over areas of the Spratly archipelago, is clearly the most favorable of all six ASEAN 
states.






































Figure 14. China’s Image in Malaysia (New Straits Times, Bernama - Malaysian 
National News Agency). Note: Total number of articles by year:
1995 (10), 1996 (8), 1997 (8), 1998 (6), 1999 (22), 2000 (7), 2001 (4), 
2002 (6), 2003 (4), 2004 (4). Data unavailable for 1994, 2005-2006.
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Poll and Survey Data Concerning China’s Image in Southeast Asia
Data derived from regional and global opinion polls and surveys concerning 
China’s image support the findings of our case-specific analysis of perceptions of China 
in regional newspaper articles. All opinion poll and survey data indicate that perceptions 
of a China “threat” in Southeast Asia have lessened considerably, even though the distri­
bution of capabilities and power in the region increasingly favor China. Steven Kull, Di­
rector of PIP A, notes that “it is quite remarkable that with its growing economic power 
China is viewed as so benign, especially by its Asian neighbors [emphasis mine] that it 
could threaten or seek to dominate. However, this cordial view from around the world 
does appear to depend on China restraining itself from seeking to convert its burgeoning 
economic power into a threatening military presence.”283 As we have seen, even the ter­
ritorial disputes in the South China Sea — the China “threat” as manifest in Southeast 
Asia — have not prevented a favorable change in perceptions of China throughout the re­
gion. The results of BBC World Service Polls for 2004, 2005, and 2006, and a 2005 U.S. 
State Department study confirm the change in China’s national image observed in our 
country-and issue-specific content analysis of newspaper articles.
The Philippines
Of the seven countries surveyed in the 2005 State Department survey Asian views 
o f China, the Philippines still has a residual sense of a China threat due to past sparring 
over territories in the South China Sea (only data for the four Southeast Asian states is
283 “22 Nation Poll Shows China Viewed Positively by Most Countries,” GlobeScan and PIPA (2004). 
Available online at www.worldpublicopinion.org, and at www.pipa.org.
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*)QA
presented here). When asked what group or nation threatens Philippine national secu­
rity (Figure 15), only 9 percent of Filipinos select China, placing Iraq (16%) and Abu 
Sayyaf, an insurgent group in the southern Philippines (15%), ahead of China. When se­
lecting from two alternative visions of China, 56% of Filipinos see China as “a peaceful 
country that is more interested in economic growth than in military adventures,” while 
35% view China as “an expansionist power that is building up its military to enforce its
9 or
claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea.” When identifying key images of 
China, Filipinos overwhelmingly selected positive images over negative (Figure 16). 
Sixty-two percent of Filipinos view Chinese as “hardworking people,” forty-two percent 
have an image of China as being a “beautiful country,” while only eleven percent of Fili­
pinos choose a “military threat” image of China and only seven percent believe that 
China “bullies other countries.”
When selecting the greatest threat to world peace in the next five years from 
seven choices,286 Filipinos see international terrorism as the leading threat (29%), the un­
controlled spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the next most pressing 
threat (21%), followed by the collapse of politically unstable countries (15%), Islamic 
extremism (13%), and the U.S. use of military force (12%). Only three percent (3%) see 
growing Chinese military power as the greatest threat to world peace in the next five 
years (Figure 17). Filipinos see the U.S. as a greater threat to world peace than China! 
This is most surprising, considering that a clear majority of Filipinos (72%) continue to
284 The seven countries are Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indone­
sia.
285 Asian Views o f China, 5.
286 The choices are international terrorism, Islamic extremism, uncontrolled spread of WMD, U.S. use of 
military force, collapse of politically unstable countries, growing Chinese military power, and Japanese 
militarism.
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Figure 15. “Which Nation or Group Threatens Your Country’s National 
Security?” Source of Data: Asian Views o f China, Opinion 
Analysis, U.S. Department of State, November 2005.
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Figure 16. “Which of These Images Do You Most Strongly Associate With China?” 
Source of Data: Asian Views o f China, Opinion Analysis, U.S. 
Department of State, November 2005.
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“Greatest Threat to World Peace in the Next 5 Years?” Source of Data: 
Asian Views o f China, Opinion Analysis, U.S. Department of State, 
November 2005.
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see the U.S. as the Philippines’ “closest security partner in 5-10 Years.287 Additionally, a 
strong majority of Filipinos (69%) expresses confidence that China deals with interna­
tional problems responsibly (Figure 18), and most (81%) believe that bilateral relations 
with China are good (Figure 19). The 2005 BBC World Service 23 Nation Poll “Who 
Will Lead the World?” supports these findings, concluding that China’s image as a 
“positive influence in the world” in the Philippines is among the highest of the 23 nations 
polled (70%).288
China’s national image in the Philippines since the early 1990s has clearly be­
come less threatening and more benign. By 2005, Filipinos were less mistrusting and far- 
less fearful of China than during the mid-1990s. The remarkable change in Filipino pub­
lic opinion is revealed by a comparison of the 1995 Social Weather Stations Survey data 
with that of the 2005 U.S. State Department Asian Views o f China survey. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, China’s image in the Philippines in 1995 was one of a hostile aggressor or 
enemy. However, the U.S. State Department’s 2005 public opinion survey revealed that 
only 9% of Filipinos viewed China as a national security threat (just 4 percentage points 
higher than that of the United States!), only 11% viewed China as a military threat, and 
only 7% perceived China as a “bully.” (Figures 15, and 16 respectively). Quite interest­
ingly, more Filipinos viewed the use of U.S. military force as the “greatest threat to world 
peace in the next five years” (12%) than China’s growing military power (3%)!
Public opinion surveys conducted in the ASEAN states since 2005 indicate that 
China is no longer perceived as a revisionist state posing a rising military threat
287 Asian Views o f China, 8.
288 BBC World Service 23 Nation Poll, “Who Will Lead the World?” (conducted by GlobeScan and the 
Program on International Policy Attitudes, April 2005), 4.
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Figure 18. “What Confidence Do You Have in China, U.S. to Deal Responsibly with 
International Problems?” Source of Data: Asian Views o f China, Opinion 
Analysis, U.S. Department of State, November 2005.
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Figure 19. “What is Your Perception of Bilateral Relations with China, with 
U.S.?” Source of Data: Asian Views o f China, Opinion Analysis, 
U.S. Department of State, November 2005.
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to regional peace and stability. Instead, the 2005 -  2006 polls and surveys indicate that 
China’s image among the ASEAN publics is currently one of a cooperative, responsible 
rising power whose contributions to regional economic and political stability reflect an 
increasing leadership role for China in Southeast Asia. In Thailand and Malaysia, the 
public have more confidence in China than the U.S. to deal responsibly with international 
problems, while almost 70% of those surveyed in the Philippines view China as responsi­
ble in dealing with international problems (Figure 18). ASEAN public perceptions of 
their respective country’s bilateral relations with China are extremely positive. This is 
especially true in Thailand and Malaysia, where positive perceptions of the bilateral rela­
tionship with China were almost unanimous (97%, 96%, respectively). Public perception 
of bilateral relations with China in the Philippines (82%) and Indonesia (92%) were also 
extremely positive while, by comparison, perceptions of bilateral relations with the U.S. 
were much less favorable in Indonesia and Malaysia (70% and 74% respectively).
Vietnam
Opinion poll and survey data for Vietnam is quite limited due to the country’s all 
but recent isolation from much of the international community. The only opinion poll or 
survey data available for Vietnam is the Australian Morgan Poll (2005 and 2006 data 
only), but this poll does not measure Vietnamese perceptions of China.
Thailand
The national image of China in Thailand is mostly favorable. Most Thais see 
China as a benign power whose rising economic strength will benefit Thailand. Most
289 Asian Views o f China, 2.
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Thai have a favorable opinion of China (83%)290 and all most all (97%) say that Thai- 
China relations are good (Figures 20 and 19, respectively). Most Thais have positive im­
ages of China (Figure 16), selecting positive attributes such as “hardworking people” 
(83%) and “beautiful country” (69%), while avoiding negative attributes such as “mili­
tary threat” (22%) and “bullies other countries” (9%). Most importantly, China is not 
viewed as a threat in Thailand. As indicated in Figures 15 and 17, only one percent (1%) 
of Thais polled view China as a threat, and only two percent of those polled regard China 
as the greatest threat to world peace in the next five years. This data set paints a more 
benign perception of China as a threat than does the data for Thailand in our content 
analysis above (Figure 11). However, the trend in Thailand toward a less-threatening 
view of China is apparent in both studies.
Singapore
English-language poll and survey data concerning China’s national image in 
Singapore are unavailable.
Indonesia
China’s national image in Indonesia is the most benign of all six ASEAN coun­
tries in our study. The State Department’s 2005 survey Asian Views o f China concludes 
that Indonesia neither views China as a potential threat to Indonesian national security
901(Figures 15 and 17), nor as a likely security partner. The strongest images of China in 
Indonesia are “hardworking people” (77%), “economic superpower” (44%), and “long
290 Thailand has a more favorable opinion of China than of the United States (only 73% have a favorable 
opinion of the United States. Asian Views a f China, 6.
291 Most Indonesians see ASEAN as their closest security partner in 5-10 years (39%). The United States is 
the second choice (23%), then the EU (5%), Japan (8%), and finally China (4%). Asian Views o f China, 4.
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history” (40%), while China as a “military threat” (8%), “human rights violator” (11%), 
and “bully” of other nations (7%) are the weakest images of China (Figure 16). Overall, 
Indonesians view China favorably (66%) and (92%) view bilateral relations with China 
as “good” (Figure 19). 292
According to results of the 2005 BBC World Service 23 Nation Poll “Who Will 
Lead the World?”, China’s image as a “positive influence in the world” in Indonesia was 
among the highest of the 23 nations polled (68%).293 The poll makes an insightful com­
ment about China’s positive global image, stating that the “positive view of China is 
closely related to its economic role in the world rather than its potential military power.” 
The study concludes that countries “which have engaged the world primarily through 
economic relations — or soft power — are widely seen as having a mostly positive influ­
ence, while the countries that have very large militaries and have used them in a promi­
nent way — the US and Russia — are more often seen as having a negative influence . . . .  
While trade might buy you love, guns clearly do not.”294
Malaysia
Data concerning China’s image in Malaysia in the 2005 State Department Survey 
Asian Views o f China clearly indicate that Malaysians do not view China as a threat (1%), 
even though the dispute between Beijing and Kuala Lumpur in the Spratly archipelago 
has yet to be resolved (Figure 17). 91% of Malaysians have a favorable opinion of China 
(Figure 20) and almost all (96%) describe the bilateral relationship with China as “good.”
292 For the sake of comparison, only 42% of Indonesians have a favorable opinion of the U.S., but trust the 
U.S. to deal responsibly with international problems more (50%) than they trust China to do so (46%). 
Asian Views o f China, 4.
293 BBC World Service 23 Nation Poll, “Who Will Lead the World?” (conducted by GlobeScan and the 
Program on International Policy Attitudes, April 2005), 4.
294 Ibid.
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Malaysians are also much more likely to trust China (75%) than the U.S. (35%) to deal 
with international problems responsibly (Figure 18). The strongest images held by Ma­
laysians of China are “hardworking people” (77%), “economic superpower" (73%), “long 
history” (69%), “beautiful country” (62%). Images of China as a “military threat” (14%), 
“human rights violator” (7%), and “bullies other countries” (7%) are the weakest among 
Malaysians (Figure 16).
All of the data presented thus far support the assertion that Beijing’s GND is suc­
cessfully altering threat perceptions of China in Southeast Asia. Our newspaper content 
analysis of China’s image in six ASEAN states concerning the South China Sea disputes 
indicates a positive change in regional threat perceptions of China. The news media in 
Southeast Asia clearly no longer view China as a serious threat to the national security of 
their respective countries. The more generalized data obtained from public opinion polls 
and surveys presented above concerning China’s image in the region support the findings 
of our content analysis. The “man in the street” clearly no longer believes it likely that 
Beijing will use force to alter the status quo in the Spratlys. China no longer has a public 
image in the region of being a “bully of other countries” nor a “military threat.” How­
ever, do the governments of these ASEAN states share the increasingly favorable view of 
China expressed by the public? To answer this question, we must now turn our attention 
to the security behavior of the ASEAN states.
SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES’ POLICIES TOWARDS CHINA
ASEAN Policy Towards China
The territorial disputes in the South China Sea represent one of the most serious 
security concerns for ASEAN (especially for the Philippines and Vietnam), as discussed
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above. The fact that the ASEAN states have agreed with Beijing not to allow the dis­
putes to stand in the way of closer China-ASEAN relations indicates that ASEAN threat 
perceptions of China have decreased considerably. Even while China’s power projection 
capabilities continue to improve and military expenditures continue to increase, the 
ASEAN states appear less inclined to view the rise of China as a threat. After all, the two 
“frontline” states in the territorial disputes with China, Vietnam and the Philippines, are 
now partners with the PRC in developing the offshore oil potential in the Spratlys! If 
this analysis is correct, then we would expect to see evidence of increased trust and 
“partnership” in Sino-ASEAN relations manifest itself in the security behavior of these 
states towards China. In other words, it is difficult to believe that Sino-ASEAN relations 
could improve as dramatically as they have during the last decade if China were still per­
ceived to represent a serious military threat in Southeast Asia. Therefore, if perceptions 
of a China threat remain high in the region, we would expect the security behavior of the 
ASEAN states to reflect such a condition. We would expect the ASEAN states to either 
balance against or bandwagon with China. Given the continuing growth of Chinese eco­
nomic and military power, any state that felt threatened by China would logically, over 
time, view China as an increasing security threat due to the PRC’s increasing military 
capability. As such, we would expect adjustments in the security policies of the threat­
ened states such as internal balancing (increase military and economic strength), external 
balancing against China via closer security relations with the U.S., or bandwagoning with 
China. If, on the other hand, perceptions of a China threat were decreasing in Southeast 
Asia, we would expect the security policies of ASEAN and member states to reflect this 
condition as well. Given the economic troubles in the region since 1997, decreased threat
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perceptions should lead to decreased military spending as limited economic resources are 
reallocated to other sectors. In addition, a decrease in threat perceptions of China would 
allow the ASEAN states more maneuvering room in their relations with both the United 
States and China — there would be less pressure to pursue or strengthen security relations 
with either Washington or Beijing. As such, the ASEAN states could benefit through 
pursuing good relations with both regional powers (the optimum situation).
As explained below, the security behavior of ASEAN and member states toward 
China since the end of the Cold War has undergone and continues to undergo significant 
change as China is increasingly viewed as a cooperative security partner in the region.
As we have seen in the earlier chapters, Beijing began in the late 1990s to promote 
“comprehensive” and “cooperative” security in the form of the New Security Concept 
(NSC), which echoes a number of ASEAN norms — non-interference in the internal af­
fairs of other states (strong state sovereignty), mutual non-aggression, peaceful coexis­
tence, mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality and mutual benefit, 
and peaceful resolution of disputes through dialogue. The convergence of Chinese and 
ASEAN security interests during the 1990s (regional stability and economic develop­
ment), as well as the emergence of a collective identity in China-ASEAN relations, have 
induced a change in both ASEAN perceptions and security behavior vis-a-vis China. Re­
gional views of China have changed from China as a “threat” to China as a cooperative 
economic and security “partner” as reflected by a change in ASEAN and member states’ 
behavior towards China. Increasingly, China and ASEAN are moving in the direction of 
establishing an Asian economic and security community. ASEAN decided to pursue its
295 Muthiah Alagappa, “Constructing Security Order in Asia: Conceptions and issues,” in Muthiah Ala- 
gappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University 
press, 2003), 76.
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own security community as the Ministers agreed to contribute to the establishment of an 
ASEAN Security Community (ASC) as declared by the ASEAN Heads of State and 
Government at the ninth ASEAN Summit held in Bali, Indonesia, on 7 October 2003 and 
mandated under the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP).296 Since then, Beijing has also 
promoted the concept of a regional security community. In light of the above, it is clear 
that threat perceptions associated with the rise of Chinese economic and military power 
and with China’s historic national image as a “threat” in Southeast Asia have declined 
considerably. China is no longer viewed in Southeast Asia as much a threat as an oppor­
tunity for economic and military cooperation. This conclusion holds true as well for indi­
vidual ASEAN states.
The Security Policies of Six ASEAN States Toward China
The security policies of the six ASEAN states studied above also indicate that re­
gional threat perceptions of China have decreased. As discussed below, military expendi­
tures as a percentage of GDP of five of our study’s six ASEAN states have decreased, 
and these states have not sought to respond to growing Chinese military power by either 
balancing against or bandwagoning with China, as Realist theory predicts. In an attempt 
to correct this theoretical deficiency, realists are currently labeling this non-realist behav­
ior “hedging.” By doing so, they continue to ground their analysis on power and threat 
considerations while at the same time discount or ignore the social construction of state 
identity and interest and the possibility that this is an endogenous process.297 In addition,
296 Association o f Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Secretariat, Declaration o f ASEAN Concord II (Bali 
Concord II), 7 October 2003. http://www.aseansec.org/15159.htm (accessed 14 July 2006).
297 Evelyn Goh provides a good explanation of the “hedging” strategy of the ASEAN states through case 
studies of Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand. Evelyn Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in 
Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies,” Policy Studies 16 (East-West Center Washington, 2005).
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the very fact that these states have the luxury of pursuing so-called “hedging” strategies 
regarding China indicates that the rise of Chinese power has not caused a corresponding 
increase in regional threat perceptions of China — otherwise these states would be under 
greater pressure to choose between balancing against or bandwagoning with China, due 
to the asymmetry of national power between China and the small ASEAN states. The re­
gional distribution of power in economic and military terms does influence perceptions 
and security strategies of the ASEAN states toward China, but to a less extent now than 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Even as Chinese economic and military power 
continue to expand and a resolution of the South China Sea disputes has yet to material­
ize, perceptions in Southeast Asia of a China “threat” are lessening as China is increas­
ingly viewed in the region as being a cooperative partner and good neighbor. This is true 
for all ASEAN states, but in differing degrees for each member state. Having said that, I 
must add a caveat. It would be “stretching it” to suggest that China is presently viewed 
as a true “friend” by any ASEAN state (except perhaps Myanmar, Malaysia, or Cambo­
dia) -- after all, the positive change in Southeast Asian perceptions of China began barely 
ten years ago and is still an ongoing process (and thus subject to change). Considering 
the long history of enmity between China and Vietnam, it would be surprising indeed for 
the Vietnamese to lose their apprehension of China in a mere decade. Trust is not easily 
earned — it takes time to develop. Nonetheless, a trend towards “friendship” in Sino- 
ASEAN (as a group and as individual states) relations is discemable and is affecting the 
security policies of ASEAN and member states. This trend will likely continue as long as 
relations across the Taiwan Strait remain stable and the global economy does not experi­
ence any serious downturns.
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Vietnam
Even though China remains the paramount security concern for Hanoi, the secu­
rity behavior of Vietnam since the early 1990s indicates that perceptions of a China threat 
are decreasing among the leadership in Hanoi. This is evidenced by Hanoi’s increased 
emphasis on diplomacy in its China policy and a corresponding attenuation of attention 
on military capabilities. While the armed forces of the PRC continue to modernize and 
develop increased power-projection capabilities, Vietnamese military expenditures are 
decreasing as measured as a percentage of GDP. After reaching a spending peak of 7.9% 
of GDP in 1990, Vietnamese military expenditures drop off considerably during 1991- 
1993, then rise slightly (from 2.3% to 2.6%) during 1994 (Figure 21). Data on Vietnam­
ese military spending for 1995-1998 is regrettably unavailable, but data does exist for 
1999-2005. However, this data comes from a different source than that of the 1988-1994 
data and measures military expenditures in $US Billions (as opposed to percentage of 
GDP). While the two data sets are not directly comparable with one another, they both 
indicate that Vietnam’s military spending remains comparatively modest with that of 
other ASEAN states. According to the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 
Vietnam’s military budget increased slightly during 1999-2005 (Figure 22). In 2004 
Vietnam’s military spending was $ 3.2 billion (US). To put this figure into perspective,
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1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Philippines 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1 1 1.1 0.9
Vietnam 7.1 7.7 7.9 5.6 3.4 2.3 2.6
Singapore 4.8 4.7 4.9 4.7 4.7 4.3 4 4.4 4.4 4.7 5.4 5.4 4.7 5 5.1 5.1 4.7
Thailand 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
Indonesia 2 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.1 0.9 1 1 1 1.1 1.1
Malaysia 2.4 2.6 2.6 3.2 3 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.6 2.1 1.7 2.2 2.4 2.8 2.3
Figure 20. Military Expenditures as Percentage of GDP. Source of Data: SIPRI 
Military Expenditure Database (SIPRI, 2006). Data for China and 
Indonesia are SIPRI estimates. Data unavailable for Vietnam after 1994.




















□  1999 0.89 4.696 1.502 2.683 39.889
□ 2000 0.931 4.316 1.493 2.419 42
12001 2.22 4.369 4.36 1.739 43.551
ID 2002 2.64 4.581 5.187 1.832
□  2003 2.901 4.741 6.443 1.931
51.159
55.948
12004 3.17 5.4 7.55 1.93 62.5
H2005 3.47 5.57 1.95 80
COUNTRY
Figure 21. Military Expenditures of Asian Powers, 1999-2005. Source of Data:
Cordesman & Kleiber, The Asian Conventional Military Balance (CSIS, 
2006). Data unavailable for the Philippines and Malaysia.
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China’s 2003 military budget was $ 56.0 billion (U.S.).298 The overall decrease in Viet­
nam’s military spending during our study’s period indicates that Hanoi does not antici­
pate hostilities with China any time soon. This is quite remarkable considering that of all 
the ASEAN states, Vietnam has the longest and most contentious history of armed con­
flict with China. Given the overall history of enmity between Beijing and Hanoi, as well 
as the more specific history regarding the territorial disputes over the Paracel and Spratly 
islands, it is extremely difficult to account for Vietnam’s decreased military expenditures 
since the early 1990s unless Hanoi’s threat perceptions regarding China have fundamen­
tally changed.
The composition and capabilities of the Vietnamese Navy also indicate that Hanoi 
does not perceive any clear and present China threat in the maritime environment. Viet­
nam has only eleven major surface warships (6 frigates and 5 corvettes), eight missile 
patrol craft, ten torpedo and coastal craft, and nineteen inshore (river) patrol boats. None 
of the six frigates is armed with guided missile systems. Vietnam also has two obsoles­
cent submarines (SS/SSK).299 Hanoi obviously does not currently perceive a need to 
strengthen its military power to any significant degree. This is not the security policy one 
might expect if Hanoi still perceived China as posing a national security threat to Viet­
nam!
Vietnam’s external security policy also indicates that China is no longer perceived 
as being the threat it once was. Hanoi has so far not pursued either a hard balancing 
strategy against China nor has Vietnam moved towards bandwagoning with China.
298 U.S. Military Spending vs. the World, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, 7 February 2005. 
http://www.armscontroleenter.org/archives/001221 .php.
299 Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, The Asian Conventional Military Balance in 2006: Total 
and Sub-Regional Balances; Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, June 2006), 73.
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Instead, Hanoi is pursuing a hedging strategy of cultivating closer economic and diplo­
matic ties with China, while at the same time pursuing a soft-balancing strategy by press­
ing for a more unified and explicit ASEAN security policy vis-a-vis China and through 
seeking better relations with Washington. Hanoi’s strategy indicates that China is no 
longer perceived as a likely, immediate military threat. However, at the same time Ha­
noi’s hedging strategy also indicates that the Vietnamese remain cautious and suspicious 
of China’s long-term goals in the region. As such, Vietnam’s strategy in coping with the 
rise of China is to enmesh the major powers in Southeast Asia (U.S., Japan, and EU) dip­
lomatically and economically to deepen their sense of having a stake in regional security 
and induce a stronger interest in maintaining regional stability. Besides limited efforts of 
cultivating closer ties with India and “testing” the viability of closer relations with the 
U.S., Hanoi’s main enmeshment strategy is to focus on the “constructive entanglement” 
of China. As such, Hanoi’s position regarding the engagement of major powers in the 
region is unique among the ASEAN states in that China — not the United States — is the 
main target of Vietnamese efforts. Vietnam therefore, follows a “defensive enmeshment 
concept” based on the notion that greater interdependence between China and ASEAN 
will raise the costs to China of any aggression against Vietnam.300 Rather than relying on 
American military power to balance the rise of China, Hanoi views U.S. economic power 
as crucial in developing Vietnam’s internal balancing ability.301
Since the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1991, Hanoi has assidu­
ously promoted close diplomatic and economic ties with China. As outlined in Chapters 
2 and 3, official contacts between the two countries, such as frequent exchanges between
300 Goh, 33.
301 Goh, 42. Also see Nayan Chanda, “A Balancing Act by Hanoi,” International Herald Tribune, 11 No­
vember 2003.
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military and civilian officials and annual high-level meetings, are well established. Be­
ginning in the late 1990s, talks between China and Vietnam concerning disputes over the 
land and sea borders became almost habitual.302 Military-to-military contacts between 
China and Vietnam also have become more frequent as well. The first visit of a Chinese 
naval vessel to Vietnam occurred in 2001 at Nha Rong port in Ho Chi Minh City.303 
Since then, such contacts have become routine in nature. Increased interaction among 
Chinese and Vietnamese officials has led to a general improvement of Sino-Vietnamese 
relations, as well as to progress in the most difficult issue in the relationship — the Sprat- 
lys dispute. After all, it is difficult to believe that Hanoi would have joined China and the 
Philippines in developing the natural resources in the Spratlys had Vietnam still per­
ceived China as constituting a serious threat to Vietnamese national security. By signing 
the 2005 Tripartite Agreement, Hanoi deepened China’s “enmeshment’ in the region and 
thus lessened the possibility of any hostile moves by Beijing in the Spratlys. By 2005, 
Vietnam had seemingly realized its goal of constructively entangling China as articulated 
in 1992 by a Vietnamese foreign ministry official:
Sino-Vietnamese relations will be meshed within the much larger network of in­
terlocking economic and political interests . . .  [creating] an arrangement whereby 
anybody wanting to violate Vietnam’s sovereignty would be violating the inter­
ests of other countries as well.304
In addition to Hanoi’s “enmeshment” strategy directed at China, Vietnam also at­
tempted to balance against China through its membership in ASEAN (2000). As a mem­
ber, Hanoi hoped to utilize the potential collective bargaining power of ASEAN to en­
302 See Lai To Lee, China and the South China Sea Dialogues and “China's Relations with ASEAN: Part­
ners in the 21st Century?” Pacifica Review 13, no.l (February 2001): 61-71 for an excellent discussion of 
Sino-Vietnamese dialogue concerning disputed sea borders in the Gulf of Tonkin, and the territorial dis­
putes in the South China Sea.
303 Goh, 21.
304 Nguyen Hong Thach, quoted in Goh, 33.
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hance Vietnam’s position regarding its giant neighbor to the north — especially concern­
ing the Paracel and Spratly islands. Hanoi suggested that ASEAN’s decision to view 
Vietnam as part of the group was due to “economic and defence [sic] reasons,” and also 
reflected ASEAN fears concerning China’s aggressive stance on the Spratlys dispute.305 
Vietnam’s strategy of emphasizing the China threat in the South China Sea has not met 
with much success, however, due to the lack of a unified ASEAN position on contentious 
issues with China. Beijing’s diplomacy in Southeast Asia has successfully divided 
ASEAN on the South China Sea issue by pursuing bilateral trade agreements and eco­
nomic relations extremely favorable to the individual ASEAN states. Several ASEAN 
states have benefited economically through their bilateral relations with China, especially 
Malaysia and Thailand (discussed below). As a result, these countries have reached a 
more “understanding” positions in certain issues important to China, such as agreeing to 
place sovereignty issues on hold in the territorial disputes dialogues and resisting Ma­
nila’s calls to internationalize the South China Sea disputes with China. Vietnam has 
also benefited economically through its relations with China. Vietnam, like China, also 
requires regional stability during its period of reform and economic development. More­
over, Hanoi is keenly aware of the crucial role played by China in the region’s economic 
development and security. Since the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations, trade 
between the two countries has significantly increased. Between 2000 and 2004, for ex­
ample, China-Vietnam trade doubled in volume (from $2.4 billion to $5 billion).306 Bei­
jing has thus skillfully utilized China’s growing economic power in its diplomacy to lev­
erage some of the Southeast Asia states toward positions more sympathetic to Chinese
305 Straits Times, 21 July 1992.
3°6 “China-Vietnam Trade to Surpass 5b Dollars,” Xinhua News, 1 September 2004.
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interests. Thus, Beijing’s strategy has successfully divided ASEAN on the Spratlys issue 
and thus countered any possibility of Vietnam building a unified ASEAN position on the 
matter. Therefore, the only other potential balancer of China is Vietnam’s previous en­
emy — the United States.
Since the normalization of relations between Hanoi and Washington in 1995, the 
Vietnamese have also quietly pursued better economic and security relations with the 
United States as a component of Hanoi’s hedging strategy vis-a-vis China. In 2000, 
President Bill Clinton and Secretary of Defense William Cohen visited Vietnam, fol­
lowed the next year by a bilateral trade agreement (BTA) which allowed Vietnamese 
goods to enter the US market under normal trading status. In addition, military coopera­
tion between the two former enemies began in the areas of searching for American MIAs, 
clearing mine fields, and military medical programs.307 In November 2003, two signifi­
cant events took place that indicate movement towards an American-Vietnamese military 
relationship — an American warship made a port call to Ho Chi Minh City, and the Viet­
namese defense minister visited the United States for the first time.308 Subsequent U.S. 
naval visits to Vietnamese ports (most recently on 4 July 2006, when the USS Patriot and 
the USS Salvor visited a Vietnamese port).309 The possibility of increased U.S.- 
Vietnamese military cooperation was underscored by Admiral William Fallon’s July 
2006 trip to Vietnam. In meetings with Defense Minister Colonel Phung Quang Thanh, 
Fallon discussed possible joint military maneuvers and more visits of U.S. Navy vessels
307 Goh, 28.
308 Nayan Chanda, “A Balancing Act by Hanoi,” International Herald Tribune, 11 November 2003.
309 Sergei Blagov, “US, Vietnam scratch each other’s back,” Asia Times Online, 2006. http://www.atimes. 
com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HG21Ae02.html (accessed 23 August 2006).
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to Vietnamese ports, as well as joint search-and-rescue exercises at sea in the future.310 
Thanh, however, did not give an immediate reply except to express that Vietnam did not 
wish to cause any “misunderstanding with regional neighbors.”311
Presently, Vietnam and the United States cooperate in counter-terrorism and 
counter-narcotics operations, and just recently, Hanoi agreed to participate in the Penta­
gon’s international military education and training program with regional US allies. In 
addition, Vietnam and the U.S. conduct annual defense dialogues among mid-level mili­
tary officers (this year will be the third such meeting).312 Further, it is generally believed 
that Washington wants access to Vietnamese military facilities, especially the former 
American naval base at Cam Ranh Bay. High-level U.S. officials have recently visited (or 
plan to visit) Vietnam for talks with their Vietnamese counterparts — U.S. House Speaker 
Dennis Hastert, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary Condolica Rice, and President 
Bush. It seems that they desire to take advantage of the 2002 Russian military with­
drawal from Cam Ranh Bay.313 Hanoi, however, has plans to convert the naval base into 
an economic hub, similar to Manila’s conversion of Subic Bay in the Philippines. In addi­
tion, there are plans to upgrade Cam Ranh Bay’s airport into an international gateway, 
and convert Ba Ngoi seaport into a container ship terminal.314
Improvements in U.S.-Vietnam relations, however, must be seen and measured 
within the framework of Sino-Vietnamese relations. Hanoi clearly wishes to avoid of­




313 Hanoi was unprepared for Moscow’s unexpected early withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay (Russia still had 
two years remaining on its 25-year contract to use the naval base without charge).
314 Blagov.
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might be perceived by Beijing as being antagonistic. For example, the BTA between 
Vietnam and the U.S. was reportedly delayed by Hanoi until China had reached agree­
ment with the U.S. concerning trade, and Secretary of Defense Cohen’s 2000 visit to 
Vietnam was postponed by Hanoi because of a Sino-Vietnamese summit and the Ameri­
can bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and a Chinese naval visit of Vietnam 
took place before the 2003 visit of U.S. Navy warships. Apparently, Hanoi will only de­
velop relations with the U.S. at a rate determined and constrained by Vietnam’s relations 
with China. For Hanoi, Sino-Vietnamese relations are the paramount concern, and there­
fore relations with the U.S. are of secondary importance to Vietnam.315 Overtures to­
wards Washington are useful to Hanoi as leverage on Beijing to maximize Vietnam’s 
gains in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. By pointing to the future possibility of im­
proved relations with the U.S., Vietnam can pressure Beijing into greater foreign aid and 
trade concessions as inducements to lure Hanoi away from pursuing warmer relations 
with Washington.
In short, Vietnam’s ability to actively balance against China is relatively weak. 
ASEAN remains divided in its China policy, and therefore is not perceived by Hanoi as 
being a significant balancing force against potential Chinese aggression. As such, lack­
ing any meaningful partners with which to balance against rising Chinese power, Hanoi 
has pursued a strategy of focusing primarily on improving relations with China and thus 
further enmeshing (entangling) China economically and politically in the region. As re­
gional peace and stability are essential to the wider interests of both Vietnam and China, 
the potentiality of armed hostility between the two socialist countries over the disputed
315 Goh, 21-23, 32-33.
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Spratly and Paracel Islands appears low. As such, Vietnam’s security behavior indicates 
that threat perceptions of China are currently low and will remain so for the near future.
The Philippines
Following the opening of relations in 1975 between China and the Philippines, the 
two countries experienced good bilateral relations. During the Third Indochina War, 
Manila supported ASEAN’s tacit alliance with China against Vietnamese hegemonic am­
bitions in mainland Southeast Asia. Given that in the security realm the Philippines en­
joyed a free ride due to the large American military presence in Subic Bay and Clark Air 
Base, Manila could afford to pursue relations with China. However, following the 
American military withdrawal from the Philippines in 1992, and the Mischief Reef Affair 
in 1995, post-Cold War relations between Manila and Beijing deteriorated. Given Ameri­
can indifference regarding the dispute between China and the Philippines in the Spratlys, 
Manila turned to ASEAN for assistance.
As discussed in previous chapters, President Fidel Ramos unsuccessfully at­
tempted to internationalize the South China Sea dispute in reaction to China’s provoca­
tive moves in the Spratlys, but due to a lack of ASEAN consensus on the issue, Ramos 
was forced to settle for bilateral talks with Beijing for the time being. These talks did re­
sult in a bilateral code of conduct concerning the disputes in the South China Sea.316 But 
as discussed in earlier chapters, the code of conduct did little to ease Manila’s worries 
about Chinese intentions in the Spratlys. Manila, therefore, continued to press for an 
united ASEAN position regarding Chinese territorial claims and actions in the South
316 “Joint Statement on the PRC-RP Consultations on the South China Sea and Other Areas of Coopera­
tion,” 10 August 1995. A good overview o f the “code of conduct” is given in Rommel C. Banlaoi, The 
ASEAN Regional Forum, The South China Sea Disputes, and the Functionalist Option (Quezon City: na­
tional Defense College of the Philippines, 2001). Also see Emmers, 138.
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China Sea. During the informal 1999 ASEAN Summit held in Manila, the Philippines 
submitted a draft multilateral code of conduct for the South China Sea in an attempt to 
create a collective ASEAN position vis-a-vis China. Manila’s draft included a proposal 
for joint development of the Spratly Islands, which was rejected by both Malaysia and
0 1 7
China. However, due in a large part to Manila’s push within ASEAN for multilateral 
development of the Spratlys, Beijing accelerated its bilateral diplomacy with Manila for 
joint development of the Spratly Islands. During the September 2003 Manila visit of Wu 
Bangguo, Chairman of China’s National People’s Congress, and an informal proposal for 
joint development of the Spratlys was made. Wu’s overture was followed in November 
by meetings between delegations from the China National Offshore Oil Company 
(CNOOC) and the Philippines National Oil Corporation (PNOC) to discuss joint explora­
tion and development of oil and natural gas reserves in the disputed region.318 This proc­
ess, as discussed earlier, ultimately led to the 2005 Tripartite Agreement between China, 
the Philippines, and Vietnam for joint exploration and development of the Spratlys. Ma­
nila’s efforts within ASEAN to pressure China towards multilateral development of the 
Spratlys succeeded in achieving its goal — but through a bilateral mechanism, which be­
came multilateral with Vietnam’s subsequent entry into the China-Philippine agreement.
To a certain extent, then, Manila successfully utilized its ASEAN membership to 
pressure China toward a bilateral agreement for joint development in the Spratlys. Given 
the poor state of Philippine military capabilities and the declining rate in Philippine de­
fense spending (Figure 4.16), some observers might contend that Manila’s diplomatic 
feat would not have been possible without American security guarantees -- that balance
317 Emmers, 140-141.
318 Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle For Autonomy (Row- 
man & Littlefield, 2005), 138-139.
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of power explains the successful conclusion of the 2005 PRC-RP joint development 
agreement which subsequently became the Tripartite Agreement. Our analysis of the 
U.S. balancing factor, however, indicates that considerations beyond the distribution of 
power were responsible for this outcome. Rather, the success of Chinese diplomacy in 
reducing Manila’s threat perception of China, as evidenced by the empirical data pre­
sented above, is responsible to a large degree for this outcome. It is inconceivable that 
such an outcome would have occurred had Manila still perceived China as an “enemy.” 
Recent Philippine security behavior indicates that Manila increasingly views China not as 
an enemy, but as a “good neighbor, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a 
nonthreatening regional power.”319
Ever since the incorporation of the Philippines into the American empire in 1898, 
U.S. military power has been the traditional source of Philippine national security. Dur­
ing the Cold War, the substantial American military presence in the Philippines allowed 
Manila a “free ride” in national security matters concerning external threats to the Philip­
pines. Because the Philippines was a key element in Washington’s strategy of forward 
deployment in Asia, Manila utilized and relied upon the American security umbrella for 
protection against external threats (1951 Mutual Defense Agreement, 1954 Southeast 
Asia Collective Defense Treaty or “Manila Pact” and the establishment of Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization or SEATO). As such, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) 
were essentially designed as a domestic security force. Therefore, when Washington re­
fused the Philippine Senate’s new lease agreement for both Subic Bay and Clark Air Base 
in 1991 and militarily withdrew from the Philippines the following year, the AFP inher­
3191 borrow David Shambaugh’s description of China’s image in the region. Shambaugh, “China Engages 
Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” 64.
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ited the responsibility for defending the country against external threats — a job that it 
was not capable of undertaking by itself. The Mischief Reef affair of 1995 and the lack 
of strong American support made this point painfully clear to Manila. According to for­
mer U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Joseph Nye, Wash­
ington would not involve the U.S. in the dispute between the Philippines and China ex­
cept to maintain the free passage of vessels in the region should conflict in the Spratlys 
threaten freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.320 In fact, Washington made 
clear that the Philippine-claimed areas in the Spratlys were not covered by the Mutual 
Defense Treaty of 1951. In May 1995 the U.S. State Department issued the following 
statement:
The United States takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims to 
sovereignty over the various islands, reefs, atolls and cays in the South China Sea. 
The United States would, however, view with serious concern any maritime 
claim, or restriction on maritime activity, in the South China Sea that was not 
consistent with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention
T91on the Law of the Sea.
However, according to Sheldon W. Simon, Washington confirmed in 1999 that the U.S. 
would defend the Philippines if it were attacked in the South China Sea.322 Manila’s re­
sponse to the 1995 manifestation of the Chinese threat in the South China Sea was to 
push the Philippine Congress to approve a military modernization plan and also to began 
working to revitalize the U.S.-Philippine alliance by negotiating a Visiting Forces
320 Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes: Conflicting Claims and Potential Solutions 
in the South China Sea, Adelphi Paper no. 298 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995): 
26-27. Also see Weatherbee, 135.
321 Christine Shelly, Acting Spokesperson of the U.S. Department of State, “Spratlys and the South China 
Sea”, 10 May 1995 as cited in Emmers, 151.
322 Sheldon W. Simon, “Theater Security Cooperation in the U.S. Pacific Command: An Assessment and 
Projection,” NBR Analysis 14, no. 2 (August 2003): 38.
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Agreement (VFA) and by requesting military assistance.323 Late in January 2002, Manila 
agreed to allow about 1000 U.S. soldiers to deploy to the southern Philippines to help in 
Manila’s fight against the separatist terror group Abu Sayyaf.324 During the March 2003 
annual U.S.-Philippines “Balikatan” joint military exercise, some training activity took 
place on Palawan Island bordering the territory in the Spratlys claimed by Manila. Ac­
cording to President Arroyo, before focusing on counterinsurgency training against the 
separatist group Abu Sayyaf, the focus of the U.S. training of the PAF was defending the 
Spratlys against China.
However, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s withdrawal of Filipino troops 
from Iraq in 2004 to win the release of a Philippine hostage resulted in a marked decrease 
in U.S. assistance to Manila. Beijing responded by offering the Philippines Chinese mili- 
tary assistance — and Manila accepted). In March 2005, Beijing offered the Philippines 
$3 million (US) in military aid to create a Chinese-language training program for the 
PAF, invited the Philippines to participate in naval maneuvers, donated engineering 
equipment, and opened five slots to Filipinos for military training in China.327 The re­
sponse from Washington was a rapid increase in U.S. military assistance to the Philip­
323 Carl Baker, “China-Philippines Relations: Cautious Cooperation,” Asia’s Bilateral Relations, Asia- 
Pacific Center for Security Studies (October 2004), 4. Available online at http://www.apcss.org/Publica- 
tions/SAS/AsiaBilateralRelations/China-PhilippinesRelationsBaker.pdf (accessed 4September 2006).
324 Emmers, 150.
325 “War Games with US Targeted China: Arroyo,” The Straits Times Interactive, 5 April 2004.
326 Beijing invited President Arroyo for a state visit and offered Manila greater cooperation and aid and 
subsequently aggressively wooed Philippine policy makers. Hannah Beech, “Deals and Diplomacy,” Time 
Asia 165, no. 21 (30 May 2005); Dan Blumenthal, “The Impact of China’s Economic Growth on North and 
Southeast Asia,” testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, published 
by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 22 July 2005. This was not the first Chi­
nese offer of military assistance, however. Beijing made offers of military assistance to the Philippines in 
2004. See “Defense Minister Cao meets with Brunei, Philippine guests,” People’s Daily Online, 24 Sep­
tember 2004.
327 Dana Dillon and John J. Tkacik, Jr., “China’s Quest for Asia,” Policy Review, no. 134 (December 2005 
& January 2006), 13.
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pines amounting to $300 million (US) over the last few years.328 Presently, there is even 
talk of establishing permanent American military bases in the southern island of Min­
danao which would support activities of the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philip­
pines (JOSTFP), established after 9/11 to train and advise the PAF on how best to fight 
terrorist groups such as Abu Sayyaf. The recent improvement in Sino-Philippines se­
curity relations, as illustrated by the 2005 Tripartite Agreement in the Spratlys and Ma­
nila’s acceptance of increasing Chinese economic and military assistance, clearly demon­
strates that Philippine threat perceptions of China have dramatically decreased since the 
late 1990s. The recent increase in American military aid and assistance to the Philippines 
also indicates growing concerns in Washington that Manila is becoming too friendly with 
China — and thus weakening the legitimacy of the U.S. “China threat” thesis and perhaps 
even making the establishment of permanent American military bases in the southern 
Philippines more problematic for the Bush Administration.
Thailand
Thailand does not view China as a serious national security threat. Thailand has 
no common borders with China, and the two countries have no territorial disputes with 
one another. Thailand was one of the first states in Southeast Asia to normalize relations 
with China (1975), and the two countries share a recent history of economic and strategic 
cooperation. Thai companies were the initial investors in China following Deng Xiaop­
ing’s decision to liberalize China’s economy and join the world market at the end of the
328 Fabio Scarpello, “Philippines weigh new military marriage,” Asia Times Online, 23 August 2006.
329 In February 2002, 160 US special forces with 500 support staff arrived on the island of Basilan in Min­
danao. Scarpello, “Philippines weigh new military marriage,” Asia Times Online, 23 August 2006. Also see 
Michael Richardson, “Joint Operation Easier to Begin Than to End,” International Herald Tribune, 28 
January 2002, and Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghani­
stan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia,” CRS Report for Congress (26 August 2005), Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress.
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1970s, and Thailand and China became strategic partners against Vietnam following Ha­
noi’s 1978 invasion of Cambodia. In addition, Thailand was a leading proponent (along 
with Singapore) beginning in the 1980s for an ASEAN policy of engaging and building a 
relationship with China. During the 1990s, Thailand was the most fulsome of the 
ASEAN states in its commendation of Beijing’s diplomatic and economic overtures in 
the region. During Prime Minister Zhu Rongji’s 2001 visit to Thailand, his Thai counter­
part emphasized closer and stronger Thai-Chinese cooperation in a wide range of inter­
ests, stating that in the future China and Thailand would become “strategic partners.”330 
In July 2005, during the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between Thailand and China, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shi- 
nawatra indicated his anticipation of greater cooperation and a more dynamic strategic 
relationship with China.331
However, China does pose several potential security problems for Thailand. First, 
China’s increasing influence in mainland Southeast Asia, especially in Cambodia, Laos, 
and perhaps Myanmar, worries Bangkok as Thailand continues to value buffer areas at its 
borders to manage the region’s strategic balance with Vietnam and China.332 Second, 
there is concern that Beijing has already “won over” the region with favorable bilateral 
trade agreements and Chinese economic and technical assistance, and is now beginning 
to pursue Chinese self-interest more assiduously in Southeast Asia. Thai officials do not 
believe that China poses any direct security threat to Thailand, but they do have concerns 
about the serious economic challenge China poses as well as the possibility that Beijing
330 “Zhu’s Visit Goes Off Well,” Bangkok Post, 22 May 2001.
331 “China’s Quest for Asia,” 14.
332 See Muthiah Alagappa, The National Security o f Developing States: Lessons from Thailand (Dover,
MA: Auburn House, 1987).
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could disrupt regional stability through political intrigue.333 An example that perturbed 
Thai officials is the free trade agreement with China that allowed a flood of cheap Chi­
nese products into Thailand while at the same time prevented a free flow of Thai goods 
into China because of China’s remaining non-tariff trade barriers.334 Nonetheless, Thai­
land has good trade relations with China and recognizes that Beijing’s influence on the 
military regime in Myanmar is of value to Thailand.335 However, Bangkok does have 
some long-term strategic concerns regarding China that prevent any bandwagoning be­
havior by Thailand and, at the same time, encourage the continuance of good relations 
with the United States.
Thailand and the United States share a long history of security relations (Thailand 
is the first Southeast Asian country to enter into a formal defense treaty with the U.S.).336 
Beginning in 1981, Thailand annually hosts the largest American military exercises in 
Southeast Asia — the joint Thai-US Cobra Gold military exercise. Since 2002, Singapore 
participates in Cobra Gold and, starting in 2004, the Philippines participate in the U.S.-
'i'in
led annual military exercise. However, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Thai coop­
eration with Washington in the war against terrorism was less than enthusiastic. Sympa­
thetic to the American position, but wary of supporting a U.S. war against Muslim coun­
tries, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra initially took a neutral stance before finally de­
ciding two weeks later to support Washington’s antiterrorism policies by offering to send 




336 In 1954 Thailand and the US join other signatories of the Manila Pact to form the Southeast Asian 
Treaty Organization (SEATO), followed in 1962 by the Rusk-Thanat Joint Statement pledging US support 
for Thailand's defense. In 1964 the first US military forces are based in Thailand.
337 Weatherbee, 38.
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(APEC) and ASEAN forums. By 2003, Thailand’s position concerning the threat of ter­
rorism moved even closer to that of Washington’s. Thaksin’s 2003 “working visit” with 
President Bush indicated a strengthening of U.S.-Thai relations and an increased security 
role for Thailand concerning the war against terrorism. Thailand has been designated as a 
“major non-NATO ally” by Washington and Thailand’s new status was affirmed by an 
agreement to deliver advanced medium range air-to-air missiles to the Thai air force.338 
While not publicly joining the U.S. coalition to invade Iraq, Thailand pledged support of 
the war in May 2003 and soon after dispatched 400 military personnel to assist in rebuild­
ing efforts.339 Even though Bangkok views terrorism in mostly domestic terms (Muslim 
unrest in southern Thailand) and has reservations about defining terrorism in very Ameri­
can terms, the importance of continued strategic relations with the U.S. is clear. How­
ever, Thailand is cautious not to strategically lean too far towards the United States for 
domestic reasons, as well as to preserve more room for maneuver with China.
In sum, the rise of Chinese power is not perceived in Thailand to be an immedi­
ate, pressing national security concern, but rather a possible long-term problem //"Bei­
jing’s regional policy shifts away from the present cooperative approach toward a more 
self-interested, unilateral policy in Southeast Asia. Until such a shift occurs, Bangkok 
appears content to pursue the traditional Thai strategy of maximizing maneuvering room 
in Thai-Chinese relations through pursuing close relations with both China and the 
United States — a modem version of the famous “bamboo diplomacy” initially under­
taken by King Mongkut (Rama IV) in response to the threat posed by European and 
American imperialism during the Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries. In the final
338 Weatherbee, 38.
339 Goh, 16-17.
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analysis, there is little evidence that China is viewed as a serious threat in Thailand. Thai 
security policy indicates that Bangkok is much more concerned about domestic terrorist 
and secessionist threats in the predominantly Muslim areas of southern Thailand, than 
worried about the rise of Chinese military power.
Singapore
Singapore’s small size, history, and geographic location make national security a 
primary concern. Beginning in 1965 with its traumatic birth through forced separation 
from Malaysia, Singapore became “a very small island state perpetually haunted by its 
sense of vulnerability.”340 Ethnic dimensions increase Singapore’s sense of vulnerability. 
Domestic security has always been the primary focus of Singapore’s ruling ethnic Chi­
nese elite who control political power at the expense of Singapore’s Malay population 
through one-party electoral domination and an authoritarian application of its internal se­
curity act.341 Singapore’s external vulnerability is largely determined by its geographic 
location. Also described as a “Chinese island surrounded by a Muslim sea,” Singapore 
historically has been concerned about its Malay neighbors, especially Malaysia and Indo­
nesia. These two Muslim states have been (and remain) Singapore’s principal external 
threat. Relations between Singapore and Indonesia have historically been strained and 
confrontational, and Indonesia remains a major security concern of Singapore.342 Singa­
340 Hussain Mutalib, “The Socio-Economic Dimensions in Singapore’s Quest for Security and Stability,” 
Pacific Affairs 75, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 39.
341 Weatherbee, 37.
342 In 1968, a crisis in Singapore-Indonesian relations resulted from the October hanging of two Indonesian 
marines found guilty in Singapore of having bombed a bank on the island during the period of Konfrontasi 
(or Confrontation) when Indonesian leader Suharto opposed the establishment of the Federation of Malay­
sia (Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak) with a military and ideological campaign. A second crisis in 
Singapore-Indonesian relations occurred in 1975 during Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor. Singapore 
was the only ASEAN state that did not support Indonesia against a United Nations General Assembly reso­
lution condemning Indonesia’s actions (Singapore abstained rather than vote against the resolution). This
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pore’s relations with Malaysia have also historically been less than cordiale, as Singapore 
traditionally feared being annexed by Malaysia. As such, Singapore possesses the most 
modem and capable armed forces in Southeast Asia.343 China, on the other hand, has 
never been viewed by Singapore’s ruling elite as a primary security threat, but rather 
more as an opportunity.
Singapore, along with Thailand, has historically viewed China as a balancer 
against Vietnamese hegemonic intentions in mainland Southeast Asia. While aware of 
the challenges posed by China, Singapore viewed its special relationship with China as 
essential in limiting Vietnam’s (and thus Moscow’s) influence in the region.344 During 
the Third Indochina War (1978-1991), Singapore supported Thailand’s strategy of form­
ing an unofficial alliance with China in 1979 to resist Vietnamese expansionism in the 
region. In the face of Vietnamese incursions into Thailand, and with Singapore’s insis­
tence, the other ASEAN states closed ranks behind Thailand at the June 1979 ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting (AMM) held in Bali and promised their support in preserving Thai­
land’s independence and territorial integrity.345 However, by the March 1980 bilateral 
summit between Indonesia and Malaysia held in Kuantan, Malaysia, ASEAN consensus 
on Vietnam broke down. Malaysia and Indonesia, concerned about great power implica­
tions of conflict with Vietnam, put forth the so-called “Kuantan Principle” which op­
posed the Thai-Singapore led strategy of using Chinese military power to force the Viet­
namese out of Cambodia. The two Muslim countries proposed allowing Vietnam a po­
angered Suharto and caused another period of strained relations between the two countries. For a good his­




345 Weatherbee argues that ASEAN’s collective political action linking Thailand’s national security to that 
of the other ASEAN states during Hanoi’s December 1978 military incursion into Cambodia “verged on 
collective defense.” Weatherbee, 77-78.
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litical sphere of interest in Cambodia in exchange for a peaceful Thai-Cambodian border. 
ASEAN solidarity thus collapsed, increasing tensions between Singapore and its two 
Muslim neighbors.346
In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the end of the Cold War, and the 
1992 American military withdrawal from the Philippines, however, Singapore (and some 
other ASEAN states) increasingly feared that China or Japan might fill the ‘power vac­
uum’ left in the region by the disengaging external powers. China’s rising power, there­
fore, became one of the most critical issues facing the ASEAN states at the end of the 
Cold War.347 Since the early 1990s, Singapore has taken a leading role among the 
ASEAN states in promoting the economic and political engagement of China in order to 
socialize and manage China’s rise by integrating the PRC into the regional and interna­
tional economy and society. In addition, Singapore also led the drive to intensify 
ASEAN’s external dialogues in political and security issues via the ASEAN Post- 
Ministerial Conference (PMC).348 The 1992 annual meeting of the ASEAN foreign min­
isters, held in Manila, was followed by the PMC where initial discussions on regional se­
curity were held on a serial rather than multilateral basis. Due to the American military 
withdrawal from the Philippines, as well as the South China Sea disputes, the ASEAN 
states decided to establish a new multilateral security dialogue in the region that would 
include non-ASEAN PMC members. The inaugural ASEAN-PMC Senior Officials 
Meeting (SOM) was hosted in May 1993 by Singapore and became a permanent feature
346 A good overview of the causes and diplomacy of the Third Indochina War is Nayan Chanda, Brother 
Enemy: The War After the War (New York: Macmillan, 1986), and Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizee, and 
Sorpong Peou, Cambodia - The 1989 Paris Peace Conference: Background Analysis and Documents 
(Kraus Intl., 1991).
347 Emmers, 112.
348 The Singapore Declaration o f1992. ASEAN Secretariat, 1992.
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in intra-ASEAN relations as well as ASEAN’s relations with the seven dialogue partners. 
At that year’s SOM, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Wong Kan Seng played a key role in 
laying the groundwork for the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 
1993. Keen on establishing a multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific which 
would secure a continuing American involvement in the Asia-Pacific and address China’s 
rising power and influence in the region, but also wary of Washington’s strategy of con­
taining China, Singapore’s security policy regarding China is based on a strategy of en­
gaging both china and the United States instead of pursuing traditional balancing or 
bandwagoning strategies predicted by Realist theory.
At present, Singapore seems satisfied with the perceived success of the engage­
ment strategy on Chinese behavior and therefore is less concerned about any possible di­
rect or indirect Chinese threat. After 9/11, however, with the discovery of Southeast 
Asian networks associated with Al-Qaeda and the 2002 arrests in Singapore of members 
of the Islamic extremist group Jemaah Islamiah (JI), terrorism has become the main secu­
rity concern for Singapore’s leaders. As such, Singapore increasingly worries about 
neighboring Malaysia and Indonesia becoming more “Islamized” and thus representing 
increased security threats to Singapore. According to Goh, Singaporean officials view 
radicalized political Islam as the most “urgent and fundamental threat” facing Singapore 
because the threat arises “not because of what we do, but because of who we are.”349 
This threat has pushed Singapore towards closer security cooperation with the United 
States that, according to Goh, is also indirect hedging against China: “Singapore is now 
maneuvering toward a closer identification of common security interests with the United 
States than before. This is a double-hedge: first against the possibility of fundamentalist
349 Goh, 14.
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Islamic threats from with Southeast Asia; second, in the long term, against the potentially 
destabilizing effects of a stronger China.”350 Actually, Singapore shares common secu­
rity interests with both China and the United States (threat of fundamentalist Islamic ter­
rorist movements, desire for regional peace and stability). As such, a strategy of engage­
ment of both China and the United States makes the most sense for Singapore. The rising 
threat to Singapore is not China but rather the threat of Islamic terrorist groups based in 
neighboring Indonesia and Malaysia. Instead of a “hedging” strategy against China, 
Singapore’s security cooperation with the U.S. is motivated by a desire for security coop­
eration with both Washington and Beijing against Muslim terrorist movements in the re­
gion. Cooperation with both powers in the war on terrorism yields maximum security 
benefits to Singapore. To this end, Singapore allowed a U.S. Navy logistics unit to relo­
cate itself in Singapore after American military facilities in the Philippines were closed in 
1992, and announced in January 1998 that American aircraft carriers would have access 
to the Changi Naval Base after its completion in 2000.351 More recently, Singapore up­
graded its defense relations with the U.S. by signing the Strategic Framework Agreement 
in July 2005,352 and now more than 100 U.S. Navy vessels visit Singapore each year.353
Singapore’s recent security behavior indicates that China is no longer viewed as a 
principal security concern for the island city-state. Rather, the rise of Islamic fundamen­
talism and Islamic-based terrorism is Singapore’s primary security concern considering
350 Goh, 15.
351 Derek da Cunha, Southeast Asia’s Security Dynamics: A Multiplicity o f Approaches amidst Changing 
Geopolitical Circumstances, ISEAS Working Papers, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, July 
1999,18-19.
352 Strategic Framework Agreement between the United States o f American and the Republic o f Singapore 
for a Closer Cooperation Partnership in Defense and Security, International Relations and Security Net­
work, available online at www.isn.ethz.ch (accessed 25 March 2006).
353 Dan Blumenthal, “The Impact of China’s Economic Growth on North and Southeast Asia,” testimony 
before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, published by the American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research (22 July 2005).
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its geographic proximity to Malaysia and Indonesia. China’s worries about Islamic fun­
damentalism and Uyghur separatism in Xinjiang Province and Singapore’s security con­
cerns about its two larger Muslim neighboring states, bring the security policies of Singa­
pore and China toward convergence in that they both regard Islamic movements as grow­
ing threats to their respective national security. As such, given the history of cooperative 
Singapore-China relations against Vietnamese and Soviet influence in Southeast Asia 
during the Cold War, and Singapore’s leading role in formulating ASEAN’s post-Cold 
War engagement of China, it can be concluded that Singapore currently views China 
more as a possible security opportunity than as a security threat.
Indonesia
Indonesia’s recent security policy indicates that Jakarta no longer perceives China 
as a threat to Indonesian national security. In fact, recent diplomatic activity between the 
two countries indicates quite the opposite. During Chinese President Hu Jintao’s June 
2005 visit to Indonesia, China and Indonesia signed a strategic partnership agreement. 
Sino-Indonesian ties were strengthened the following month when Indonesian President 
Yudhoyono traveled to China and signed several economic and security-related agree­
ments, including an agreement for Chinese assistance to develop medium range missiles 
since the Western arms embargoes had grounded Indonesia’s fighter aircraft.354
The recent warming of relations between Jakarta and Beijing reflects quite a sea 
change in Sino-Indonesian relations. During the Cold War, Indonesia perceived the PRC 
as its main external threat due, in part, to Beijing’s association with the failed coup d'etat 
undertaken by the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, or Indonesian Communist Party) in
354 This information is attributed to the Indonesian defense minister. See “China’s Quest for Asia,” 14.
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1965.355 In 1967, Indonesia severed its diplomatic ties with the PRC as Jakarta contin­
ued to view China as the country’s principal security threat.356 This impasse in relations 
continued until July 1985 when China and Indonesia signed an agreement for the resump­
tion of direct but highly regulated bilateral trade to begin in February 1989.357 Sino- 
Indonesian relations improved further in February 1989 when President Suharto and Chi­
nese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen met in Tokyo while both men were attending Em­
peror Hirohito’s funeral. During their talk, Suharto indicated that he was satisfied with 
Qian’s assurances that Beijing would not interfere with Indonesian domestic affairs and 
both men agreed that Sino-Indonesian relations should be normalized.358 Sino- 
Indonesian relations were normalized on 8 August 1990. However, Beijing’s promulga­
tion of the 1992 Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Waters and 
Contiguous Areas, as well as the 1995 Mischief Reef Affair between China and the Phil­
ippines, caused alarm in Jakarta as China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea in­
cluded waters near Indonesia’s Natuna gas fields.359 In response, Indonesia conducted 
military exercises during 1996 in the Natuna area to assert its sovereignty and the De- 
fense and Security Ministry drew up plans for the defense of the Natuna islands.
The fashion by which Indonesia approached the rising territorial dispute with 
China indicates that Jakarta apparently wished to downplay the issue. As host of the an­
nual workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Jakarta under­
standably wished to avoid tarnishing its impartial position as honest broker vis-a-vis the
355 Emmers, 88.
356 Lee, “China’s Relations with ASEAN: Partners in the 21st Century?”, 62.
357 Ibid.
358 Lee, China and the South China Sea Dialogues, 16.
359 The Straits Times, 31 May 1995.
360 The Straits Times, 30 June 1995, and 15 August 1996. Also see Liselotte Odgaard, “ASEAN’s Security 
Concerns About China,” Security Dialogue 34, no. 1 (March 2003): 15.
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territorial disputes issue and China. The official Indonesian statement concerning its ter­
ritorial dispute with China, therefore, was that no sea border problem existed between 
Indonesia and China and that there had never been any problem between Jakarta and Bei­
jing over the Natuna islands. Beijing responded by agreeing that the Natuna islands be­
longed to Indonesia, but added that China was prepared to enter into bilateral discussions 
with Indonesia concerning the issue of the sea border delimitation in the area.361
Just as Sino-Indonesian relations are improving, it seems that U.S.-Indonesian re­
lations are becoming increasingly strained. After the fall of Sukarno in 1966 and under 
Suharto’s rule, Indonesia froze relations with the PRC and replaced the USSR with the 
United States as the country’s major defense supplier.362 Relations between Jakarta and 
Washington continued to improve in the 1970s as illustrated by the U.S. support of Indo­
nesia’s 1975 annexation of Portuguese Timor in reaction to the proclamation of the De­
mocratic Republic of East Timor (DRET) by the communist Revolutionary Front for an 
Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) supported by Beijing and Hanoi. However, rela­
tions between Indonesia and the U.S. began to worsen after the economic crash of 1997 
and the political upheavals of the post-Suharto era. After the fall of Suharto’s authoritar­
ian government in May 1998, the three successive governments of B. J. Habibie, Abdur­
rahman Wahid, and Megawati Sukarnoputri demonstrated marked leadership failure and
361 The Straits Times, 30 June 1995.
362 Weatherbee, 67-68. Also see Emmers, 11-12.
363 President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger met with Suharto in Jakarta in December 1975 and as­
sured the Indonesian president that the U.S. would not interfere in spite of the fact that American weapons 
would be used in the invasion breaking American law. See Memorandum of Conversation between Presi­
dents Ford and Suharto, 5 July 1975, 12:40 p.m. - 2:00p.m., Gerald R. Ford Library, National Security 
Adviser Memoranda of Conversations, box 13, July 5 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Indonesian President Su­
harto; The Secretary's 8:00 a.m. Staff Meeting, Tuesday, August 12, 1975, Secret [excerpt], with cover 
memorandum on highlights o f meeting attached, National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State 
Records, Transcripts of Staff Meetings of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 1973-77, box 8, available 
online at http://www.gwu.edU/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/#docs.
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reflected a “pervasive culture of corruption.”364 In the post-9/11 world, Indonesia’s rela­
tionship with the U.S. continues to be strained. Even though Jakarta supports the U.S. 
war against terrorism in a limited fashion, and must confront domestically the challenge 
of separatist and Islamic extremist groups such as Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI), the Indonesian 
government finds itself facing rising popular anger against the American war in Iraq and 
has responded by denouncing American policy while at the same time attempting to 
avoid an open breach with Washington. Jakarta’s brutal 2003 military campaign against 
the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, or “Free Aceh Movement”) and subsequent criticism 
from Western human rights groups and national governments, resulted in worsening rela­
tions with the U.S. as Jakarta’s actions reflect disdain for Washington’s human rights 
campaign which is viewed as a violation of Indonesian sovereignty. Recently, Washing­
ton’s anti-terrorism campaign was received with distrust in Indonesia. The U.S. focus on 
preemption and regime change has become a point of significant concern among the In­
donesian public, 74% of whom worry that the United States could become a military 
threat to their country. These concerns were illustrated in 2003 when Indonesian Vice- 
President Hamzah Haz stated “who is the real terrorist? Well, it’s America . . .  In fact, 
the US is the King of terrorists because of its war crimes in Iraq. The US condemns ter- 
rorists but itself carries out terror acts on Iraq.” Nonetheless, Indonesia continues to 
favor an American military presence in the region to balance China. As such, Jakarta 
pursues a policy of modest militarily cooperation with the U.S. including limited transit, 
refueling, and visiting rights, as well as joint training and intelligence sharing. Con­
cerning the rise of Chinese military power and Indonesian national security, it is clear
364 Weatherbee, 30.
365 Mark Barker, “Southeast Asia turns on Bush,” The Age, 20 March 2004.
366 Odgaard, 20.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
217
that Jakarta does not perceive any pressing need to seek closer military relations with the 
United States — China is not viewed as a rising threat by Indonesia. Rather, it appears 
that Jakarta increasingly views the United States as a rising threat and China as an eco­
nomic opportunity and a balance to American militant unilateralism.
Malaysia
Malaysian security policy of the last decade indicates that Kuala Lumpur does not 
perceive the rise of Chinese military power as constituting a growing national security 
concern, even though a final resolution of the mutual territorial dispute in the Spratlys has 
yet to be concluded. Of all the ASEAN states, Malaysia comes the closest in pursuing a 
bandwagoning strategy vis-a-vis China, although Kuala Lumpur’s limited military coop­
eration with the United States is viewed by some as a balancing strategy directed at 
China. If this behavior represents balancing against China, it is extremely modest in 
scope. It seems more reasonable to interpret Kuala Lumpur’s most limited military coop­
eration with the U.S. in the same light as that of Hanoi’s tentative relationship with 
Washington — as a means of leveraging increased economic and foreign aid benefits from 
China intended by Beijing to limit Malaysia’s relationship with the United States. After 
all, Sino-Malaysian relations are less problematic than China’s relations with the other 
states in the region, and therefore there is little perception in Kuala Lumpur of a rising 
Chinese threat.
Malaysia was the first Southeast Asian country to establish relations with the 
People’s Republic of China in May 1974.367 However, during the Cold War Malaysia 
viewed China with suspicion and as a potential threat. Beijing’s aggressive actions in the
367 See Corrine Phuangkasem, Thailand’s Foreign Relations, 1964-80 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1984).
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Spratlys during the late 1980s, including some brief military clashes with Malaysian na­
val units in mutually contested areas of the archipelago, did cause concern in Kuala 
Lumpur. However, Malaysia’s response was far less confrontational than that of either 
the Philippines or Vietnam. Instead, Kuala Lumpur pursued a path of accommodation 
and maximization of benefits accrued through cooperation with Beijing. During the 
1990s, Malaysia supported Beijing’s position against any internationalization of the 
South China Sea disputes as well as China’s position against any formal code of conduct 
for the South China Sea.368 In January 1995, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir bin 
Mohamad stated “it is high time for us to stop seeing China through the lenses of threat 
and to fully view China as the enormous opportunity that it is.” Since the mid-1990s, 
Malaysia has pursued the “enormous opportunity” presented by China’s growing econ­
omy. In September 2003, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi led a substantial Malaysian delega­
tion to China to demonstrate that Malaysia — not Thailand — was China’s natural partner 
in Southeast Asia. Then, following Mahathir’s replacement as Prime Minister by Abdul­
lah in October 2003, Kuala Lumpur’s support of the PRC “as a stabilizing force in the 
region” has been articulated frequently. During 2004, a series of bilateral events cele­
brated the thirtieth anniversary of Sino-Malaysian diplomatic relations and served to 
highlight indirectly the success of Beijing’s GND.
There exists little evidence that Malaysia seeks to balance China with American 
strategic power in spite of increased military and economic relations with the United
368 At the inform Manila Summit of November 1999 Malaysia dissented from the Philippine version of a 
code of conduct also supported by Vietnam proposing joint development of the Spratly Islands. Later, dur­
ing the July 2002 AMM Meeting held in Brunei, Malaysia proposed a non-binding declaration for the 
Spratly Islands which moved much closer to the Chinese proposal, which was not approved. Finally, Ma­
laysia’s efforts toward a declaration of conduct for the South China Sea were realized in 2002 at the 8th 
ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh. See Emmers, 140-142.
369 New Straits Times, 21 January 1995.
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States as the level of military and economic cooperation between Malaysia and the U.S. 
is much too low to constitute any real balancing behavior against the PRC. Since 1984, 
the Royal Malaysian Navy has conducted annual joint exercises with the U.S. Navy, and 
since 1992 has been prepared to offer the U.S. Navy access to Malaysian facilities.370 
Malaysia’s support of ASEAN’s 1992 call for continued U.S. strategic presence in the 
region and its low-key military cooperation with the U.S. military during the 1990s illus­
trate Kuala Lumpur’s view that American military power remains vital for regional sta­
bility. However, this position should not be mistaken for Malaysian acceptance of 
American perceptions of a rising China threat. Even in the post-9/11 era, with the atten­
dant strengthening of U.S.-Malaysian relations in response to international terrorism,
-3 <71
Kuala Lumpur continues to reject Washington’s China threat thesis. Instead, Malaysia 
appears to be seeking “a modus vivendi with China” which will maximize Malaysian 
economic and political gains earned through cooperation with Beijing on important is­
sues.372 Kuala Lumpur’s limited military cooperation with the United States must, there­
fore, be seen more as a strategy aimed at extracting maximum benefits from Malaysia’s 
relations with China and less as a balancing strategy against the PRC.
CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis of the empirical evidence presented in this chapter clearly indicates 
that the majority of the ASEAN states do not view China as a rising threat in Southeast 
Asia despite China’s increasing economic and military power. Beijing’s GND is clearly
370 Emmers, 150-151.
371 Malaysia has cooperated with the U.S. in the war against al Qaeda in Southeast Asia, but only to the 
extent that by doing so Kuala Lumpur can also utilize American help in its domestic battle against the fun­
damentalist Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS), which has ties with al Qaeda. Weatherbee, 34.
372 Odgaard, 14-15.
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succeeding in dispelling the China threat thesis in Southeast Asia. The primary data set 
obtained from our content analysis of regional newspaper articles clearly indicates that 
informed public opinion among most ASEAN states increasingly views China as being 
less likely to initiate the use of force in the South China Sea to solidify Beijing’s territo­
rial claims. For most regional journalists then, traditional Cold War views of China as an 
enemy or threat (as measured by the case of the South China Sea disputes) have greatly 
diminished as a new image of China as a cooperative “good neighbor” has steadily inten­
sified in Southeast Asia. This positive trend is most pronounced in the Philippines and 
Vietnam — the two “frontline” ASEAN states historically the most suspicious of Chinese 
intentions concerning the disputed territories in the South China Sea. This is undoubtedly 
due in part to the fact that both states held such hostile and threatening images of China 
as an aggressive and violent actor regarding the disputes, and as such any improvement at 
all in their perception of China would appear significant. However, the counter-argument 
is that long-held views and opinions are most difficult to change. Any positive change in 
China’s image in these most “difficult” tests of Beijing’s GND are, therefore, quite sig­
nificant. Much more so than any change observed in states historically more neutral in 
their security perceptions of China — Thailand, or perhaps Singapore, for example. Neu­
tral images and perceptions are more easily influenced towards change than negative im­
ages which have, over time, become institutionalized. In other words, it should be easier 
for journalists in Thailand to believe that Beijing’s behavior and policy concerning the 
disputes has actually changed in a constitutive rather than an instrumental fashion than it 
should be for Filipino or Vietnamese journalists who would naturally be more cautious 
and less trusting of Chinese motivations.
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Our analysis of the primary data set indicates that China’s image in the Philip­
pines and Vietnam has indeed changed from that of a hostile, aggressive “enemy” toward 
a less hostile, more cooperative image as a “partner” or “good neighbor.” This is indeed 
remarkable, considering that the territorial disputes between China and the two ASEAN 
states are yet still unresolved, and both Vietnam and the Philippines experienced in­
stances of armed conflict or hostile interaction with Chinese military forces in the not- 
too-distant past (Vietnam, of course, has the longest history of conflict with China). Nei­
ther state has significantly increased spending to strengthen its armed forces since the 
mid-1990s, nor has either pursued any significant balancing strategy against China. In­
stead, both Manila and Hanoi have undertaken strategies of deepening relations with the 
PRC. This fact also holds true for most ASEAN states in spite of American warnings of 
a rising China threat. This trend is likely to continue during the near-to-mid future, bar­
ing any unforeseen events such as an increase in cross-strait tensions between China and 
Taiwan, or between Beijing and Washington. Any destabilizing moves undertaken by 
Beijing would bring into question China’s “good neighbor” image held by most ASEAN 
states.
An analysis of the data obtained from public opinion polls and surveys conducted 
in Southeast Asia (and beyond the region as well) concerning China’s image as a rising 
economic and military power also support this study’s assertion that views and percep­
tions of China as a “threat” have decreased considerably since the mid-1990s. Perhaps 
the most striking example is the contrast between 1995 and 2005 Filipino threat percep­
tions of China. The 1995 Social Weather Stations Survey data indicated that China’s im­
age in the Philippines during the Mischief Reef incident was one of threat. Understanda­
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bly so. At the time, a weak and unprepared Manila found itself in an untenable position 
as it faced the superior military power of the PRC alone, without an united ASEAN re­
sponse or the possibility of direct American military assistance. However, according to 
the results of the U.S. State Department’s 2005 public opinion survey, Asian Views o f 
China, China’s national image in the Philippines is much less threatening than it was a 
mere decade ago. In fact, Filipinos now are substantially more concerned about Ameri­
can unilateral use of force as a threat to world peace in the next five years than the rise of 
Chinese military power (Figure 17). This metric holds true for the other ASEAN states 
analyzed in our study as well.
Data obtained through an analysis of recent security policies of our six ASEAN 
states towards China also support the assertion that threat perceptions of China in South­
east Asia continue to decrease. Certainly since 9/11, domestic terrorist and separatist 
threats remain the principal national security threats for most ASEAN States. As such, 
the security behavior and defense expenditures of most Southeast Asian countries since 
then have been focused on strengthening counterinsurgency capabilities and strategies — 
not on defending themselves against the possible emergence of an hegemonic China. 
Clearly, Washington’s pessimistic view of a rising Chinese threat, founded largely upon 
Realist analysis, is not shared by most ASEAN states. The data support this conclusion. 
Defense spending of the ASEAN countries during the 1990s has, for the most part, re­
mained either relatively constant or decreased in spite of several periods during the sec­
ond half of the decade of heightened tensions over the Spratlys. This observation is most 
salient for Vietnam and the Philippines, the two ASEAN states which traditionally held 
the strongest threat perceptions of China due to their territorial disputes with China in the
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South China Sea. If Hanoi and Manila viewed the rise of Chinese economic and military 
power as a threat, one would hardly expect a decrease in defense spending. The security 
behavior of both states toward China also indicates that they no longer perceive China as 
constituting a serious national security threat as neither country has followed an outright 
strategic balancing strategy against China nor have they opted to bandwagon with China. 
The very fact that Hanoi and Manila have not felt the necessity of choosing either option 
indicates that they have a much more benign view of China’s rise than does the United 
States. In other words, they do not feel compelled to balance with the United States 
against China’s rise because neither Vietnam or the Philippines currently perceive China 
as a serious security threat. Rather, China is increasingly viewed as an economic oppor­
tunity and as a cooperative good neighbor by both Asian states. The security behavior of 
the other ASEAN states also indicates that threat perceptions of China in the region have 
decreased significantly while, at the same time, regional perceptions of the U.S. have be­
come more reserved. The Bush administration’s unilateral use of force and apparent dis­
regard for multilateralism has raised concerns in the region about an American threat to 
world peace and thereby makes it easier for Beijing to promote China as a peaceful, co­
operative good neighbor in Southeast Asia.




Unfortunately, there is no single conceptual metamodel sufficient to describe the 
evolving Asian system; one size does not fit all. Analysts and policymakers 
therefore need to employ multiple analytical tools and policy instruments to 
effectively understand and navigate the Asian region in the coming years. Realist 
theory seems particularly incapable of explaining such a complex and dynamic 
environment, and it thus tends to offer oversimplified (and sometimes dangerous) 
policy prescriptions. Nor does liberal institutionalism fully suffice as an analytic 
paradigm. There are phenomena in Asia today that neither realist nor liberal 
international relations theory is able to capture, thus requiring deep grounding in 
area studies to be comprehended.
— David Shambaugh, 2005 —
It is clear that the ASEAN states no longer believe it likely that China will con­
tinue to use force and divisive diplomacy in support of its territorial claims in the South 
China Sea, as was the case during and shortly following the end of the Cold War. Even 
though a conclusive settlement of the South China Sea disputes has yet to be realized, and 
Beijing continues to modernize China’s military and increase the power projection capa­
bilities of its navy and air force in the South China Sea, the ASEAN states no longer be­
lieve military conflict over the disputed territories with China likely. This is true for 
ASEAN as a group, as well for the two “frontline” ASEAN states confronting China’s 
territorial claims in the Paracels and Spratlys highlighted earlier, Vietnam and the Philip­
pines. Considering the history of conflict and hostility between China and Vietnam gen­
erated by conflicting territorial claims over the Paracel and Spratly islands (as well as the 
enmity between Beijing and Hanoi regarding the Cambodian question), it is surprising 
that Sino-Vietnamese relations have improved and deepened to the point that mutual dis­
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putes over the land border and the contested maritime boundary in the Tonkin Gulf are 
resolved, and that Hanoi agreed in 2005 to participate in joint development of hydrocar­
bon resources in the disputed Spratly islands (the Tripartite Agreement between China, 
the Philippines, and Vietnam). Surprising, that is, unless Vietnamese threat perceptions 
of China have decreased and Hanoi no longer views it neighbor to the north as an “en­
emy,” but rather as a cooperative “partner” and potential “friend.” Only then, does it 
seem possible that Hanoi would take the risk of weakening Vietnam’s territorial claim in 
the Spratlys by a de facto recognition and acceptance of Chinese territorial interests in the 
archipelago implicit in Vietnam’s accession to the 2005 Tripartite Agreement.
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS HYPOTHESES
The empirical evidence presented in Chapter Four supports the main arguments 
and hypotheses of this case study. Clearly, social learning (both “simple” and “com­
plex”) between China and the ASEAN states has affected an evolution of Beijing’s GND 
toward a more holistic approach to the disputes which places greater emphasis on coop­
eration and common or mutual benefit than during the initial post-Cold War period.
The evidence presented also supports our second hypothesis that the positive change in 
Beijing’s GND has affected a positive change in ASEAN threat perceptions of China as 
well as the style and orientation of their China policies. In other words, the evidence 
supports the argument for our two hypothesized causal relationships: one between social 
learning and a reorientation in Beijing’s GND, the other between the reorientation of Bei­
jing’s GND and a change in ASEAN perceptions of China and their China policies (Fig­
ure 4).
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The empirical evidence also supports the hypothesis that Chinese actions viewed 
as incongruent with Beijing’s promoted “good neighbor” image will cause ASEAN per­
ceptions to become more suspicious of China. That is, besides leading toward identity 
convergence (collective or shared identity), social learning can also at times lead to a di­
vergence of identities and an increase in mutual suspicion. As Wendt argues, identity 
formation is a constant, ongoing process which has no end point. Therefore it follows that 
role-identities between actors are also constantly being socially constructed and recon­
structed (usually reconstituted, as culture is “sticky” and resistant to change). As such, 
China’s traditional “Cold War” identity was reinforced during the late 1990s by Beijing’s 
assertive policy of granting offshore oil exploration contracts in contested areas of the 
South China Sea to foreign energy companies. Although Beijing’s actions appear to have 
been taken in response to Hanoi’s leasing of concession areas to foreign oil companies in 
disputed waters, China’s actions served to reaffirm (reconstruct) the “enemy-enemy” or 
“rival-rival” role-identities shared between China and the Philippines, and between China 
and Vietnam.
Our content analysis clearly indicates that threat perceptions of China specific to 
the territorial disputes decreased following Beijing’s ratification of the 2002 Declaration 
of Conduct in the South China Sea and accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in 2003. In all six of our selected ASEAN states, “favorable” images of 
China increased while “unfavorable” images decreased (Figures 6, 10-13). And since 
images of China coded as “favorable” in our content analysis represent ASEAN percep­
tions congruent with those associated with China’s “post-Cold War” identity (coopera­
tive, non-threatening, seeking mutual benefit), and “unfavorable” images reflect percep­
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tions attributed with China’s traditional “Cold War” identity (confrontational, threaten­
ing, pursuing egoistic, zero-sum, self-help policy), there is a direct correlation between 
“favorable” images and perceptions of China as a “good neighbor.” Therefore, the trend 
of increasing “favorable” images and decreasing “unfavorable” images of China observed 
in our study reflect and evidence a weakening of China’s traditional “Cold War” identity 
and a corresponding strengthening of China’s new “post-Cold War” identity in Southeast 
Asia.
The observed positive change in perceptions of China concerning the territorial 
disputes is most pronounced in the Philippines and in Vietnam, the two “frontline” dispu­
tant ASEAN states, and less so in Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. More importantly, 
all six ASEAN states indicate a correlation between the reorientation in Beijing’s GND 
(increasing acceptance of ASEAN norms) and the positive transformation of China’s re­
gional image observed in our study. This correlation is clearly exemplified by the data 
points for 2002 -  2006. For 2002, the year Beijing signed the ASEAN Declaration of 
Conduct in the South China Sea; the frequency of “unfavorable” images of China in all 
six states either decreased dramatically or remained low, while the frequency of “favor­
able” images increased.
The regional public opinion polls and survey data concerning China’s image sup­
port the findings of our case-specific content analysis. In Southeast Asia, traditional 
threat perceptions of China (as an “enemy,” “territorial aggressor,” or “dangerous rival”) 
have dramatically decreased as perceptions of China as a responsible, cooperative “part­
ner” or “friend” (“good neighbor”) intensify. The Philippines provides the strongest sup­
porting evidence of a positive change in China’s national image among the region’s pub-
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lies for two reasons. First, the 1995 Social Weather Stations Survey is the only public 
opinion study conducted in Southeast Asia concerning China. As such, the Survey repre­
sents the sole source of polling data for the mid-1990s available to our analysis. There­
fore, public opinion data for the Philippines concerning China’s image allows for two 
chronological points of comparison, 1995 and 2005, while corresponding opinion data for 
the other ASEAN states is only available since 2005. Second, public opinion in the Phil­
ippines is historically the most pro-American of all the ASEAN publics, and therefore 
any measurable change in Filipino perceptions of China (and of the U.S., for that matter) 
are more significant than those of other regional publics traditionally sympathetic and 
biased in favor of China (Malaysia).
Global public opinion polls and surveys conducted during 2004 -  2006 also con­
firm the results of both our case-specific content analysis and the regional surveys men­
tioned above. Global public opinion generally views China in positive terms. The 2004 
BBC World Service Poll of 22 Nations revealed that large majorities in key Asian coun­
tries view China’s influence in the world as positive: India (66%), Indonesia (68%), the 
Philippines (70%), and that a majority of Australians (56%) also perceive China in posi­
tive terms. Interestingly, the 2004 Poll also concluded that individuals with lower levels 
of education are less apt to view China positively (45%) than those with medium or 
higher levels of education (51% and 52% respectively), and that young people worldwide 
generally have more benign views of China than do older people.373 China is perceived 
as a cooperative and responsible member of the international community, Chinese eco­
nomic and military power are mostly viewed in more benign and less threatening terms
373 Among young people polled (between 18 and 29 years old), 58% had a positive view of China, while 
only 43% of those over 60 years in age shared the same opinion of China. BBC World Service 22 Nation 
Poll (2004).
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than they are among the American public, where the “China threat” thesis remains rela­
tively strong. Gallup polls conducted in 2004,2005, and 2006 concerning China reveal 
that the American public views China in less positive and more cautious terms than do 
most other publics. Apparently, China’s traditional “Cold War” image remains strong in 
the U.S. where China’s “post-Cold War” image has yet to be accepted. Although Sino- 
American relations fall outside the purview of this study, I believe that the current role- 
identity shared between China and the U.S. (“rival-rival”) reflects a different “logic of 
anarchy” (Hobbesian-Lockean) than that underwriting Sino-ASEAN relations (Lockean- 
Kantian). Studies are needed in this area.
China Policies of the ASEAN States
From our analysis of the China policies of six ASEAN states there is little indica­
tion in Southeast Asia today that China is perceived to be a military and economic threat 
as was the case throughout the Cold War and into the 1990s. Instead, the China policies 
of ASEAN and member states indicate that China is increasingly viewed as an economic 
and security partner as the rapidly expanding economic and political relations between 
China and ASEAN attest. As such, ASEAN’s enthusiastic support and concerted effort 
toward a further deepening of Sino-ASEAN relations must not be seen as a “hedging” 
strategy, but rather as a policy of “beneficial accommodation” to the rise of Chinese 
power. The current China policy of ASEAN is formulated in terms of confidence and 
trust in China as a cooperative and peaceful “good neighbor” with whom relations are 
based upon mutual benefit, rather than in Realist terms of balance o f power and self-help. 
The ASEAN states have “learned” through interaction with Beijing over time that both 
parties view regional and global stability as the essential condition for continued eco-
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nomic development of their respective countries. Both sides have also learned that they 
increasingly view national security in economic rather than military terms, and therefore 
view regional instability as the greatest security threat. And both sides have learned from 
one another that they view current U.S. foreign policy (“War on Terror”) as an increasing 
threat to regional and global stability. As such, American foreign policy is indirectly re­
sponsible, to some extent, for both the positive change of China’s national image in 
Southeast Asia as well as the strengthening of ASEAN’s policy of “beneficial accommo­
dation” with China. In short, the success of Beijing’s GND in Southeast Asia is due in 
part to decreasing regional confidence and trust in the U.S. as the guarantor of regional 
security and as the leading economic power in the Asia-Pacific.
While the influence of American foreign policy in Southeast Asia falls outside the 
purview of our case study, it seems reasonable to assume that American foreign policy 
failures in U.S.-ASEAN relations indirectly helped lead to the significant success of Bei­
jing’s GND in the region. Since 1991, Washington’s inattention and neglect of U.S. rela­
tions with the ASEAN states (until recently) seriously damaged the credibility of Ameri­
can leadership in the region. In fact, as early as the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, many 
ASEAN states began to question Washington’s commitment to the continuance of Amer­
ica’s leadership role in Southeast Asia. Washington’s insensitive and weak reaction to 
the Crisis indicated to many that the U.S. was at best indifferent to the economic plight of 
the ASEAN states, and at worst pursuing narrow self-interest to the detriment of the 
ASEAN economies. Since the turn of the 21st Century, Washington’s continued reliance 
on bilateral trade relations with the ASEAN states and avoidance of trade agreements 
with ASEAN as a group contrasts starkly with the 2002 China-ASEAN commitment and
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ongoing negotiations to create the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) by 2010. 
This situation only serves to strengthen ASEAN perceptions of China as a cooperative 
“good neighbor” and the U.S. as a state cooperating only in terms of its own self interest. 
Remarks made by Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi during his Sep­
tember 2005 address of the Asia Society in New York serve to illustrate this point.
Ladies and gentlemen,
Although the ASEAN-U. S. dialogue relations is 28 years old this year, I feel this 
partnership still suffers a considerable problem with expectations which do not 
match. ASEAN expects the United States to be an important strategic economic 
and development partner as much as it is an important diplomatic partner. The 
United States, on the other hand, gives a higher priority to ASEAN as a strategic 
partner for political and regional security purposes.. . .  Clearly, both sides need to 
work hard to erase the lingering perception that, in the dialogue process, the 
agenda is conditioned more by the United States’ interests rather than those, 
which bring true mutual benefits [emphasis mine] to both sides. To change the 
situation, all efforts must be made to put more economic substance into the 
relations between ASEAN as a group and the United States as a dialogue partner 
[all emphases mine].374
Following 9/11, regional perceptions of U.S. foreign policy have become increas­
ingly negative as the Bush Administration is viewed to be myopically focused on the 
“War on Terror” and thus unaware (or unconcerned) of ASEAN interests and concerns. 
President Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 2003 worsened regional perceptions of American 
foreign policy. Increasingly in Southeast Asia (and in much of the world) the U.S. is 
seen as a force of instability, while China’s image as a source of regional and global sta­
bility correspondingly strengthens. Recent regional and global public polling and survey
374 The Honorable Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, “Creating a Better Understanding of ASEAN -  United States 
Relations,” formal address of the Asia Society meeting, New York, 15 September 2005. http://www.asia 
society. org/speeches/badawi05.html (accessed 3 February 2007).
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data strongly support these perceptions.375 From an ASEAN point of view, if the U.S. is 
unwilling or unable to continue to provide cogent leadership in the Asia-Pacific and Bei­
jing appears willing and ready to do so, then the Asian countries will increasingly look to 
China to play a growing leadership role in Asia. Studies are needed to assess the validity 
of this assumed causal relation between the decline of American influence and the rise of 
Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.
The transformation of Vietnam’s China policy is most spectacular. Until 1991, 
Hanoi viewed China as an enemy and therefore predicated Vietnamese foreign policy ap­
propriately. This situation changed by 1991 as a consequence of the structural changes 
mentioned earlier. With the resumption of formal diplomatic relations between Vietnam 
and China in 1991, a reorientation of Vietnam’s China policy began -  Hanoi’s “enmesh- 
ment” strategy. As Sino-Vietnamese political and economic relations improved, talks 
between Hanoi and Beijing concerning the disputed land border and maritime boundary 
in the Tonkin Gulf eventually led to a resolution of both disputes. In addition, normal 
mail and transportation links between the two socialist countries were resumed, as well as 
cross-border trade and human transit. The only remaining thorn of contention in improv­
ing Sino-Vietnamese relations was the South China Sea disputes. Hanoi’s early attempt 
to build a united ASEAN position vis-a-vis China and the South Sea disputes resulted in 
failure. However, as the role-identity between China and Vietnam transformed over time 
from “enemy-enemy” to “competitor-competitor” or (“partner-partner”) as a result of in-
375 The recent GlobeScan/PIPA public opinion survey of the global view of the United State’s role in world 
affairs conducted for the BBC World Service (November 2002 -  January 2007) indicates that over two- 
thirds (68%) polled believe that the American military presence in the Middle East causes more conflict 
than in prevents and only 17% of those polled view U.S. troops there as a stabilizing force. From the 25 
countries polled, 18 view the U.S. as having a mainly negative influence, five view the U.S. as having a 
mostly positive influence, while 2 views are evenly divided. Significant to our study, the Philippines is tied 
with Nigeria for the highest positive view of the U.S. global role (72% each), while Indonesia has the sec­
ond highest negative view (Germany the highest at 74%) of the united States’ role in world affairs.
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teraction and social learning, a virtual resolution of the outstanding territorial dispute be­
tween China and Vietnam in the Spratlys became possible in 2005.
The recent rapprochement in China-Philippines relations concerning the disputed 
territories in the South China Sea is also surprising given the history of tension and con­
flict in the dispute. Of all ASEAN states, the Philippines was the loudest critic and most 
outspoken opponent of China vis-a-vis the territorial disputes — even to the extent that 
Manila was willing to forsake one of ASEAN’s fundamental norms (lessening and resist­
ing the influence of external powers in the region) during the 1995 Mischief Reef Crisis 
by calling for the internationalization of the dispute with China. However, Manila’s 
critical and confrontational policy vis-a-vis China and the South China Sea disputes had 
by 2003 transformed into a more optimistic policy favoring increased economic and po­
litical cooperation. As we have seen, by 2005 threat perceptions of China in the Philip­
pines had decreased to the point that a “virtual” bilateral solution of the Spratlys dispute 
became possible. In effect, Manila “learned” that China no longer represented a serious 
threat to the territorial integrity of the Philippines. Manila learned to see China as a re­
sponsible and cooperative “good neighbor,” as well as an economic opportunity for the 
Philippines.
SOCIAL LEARNING AND A REORIENTATION IN BEIJING’S GND
It is clear that traditional threat perceptions of China in Southeast Asia associated 
with the South China Sea disputes have decreased appreciably from those held by the 
ASEAN states during the Cold War and the subsequent decade. To be sure, structural 
change such as the demise of the bipolar international system and the resolution of the 
Cambodian crisis in 1991 contributed to the transformation of China’s national image in
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the region from one of threat (“enemy” ) to one of cooperation (“partner” or “friend”). 
This transformation probably could not have occurred without a corresponding restructur­
ing of the international system. Structural change, however, only partially explains the 
remarkable transformation of ASEAN threat perceptions of China and the associated 
rapid improvement in Sino-ASEAN relations in general. Structural change associated 
with the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the 1991 resolu­
tion of the Third Indochina War, lessened foreign policy constraints which historically 
limited the extent of China-ASEAN interaction. With these constraints lifted, increased 
interaction between China and the ASEAN states was possible. As mentioned in earlier 
chapters, Beijing wished to cultivate relations with ASEAN as a means of ending China’s 
post-Tiananmen isolation in the international community, and the ASEAN states were 
anxious to “socialize” China as a means of “shaping” the behavior (and mollifying poten­
tial risks) of this rising economic and military power. Structural change, therefore, facili­
tated the implementation of engagement policies desired by both China and the ASEAN 
states. Social learning, resulting from diplomatic interaction between China and ASEAN, 
is the principle factor responsible for the remarkable improvement and deepening of 
Sino-ASEAN relations witnessed the last decade. Interaction between China and 
ASEAN concerning the South China Sea disputes - the pivotal issue on which the future 
of Sino-ASEAN relations depended - proved crucial in affecting this positive outcome.
As the disputes arguably represented the most difficult issue in China-ASEAN relations 
and the most visible manifestation in the region of a possible “China threat,” the recent 
deepening of Sino-ASEAN relations would not have been possible without a satisfactory 
resolution of the territorial disputes. Therefore, ideational change must also be taken into
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account in reaching a more complete, satisfying understanding and appreciation of Bei­
jing’s evolving GND and its effects on Sino-ASEAN relations.
Success of Beijing’s GND directly related to the transformation of China’s iden­
tity and interests via complex social learning gained through diplomatic interaction with 
ASEAN. During the first period (1989 -  1996), China’s traditional “Cold War” identity 
continued as Beijing’s actions concerning the South China Sea disputes reinforced per­
ceptions in Southeast Asia of a China threat. In 1992, Beijing’s promulgation of China’s 
Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, as well as the deal signed the same 
year with Crestone Energy Corporation for oil exploration in waters contested by China 
and Vietnam, both served to reinforce China’s traditional image in the region. Actions 
taken by Beijing in the Spratlys leading to the 1995 Mischief Reef crisis with the Philip­
pines further intensified perceptions of China as a rising threat. However, beginning in 
1995 -  1996, a reorientation of Beijing’s traditional bilateral approach (Track I diplo­
macy) to the territorial disputes to include multilateral diplomacy could be discerned.
As argued in Chapters 2 and 3, the reorientation of Beijing’s GND toward accep­
tance of multilateral dialogue with ASEAN concerning the disputes resulted as a conse­
quence of social learning affecting change of China’s cogitative base and national iden­
tity (“Cold War” identity -> “post-Cold War” identity). This “learning” occurred as a 
result of bilateral as well as multilateral interaction between China and the ASEAN 
states. As we have seen, by the mid-1990s Beijing learned through bilateral dialogue 
with Vietnam and the Philippines that China would have to address the territorial disputes 
within ASEAN’s multilateral framework as both Hanoi and Manila sought the advantage 
of confronting China as a group, and were therefore unwilling to seriously address the
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disputes at the bilateral level. Concurrently, through participation in multilateral dialogue 
at the annual Indonesian-sponsored Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the 
South China Sea, Beijing learned that China could safely address the disputes within 
ASEAN’s Track I multilateral framework without compromising China’s claim of territo­
rial sovereignty. ASEAN’s consensus-based approach to multilateralism — one of the 
principle norms which comprise the ASEAN Way — would allow Beijing substantial con­
trol over both the pace and the agenda of the talks, while at the same time promote a co­
operative, “good neighbor” image of China by finally acceding to multilateral Track I 
discussion of the disputes. Within the Track II framework of the workshops, the Chinese 
successfully avoided discussion of territorial sovereignty issues (maintaining that this was 
a Track I issue) while promoting an image of China as a cooperative and responsible 
country through increased participation in joint development activities to evaluate the 
natural resources of the South China Sea, ensure maritime safety, and conduct scientific 
research. The Chinese also learned at the Workshops that Beijing’s suggestion for joint 
development of the disputed territories was not well-received because the ASEAN states 
did not yet believe in the veracity of China’s new “good neighbor” image.
Other, less tangible learning also occurred at the Workshops as a result of interac­
tion as the unofficial and informal environment of the multilateral Workshops allowed for 
more interpersonal interaction and discussion among the participants, many of whom 
were high-ranking members of their respective governments in their official capacities. 
Attending the Workshops in their personal capacities allowed for more frank and open 
dialogue among individuals than was possible in their official capacities. As such, the 
unofficial nature of the Workshops provided an environment more conducive to social
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learning than that of Track I multilateral processes such as the ARF and APEC. In effect, 
the annual Workshops facilitated the development of an informal, unofficial “epistemic 
community” constituted by individuals acting in private capacities who are important and 
influential people in their respective official capacities. Social learning which occurred 
as a result of interaction at the Track II Workshops undoubtedly influenced the reorienta­
tion of Beijing’s GND, which subsequently led to tangible results in Chinese Track I bi­
lateral and multilateral diplomacy. The importance and utility of multilateral Track II 
dialogue in facilitating cooperation between China and the ASEAN states may be higher 
than commonly perceived by most Western scholars and policymakers. This point was 
highlighted during a recent conversation with Patrick Lewis, former Antiguan Ambassa­
dor to the United Nations and the United States. Asked whether he shared the conven­
tional Western opinion that the Indonesian-sponsored Workshops were only “talk-shops” 
producing no tangible results and were therefore of little or no utility in dispute resolu­
tion, Lewis gave an interesting answer:
Let me answer your question this way. In the United States and Europe there are 
many psychiatrists and psychologists. In the developing world by comparison, 
there are relatively few. This is because Westerners only feel comfortable dis­
cussing their problems in private with a “specialist,” while in many parts of the 
developing world an individual’s problems are addressed informally by appropri­
ate family members and/or individuals in the community. Solutions to an indi­
vidual’s problems are arrived at through an unofficial, group-oriented process 
rather than the official, personal process favored in the developed countries.376
Diplomatic interaction between China and the ASEAN states concerning the 1995 
Mischief Reef Crisis with the Philippines also led to important social learning for Beijing.
376 Personal discussion with Dr. Patrick Lewis at Hampton University, Hampton Virginia, November 2006.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
238
At the inaugural ASEAN-China SOM in Hangzhou, and the Brunei ARF-SOM and sub­
sequent ARF Meeting in Jakarta, the Chinese learned that Manila’s attempt at interna­
tionalizing the dispute with China over the Spratlys was not warmly received by other 
ASEAN member states which desired to deal with the crisis “in house.” In short, Beijing 
learned that China and ASEAN held in common the norm of regional autonomy and non­
interference — Asian problems should be addressed by Asians. This knowledge impacted 
China’s cognitive base by challenging the traditional view of multilateralism as a “Trojan 
Horse” of American imperialism. Beijing learned that China could discuss the South 
China Sea disputes within ASEAN’s multilateral processes and thereby promote a coop­
erative, “good neighbor” image of China in the region without U.S. interference. 
ASEAN’s style of multilateralism was compatible, therefore, with Chinese interests.
This knowledge led to an important reorientation of Beijing’s GND concerning the South 
China Sea disputes from a traditional bilateral approach to a new approach combining 
bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.
Beijing’s reoriented Track I approach to the territorial disputes became apparent 
at the 1996 ARF Meeting. In response to Ali Alatas’ call for a regional code of conduct, 
Qian Qichen responded indirectly by stating that China was now ready to discuss the 
South China Sea situation with ASEAN as a group, making good Tang’s 1995 promise 
made during the China-ASEAN Hangzhou meeting. However, while committing to mul­
tilateral discussion of the disputes, Beijing also underlined China’s position favoring a 
bilateral resolution of the disputes by concluding a bilateral code of conduct with Manila 
in 1995. Hence, the first overt indications in our case study of a reorientation of Beijing’s 
GND (reflecting the birth of China’s “post-Cold War” identity) manifest themselves
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solely in Beijing’s new Track I multilateral approach, while Beijing’s bilateral diplomacy 
continued to reinforce China’s traditional “Cold War” identity in Southeast Asia. Addi­
tionally, while Beijing’s commitment to discuss the disputes multilaterally with ASEAN 
did have the intended effects of lessening threat perceptions of China and promoting 
China’s “good neighbor” image in the region, it also elevated the South China Sea issue 
to main agenda status in ASEAN Track I dialogue during the second period of our case 
study (1997 -2006). This reality led to increased interaction between China and ASEAN 
(now Track I and Track II venues) concerning the arguably most contentious and difficult 
issue in developing Sino-ASEAN relations.
Over time, “simple” learning led to “complex” learning which in turn caused a 
change in China’s cognitive base and a corresponding reorientation of Beijing’s GND. 
Beijing learned that the “ASEAN Way” of informal, consensus-based multilateral dia­
logue could be instrumentally utilized by China to decrease tensions with Manila, Hanoi, 
and ASEAN concerning the South China Sea disputes. By agreeing to discuss the dis­
putes with ASEAN as a group (1995, China-ASEAN SOM; 1996, ARF SOM and third 
ARF Meeting, second China-ASEAN SOM), Beijing could promote a cooperative “good 
neighbor” image and lessen perceptions of a China threat, while at the same time prevent 
progress toward any substantive multilateral resolution of the disputes (i.e. Beijing refus­
ing to discuss issues of sovereignty). Beijing learned at the Track II Indonesian- 
sponsored Workshops that ASEAN’s informal, consensus-based approach to dispute 
resolution (a constitutive norm) would allowed China to participate in multilateral Track I 
dialogue with ASEAN concerning the disputes without weakening China’s claims of ter­
ritorial sovereignty in the South China Sea.
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During the second period of this study (1997 -  2006), multilateral interaction be­
tween China and the ASEAN states increasingly led to “complex” learning directly re­
sponsible for changing China’s cognitive base (and continuing reorientation of Beijing’s 
GND) to the extent that China’s “schizophrenic” identity — “Cold War” identity in bilat­
eral relations, and emerging “post-Cold War” identity in multilateral relations — was fi­
nally resolved in favor of the later. The “complex” learning during this period mostly 
occurred via multilateral interaction. Most significantly, “complex” learning occurred in 
“Asians-only” venues such as the ASEAN-China Summits (ASEAN Plus One), ASEAN 
Plus Three, and ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences, as opposed to the ARF, where 
membership includes non-Asian states such as the United States and Russia. As dis­
cussed in Chapter 3, within the ASEAN-China Summit framework several important 
agreements pertaining to the territorial disputes were concluded: the 1997 joint statement, 
“ASEAN-China Co-operation Towards the 21st Century” outlining the basic principles 
for expanding China-ASEAN economic, political, and security relations and also reaf­
firming earlier agreements rejecting the use of force to settle territorial disputes; the 2002 
ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea; the establishment 
of the joint China-ASEAN “Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity” and China’s 
accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003. These 
agreements made China the first non-ASEAN state to become a “Strategic Partner” with 
ASEAN and also the first non-ASEAN state to accede to the TAC. By 2003, China es­
sentially became a “virtual” ASEAN member as Beijing had adopted most of the norms 
associated with the ASEAN Way (both regulative and constitutive norms): multilateral­
ism; non-interference; rejection of the use of force to settle territorial disputes; and a con­
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sensus-based, incremental approach to dispute resolution and regional integration. As a 
result, regional threat perceptions of China greatly decreased as China’s “good neighbor” 
image supplanted the China as a “threat” image. In short, China’s “post-Cold War” iden­
tity first revealed itself in Beijing’s multilateral interaction with ASEAN. China’s new 
“post-Cold War” identity only fully manifest itself in Beijing’s bilateral diplomacy with 
the Philippines and Vietnam in 2005 as represented by China’s bilateral-tumed- 
multilateral Tripartite Agreement with Manila and Hanoi. Manila and Hanoi finally ac­
cepted China’s long-standing offer for joint development of disputed territories (Spratlys) 
because they no longer perceived China as an “enemy” or “threat” as they had during the 
1990s. Instead, China became increasingly perceived as being a cooperative “partner” 
and “good neighbor.”
China as a “Virtual” ASEAN Member
Social learning and shared knowledge of “Self’ and “Other” generated by China- 
ASEAN interaction is responsible, to a large extent, for a convergence of interests and 
identity in the relationship. Over time, as social learning affected a change in China’s 
cognitive base and thus a reorientation of Beijing’s GND, China increasingly embraced 
much of ASEAN’s normative framework -  the ASEAN Way -  revealing a convergence 
of Chinese interests and identity with those of the ASEAN states. Beijing learned that 
ASEAN’s informal, consensus-based multilateralism is conducive to Chinese interests in 
the region as it allows China to “cooperate” with ASEAN and member states at her own 
pace and in issue areas mostly of her choosing, thereby promoting a “good neighbor” im­
age and lessening China threat perceptions. Beijing also learned that the ASEAN norm 
of non-intervention (“hard” state sovereignty) coincided with China’s disapproval of the
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U.S. human rights campaign targeting the PRC (Clinton Administration) and Washing­
ton’s more recent doctrine of preemption and regime change (second Bush Administra­
tion). In addition, China learned that ASEAN’s normative position against the use of 
force in settling disputes reflects a shared interest of maintaining regional peace and sta­
bility conducive to economic development -  Deng Xiaoping’s “peace and development” 
strategy. This shared normative position also indicates a convergence of interest between 
China and the ASEAN states in opposition to current U.S. foreign policy which is in­
creasingly viewed in the region as the major source of international conflict and global 
instability. Lastly, Beijing learned that ASEAN’s incremental approach to dispute reso­
lution allows China to “engage” ASEAN and member states concerning issues of conten­
tion in a cooperative but controlled fashion. Cui Tiankai, who heads the Asian affairs 
department in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acknowledged that Beijing’s embrace 
of multilateralism resulted from knowledge gained through interaction with the ASEAN 
states: “It was a gradual learning process for us, as we needed to become more familiar 
with how these organizations worked and to learn how to play the game.”377 In other 
words, Beijing learned that China and the ASEAN states could “agree to disagree” on 
difficult issues while at the same time advance cooperation in other, less contentious is­
sue areas. This normative feature of the ASEAN Way, as we have seen, has been crucial 
in Beijing’s application of the GND to the territorial disputes. As such, Beijing’s increas­
ing adoption of ASEAN’s normative framework indicates a convergence of actor identi­
ties toward a collective “Asian” identity.
377 Quoted in Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 70.
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WIDER POLICY AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF STUDY
GND in Southeast Asia
Interaction between China and the ASEAN states in issue areas outside those of 
our case study during this period (especially trade and economic issues) also produced 
social learning which influenced perceptions of “self’ and “other.” This is where 
Moore’s “economic-security nexus” comes into play. Beijing’s “New Security Concept” 
(NSC) campaign directly linked security and economic issue areas together by essentially 
redefining security more in economic terms than in military. This is significant, consid­
ering that national security for ASEAN states has been and continues to be defined 
mostly in domestic terms due to social unrest caused by widespread economic and politi­
cal inequality. In addition, the numerous independence-separatist movements throughout 
the region also cause national security to be defined in domestic terms. China faces Is­
lamic separatist movements in the western province of Xinjiang, Thailand along its 
southern border with Malaysia (the banned Patani United Liberation Organization, the 
Mujahideen Islam Pattani, and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional), the Philippines in Min­
danao (Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Liberation Front), and Singapore (Jemaah Islamiah). 
Indonesia also faces various independence-separatist movements (Jema ’ah Islamiyah and 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka). As such, along with the authoritarian measures of maintaining 
political power used by many regimes in the region, economic development is seen as 
crucial in maintaining domestic order by mitigating sources of conflict caused by eco­
nomic disparity. Therefore, for China as well as the ASEAN states, national security is 
increasingly defined in domestic and economic terms, rather than in terms of external 
military threat. China’s New Security Concept (NSC) mentioned in Chapter 3 highlights
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the increasing importance of “economic security” in the Twenty-First Century, and Bei­
jing’s GND in Southeast Asia reflects this view well, as economic relations between 
China and ASEAN remain the central focus of Chinese foreign policy.
Beginning with the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Beijing began actively promoting 
the rise of Chinese economic power as an opportunity (not a threat) for the ASEAN states 
to further their own economic recovery and development. Indeed, much China-ASEAN 
interaction has occurred in the area of trade and economic relations, and the resulting so­
cial learning is leading to increased regional economic integration as China is viewed in­
creasingly by ASEAN as an economic “partner” instead of an economic “rival” or 
“threat.” The 2005 agreement to establish the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) 
illustrates positive regional perceptions of China in the economic realm. Beijing’s “Early 
Harvest” program exemplifies China’s commitment to mutual economic benefit in China- 
ASEAN relations. This program grants the less-developed ASEAN countries (Laos, 
Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar) advantageous bilateral trade privileges with China to 
help ease their entrance into the CAFTA. China also provides considerable foreign aid to 
the poorer ASEAN countries in the form of economic and technical assistance. Signifi­
cantly, Chinese foreign aid loans increasingly come with little-to-no strings attached, as 
opposed to foreign aid from the West (World Bank and IMF loans) which comes with 
many unpalatable conditions and stipulations. For example, recipient country must hire 
many western “advisors” and follow their recommendations as to how the funds are util­
ized. Often this “advice” is not in the best interest of developing economies and the 
terms and conditions attached to foreign development aid are seen as Western interfer­
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ence in the domestic affairs of recipient states. As such, Chinese foreign aid is more pal­
atable and provides an alternative to that from the West.
In short, Beijing’s trade and economic-development assistance policies in South­
east Asia have only served to reinforce and iterate China’s “good neighbor” image in the 
region. The success of Beijing‘s GND in facilitating strengthened China-ASEAN eco­
nomic and trade relations and promoting an image of China as an economic “partner” had 
a positive “spill-over” effect on the South China Sea disputes. During the second half of 
the 1990s, as tensions over the disputed Spratlys were increasing yet again, considerable 
progress in China-ASEAN trade and economic relations reinforced China’s “good 
neighbor” image among the ASEAN states and served to refute views of China’s eco­
nomic rise as an economic threat to the regional economies. Thus the resultant strength­
ening of China’s image as a “good neighbor” or “partner” in economic-trade issues 
helped to mollify China threat perceptions among the ASEAN states in security issues -  
especially concerning the territorial disputes. It seems unlikely that Manila and Hanoi 
would have signed the 2005 Tripartite Agreement for joint oil exploration and develop­
ment with China in the contested Spratlys if they still viewed China to be a territorial 
threat and economic rival. Instead, the Tripartite Agreement reveals an increased level of 
confidence in the Philippines and Vietnam that China can be trusted to live up to her 
“good neighbor” image in both economic and security issues.
GND in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond
Several key elements or aspects of Beijing’s current GND in Southeast Asia can 
be discerned in the wider application of Chinese foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific and 
beyond. Beijing’s initial embrace of regional multilateralism in Southeast Asia has ex­
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panded to Northeast Asia as exemplified by the Chinese-sponsored Six-Party Talks, to 
Central Asia in the form of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) established by 
China in June 2001. The SCO is the first regional multilateral cooperative organization 
established in the twenty-first century and represents the first multilateral security organi­
zation in which China has played a leading role from its inception. This is a remarkable 
event in Chinese foreign policy considering that Beijing historically has preferred bilat­
eral rather than multilateral diplomacy. While China’s Southeast Asian multilateral di­
plomacy has argued against the establishment of a formal and institutionalized security 
regime in the Asia-Pacific (multilateral security dialogue and consultation are considered 
sufficient to address states’ security concerns), Beijing surprised the world by doing so 
with former enemies in Northeast and Central Asia. China’s experience of multilateral­
ism in Southeast Asia must have played a major role in Beijing’s 2000 decision to expand 
the scope and institutionalization of the bilateral, informal “Shanghai Five” mechanism 
into the multilateral, formal SCO. Most interesting is the fact that Beijing advocates 
much the same norms for governing relations among SCO members as those advocated 
by ASEAN: mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, joint consultation, respect for cultural 
diversity, and the desire for common development. Further, Beijing intends the SCO to 
constitute a model of cooperation in which large and small powers can collaborate on a 
basis of equality. One mechanism advocated by Beijing for promoting equitable relations 
among SCO member states is consensus building in decision making -  a key ASEAN 
norm! Beijing “learned” from interaction with ASEAN that multilateralism is viable and 
applicable to China’s periphery foreign policy strategy.
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China’s embrace of regional multilateralism in Northeast Asia has also been in the 
area of conflict resolution on the Korean peninsula. Although initially reluctant to get 
involved in the Korean nuclear crisis, and disapproving of the U.S. call for multilateral 
talks, Beijing began to shift its position in favor of a multilateral approach in early 2003. 
In a March 2003 telephone call between President Jiang Zemin and President George 
Bush, Jiang advised that the form of dialogue was not of paramount importance. What 
really mattered was “whether both sides have sincerity, whether the dialogue has substan­
tial content and result.”378 By the second round of the Six-Party Talks held in early 2004, 
Beijing strongly advocated the institutionalization of the talks through establishing a
' I ' l Q
permanent working group and by stationing specialists from all parties in Beijing. Ob­
viously, through interaction with the ASEAN states, Beijing came to realize the merits of 
both informal and formal multilateral dialogue as a means of dealing with difficult issues, 
and also recognize the utility of such an approach to difficult problems in other geo­
graphic regions.
Another aspect of Beijing’s GND in Southeast Asia discemable in China’s wider 
foreign policy is the strategy of mutual benefit and “win-win” scenarios in inter-state re­
lations, so crucially important for China’s “good neighbor” image in Southeast Asia. 
China’s trade, diplomatic, and security relations around the world are now predicated on 
mutual benefit. This is well-illustrated by Beijing’s considerable effort (and success) in 
concluding trade and investment agreements with states worldwide. China has been of­
fering debt relief, low-interest loans, and other incentives to many of the world’s poorest 
countries, in exchange for access to their natural resources so necessary for China’s
378 “Jiang, Bush Talk over Phone on DPRK, Iraq Issues,” Xinhua News Agency, 10 March 2003.
379 “Six-Party Talks Should Become Mechanism: FM Spokeswoman,” People’s Daily, 24 February 2004.
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booming economy. Hu Jintao’s current eight-nation African tour exemplifies China’s 
“win-win” strategy. In his 7 February Pretoria speech, Hu made it clear that “China has 
never imposed its will or unequal practices on other countries and will never do so in the 
future,” and that China would “certainly not do anything harmful to the interests of Af­
rica and its people.” He continued by stressing that China lives in “cooperation and har­
mony among nations and we hold that the strong and the rich should not bully the weak 
and the poor.” While visiting Sudan, Hu offered the government a “no strings attached” 
aid policy which has angered many Western nations who want China to use its economic 
leverage to induce Khartoum to end human rights abuses in the Darfur region. Hu did, 
however, make it clear that China hoped that the Sudanese government would soon im­
plement the peace agreement it had agreed to with the African Union and the United Na­
tions.380 China’s current global strategy of pursuing mutual benefit in economic and dip­
lomatic relations reflects the effect of social learning and shared knowledge on Chinese 
foreign policy gained from Beijing’s earlier diplomatic and economic interaction with the 
ASEAN states. In short, much of China’s current foreign policy is the result of lessons 
learned earlier by Beijing in its regional GND in Southeast Asia.
Theoretical Implications
The findings of this study support the utility and validity of a constructivist ap­
proach in analyzing recent Chinese foreign policy and the meteoric improvement in Sino- 
ASEAN relations since the early 1990s. Neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches fall short 
in explaining the phenomenal change in Sino-ASEAN relations which began during the 
mid-1990s, because of their relatively narrow parameter for explaining change in intema-
38° “Qjjjjg’g Leader Says Investment Will Not Hurt Africa,” New York Times, 7 February 2007.
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tional relations. Neo-realism is the most skeptical of the possibility for peaceful change 
because change is viewed as a consequence of shifts in the balance or distribution of 
power. International institutions are viewed as having only marginal influence on the be­
havior of states as they reflect great power self-interest. Neo-liberalism is somewhat less 
skeptical of the possibility for peaceful change as international institutions are given a 
more influential role in regulating state behavior. In this theoretical paradigm, institu­
tions facilitate cooperation among states by providing information and reducing transac­
tion costs, and by reducing the likelihood of actor defection or cheating. However, neo­
liberalism accepts the basic neo-realist premise that institutions reflect and are affected by 
the distribution of power in the international system, and that they are created by self- 
interested states. As such, institutions only constrain state behavior and do not change 
state interest or identity. Both neo-realism and neo-liberalism take state interest and iden­
tity as a given as they are viewed to be exogenous to the process of state interaction. 
Hence, mainstream IR theory holds that state interaction does not fundamentally alter the 
condition of anarchy.
This narrow focus on the distribution of material power and reliance on a narrow 
“self-help” definition of anarchy handicaps both neo-realism and neo-liberalism in their 
ability to offer any insightful explanation for the precipitous rise of Chinese influence in 
Southeast Asia. The neo-realist approach can not adequately explain why the relatively 
small and weak ASEAN states have neither balanced against or bandwagoned with 
China, as neo-realism predicts. The best neo-realist explanation for ASEAN’s apparently 
aberrant China policy is that ASEAN is pursuing a “hedging” strategy of engaging China 
while at the same time balancing against China through military ties with the U.S. Neo­
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liberal approaches also fall short in explaining the intensity and rapidity of Sino-ASEAN 
rapprochement this past decade or so because of ASEAN’s “weak” form of institutional­
ism. Given that neo-liberalism only grants institutions limited power in regulating the 
behavior of states, ASEAN’s relatively “low” level of institutionalization would logically 
be less able to constrain actor behavior than that of the European Union which represents 
“strong” or “high” level institutionalization. The constructivist approach, on the other 
hand, views power politics as being socially constructed and also sees cooperation among 
states as a social process that can sometimes reorient or transform state interest and iden­
tity. As such, the recent habit of conflict avoidance between China, Vietnam, and the 
Philippines illustrated in our case study can be better explained as a result of interaction, 
socialization, norm formation and identity building, rather than the result of forces ex­
ogenous to these social processes (such as the distribution of power in the international 
system). This is especially important in our case because the rise of Chinese economic 
and military power has apparently not constrained or limited cooperation between China 
and the ASEAN states, or had a detrimental effect on Sino-ASEAN relations. By focus­
ing on the constitutive effects of norms and social learning (shared knowledge), a con­
structivist approach allows interaction and socialization a greater role in regulating state 
behavior than do neo-realism and neo-liberalism, as state interest and identity are viewed 
as being endogenous to social interaction. This approach allows an analysis of Beijing’s 
GND in Southeast Asia that moves beyond the impact of material forces alone. By grant­
ing intersubjective factors such as ideas, culture, and identity a determining rather than a 
secondary role in our analysis of Sino-ASEAN interaction, a more insightful understand­
ing and explanation of China’s rising influence in Southeast Asia is possible. Shambaugh
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concurs: “one reason for the increase in the number of institutions in Asia has been the 
growing acceptance of common norms within the region. Such ideational agreement must 
precede the formation of institutional architecture; but once norms are institutionalized,
'J O  f
they can become binding on member states.”
Our study also supports Wendt’s assertion that anarchy is “what states make of it” 
by illustrating the social processes involved in the reorientation of Beijing’s GND and the 
positive transformation of China’s identity in Southeast Asia, and their cumulative effect 
on Sino-ASEAN relations. Our case study illustrates a change in the “culture of anar­
chy” between China and the ASEAN states, lfom that of a “Hobbesian” or “Lockean” 
culture (actor role-identity of “enemy” or “rival”) toward a “Kantian” culture (actor role- 
identity of “partner” or “friend”). Clearly Vietnam and the Philippines no longer per­
ceive China as an enemy or immanent threat as they did during the Cold War and into the 
1990s. As such, the rise of Chinese economic and military power (material factors) has 
become less of a concern for Hanoi and Manila (and ASEAN as a group) because they no 
longer perceive China as a threat, but rather as a responsible and cooperative “good 
neighbor,” an economic opportunity, and increasingly as a revitalizing force in ASEAN’s 
commitment to establish the ASEAN Community by 2020 (ideational factors). As such, 
the ASEAN states view the rise of China’s economic power both as an incredible oppor­
tunity to accelerate their respective national development and economic growth, and as 
an opportunity to push forward ASEAN economic integration, while they increasingly 
view the rise of Chinese military power in less threatening and more benign terms. 
“Hobbesian” (Realist) culture of anarchy is becoming largely irrelevant in China’s rela-
381 Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 96. Also see Alagappa, Asian Security Order: Instrumental and 
Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), chapter 6 by Amitav Acharya.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
252
tions with ASEAN and member states as the likelihood of military conflict or the out­
break of trade wars between China and the ASEAN states in the foreseeable future is 
minimal.
China’s recent successful test of an anti-satellite weapon system (ASAT) illus­
trates this point. In contrast to Washington’s loud protest against China’s missile test and 
dire warnings of China initiating an “arms race in space,” there was relative quiet in 
Southeast Asia. Among the ASEAN states, Beijing’s demonstrated ASAT capability 
does not represent an increased China threat because the culture of anarchy has changed -  
China is no longer viewed as an aggressive and hostile power (as remains the case in 
Washington). Increasing Chinese military power is no longer the concern that it once 
was, because the ASEAN states now view China to be a cooperative and vital partner ac­
tively (and genuinely) pursuing a foreign policy predicated on peaceful relations and re­
gional stability, multilateral dialogue (ASEAN-style), and mutual benefit in economic 
and security relations. Instead, the ASEAN states believe it very likely that economic 
and political cooperation between China and ASEAN will continue to expand, and the 
process of regional integration will move forward as Sino-ASEAN relations increasingly 
become underwritten by a “Kantian” culture of anarchy. This is not to say that Sino- 
ASEAN relations are currently based on a “Kantian” culture of anarchy, but rather that 
they are increasingly moving toward such a reality. Wendt’s categorical representation 
of differing cultures of anarchy (“Hobbesian,” “Lockean,” and “Kantian”) however, must 
not be viewed in mutually exclusive terms (i.e., Sino-ASEAN relations based solely upon 
either a “Lockean” or a “Kantian” culture of anarchy). Rather, these categories should be 
understood as reference marks on a gradient scale moving from conflictual relations
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(“enemy-enemy” role-identity) at one end to cooperative relations (“partner-partner” or 
“ffiend-friend” role-identities) at the other end of the scale. In addition, the “culture of 
anarchy” underwriting state relations can vary in intensity and scope in different issue 
areas at the same time. For instance, China’s “good neighbor” image among the ASEAN 
states progressed faster in trade and economic relations than it has in security relations. 
Usually, an economic relation between states sharing a troubled past progress faster than 
security relations, but this is not always the case. As mentioned above, the SCO first ad­
dressed security issues before widening the dialogue to include economic relations.
This study’s findings also support China’s “peaceful rise” thesis by challenging 
realist (especially the “offensive” realism of John Mearsheimer) assumptions that rising 
powers seek to establish hegemony and thus must challenge the established power. His­
torical analogies of rising powers are insufficient and do not fit contemporary China. In 
fact, these realist assumptions do not fit with China’s past either. This is not the first time 
in history that China has risen, but rather the fourth such occurrence. In each instance, 
external pressures, combined with internal economic, social and demographic pressures
- 5 0 9
led to dynastic decline. Indeed, there is not a significant history of coercive Chinese 
statecraft. As Shambaugh points out, China’s tributary system, which constituted the 
Asian regional system for more than two and a half millennia, “was characterized by a 
combination of patron-client ties; economic interdependence; security protection for 
those closest to China (especially Korea); cultural assimilation into Confucian customs 
(lai Hua); political ritual (koutou); and benevolent governance (wangdao). The tribute 
system may have been hegemonic, but is was not based on coercion or territorial expan-
382 China was a rising power three times before this current ascendancy (Qin, Sui, and Ming dynasties).
See Wang Gungwu, “The Forth Rise of China: Cultural Implications,” China: An International Journal 2 
no. 9 (September 2004): 311-322.
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sionism. These are essential points to bear in mind when considering China’s new as-
•  • ' l O ' Icendance in Asian affairs.” Our case study of China’s territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea further evidences the possibility that China’s fourth rise to great power status 
will also prove to be peaceful.
383 Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia,” 95.
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